Consciousness and CognitionOur thinking about consciousness and cognition is dominated by a certain very natural conception. This conception dictates what we take the fundamental questions about consciousness and cognition to be as well as the form that their answers must take. In this book, Michael Thau shows that, despite its naturalness, this conception begins with and depends upon a few fundamental errors. Exorcising these errors requires that we completely reconceive the nature of both consciousness and cognition as well as the fundamental problems each poses. Thau proceeds by discussing three famous and important philosophical puzzles - Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White Mary - each of which concerns some aspect of either consciousness or cognition. It has gone unnoticed that at a certain important level of generality, each of these puzzles presents the very same problem and, in bringing out this common problem, the errors in our natural conception of consciousness and cognition are also brought out. Thau's book will appeal to the casual reader interested in the proper solution of these puzzles and the nature of consciousness and cognition. The discussion of Frege's puzzle also contains important insights about the nature of linguistic communication and, hence, anyone interested in the fundamental questions in philosophy of language will also want to read the book. |
Contents
| 3 | |
1 SPECTRUM INVERSION | 13 |
2 THE STRUCTURE OF BELIEF AND PERCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION | 49 |
3 FREGES PUZZLE | 98 |
4 THE STRUCTURE OF LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION | 137 |
5 BLACKANDWHITE MARY | 178 |
Notes | 239 |
| 271 | |
| 277 | |
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Common terms and phrases
ability Alec Guinness Aristotle ascribe bears the belief behavior belief ascriptions belief relation believes that Clark believes that Superman Chapter claim Clark Kent flies color concept consciously constituent conversational implicature convey different information Daily Planet descriptive content descriptive Fregeanism engines are red example explain express fact false Fergie fire engines Frege's puzzle Grice guise Millian Harman hence imply important philosopher information conveyed intentional objects intrinsic surface property intuitions involves Irish pub Lex believes Lex Luthor Lex's lief maxims meaning mental modes of presentation non-descriptive Fregean non-descriptive modes Norm's perceptual experiences philosophy of mind possible worlds proposition propositional knowledge qualia freak qualia freak's view red object red thing relevant representational content seems semantic value sense sense-data sentence Superman someone speaker spectrum inversion subjective difference Superman flies Superman is coming supposed tence tion tomato trivial true truth-value utter the sentence visual perception what's implicated ZF is incomplete
