ἐπὶ guishes be here distin tween sin and punishment. fies through be inflicted grant, which yet we do not in the least, that to sin The apostle sometimes denotes to undergo punishment, yet it cannot signify this here; because the apostle in this place immediately distinguishes between death as the punishment, and sin as the meritorious cause, "and death by sin." And by this interpretation of Grotius, the apostle's discourse, which we have already shown is solid, would be an insipid tautology. For where is the sense to say, "So death passed upon all, through whom all die?" 3dly, Grotius discovers Whether but little judgment in his attempt to prove that ' signisignifies through whom certainly Luke v. 5, T T whom. onuari σov does not signify through thy word, but at thy word, or, as Beza translates, at thy command. And, Heb. ix. 17, ¿πì vεкpois does not signify through the dead, but when dead, and rather denotes a circumstance of time. Acts iii. 16 is alleged with a little more judgment, and 1 Cor. viii. 11 not improperly. But it might be insisted, that in' uoí σrl signifies, it is owing to me, so that the meaning should be, to whom it was owing that all sinned. Which interpretation is not altogether to be rejected. Thus the Scholiast, ἐφ ̓ ὦ 'Αδάμ, δι' όν. And if there was nothing else couched under this, I would easily grant Grotius this explanation of that phraseology. 4thly, It cannot be ex- Punishment plained, consistently with divine justice, how without cannot justly a crime death should have passed upon Adam's pos- on his posterity. Prosper reasoned solidly and elegantly against Collator, c. 20: "Unless, perhaps, it can be said that the punishment, and not the guilt, passed on the posterity of Adam ; but to say this is in every respect false. For it is too impious to judge so of the justice of God; as if he would, contrary to his own law, condemn the innocent with the guilty. The guilt therefore is evident, where the punishment is so; and a partaking in punishment shows a partaking in guilt; that human misery is not the appointment of the Creator, but the retribution of the judge." If, therefore, through Adam all are obnoxious to punishment, all too must have sinned in Adam. 5thly, Chrysostom also is here improperly brought in, as if from Adam he derived only the punishment of death, without partaking in the guilt. For the homily from which the words are quoted begins thus: "When the Jew shall say, How is the world saved by the obedience of one, namely, Christ? You may reply, How was the world condemned by one disobedient Adam ?" Where it is to be observed, 1st, That he supposes the miseries of mankind to proceed from God, as a judge, who cannot justly condemn, but for sin. 2ndly, That he compares the condemnation of the world by Adam's disobedience with its salvation by Christ's obedience. But this last is imputed to believers, and deemed to be theirs; and therefore Adam's sin is in like manner imputed terity with. out sin. to all. As also Gregory of Nazianzen, quoted by Vossius, Hist. Paleg. lib. ii. P. 2. p. 163, said, that Adam's guilt was his. "Alas! my weakness!" says he, "for I derive my weakness from the first parent." It is only sin that is im- XXXV. But we only understand this of Adam's first sin. We cannot agree with those who absurdly tell us that Adam's other sins were also imputed to us; for Paul, when treating on this subject, Rom. v., every where mentions transgression in the singular number; nay expressly, verse 18, one transgression, by which guilt passed upon all. And the reason is manifest; for Adam ceased to be a federal head when the covenant was once broken, and whatever sin he was afterwards guilty of was his own personal sin, and not chargeable on his posterity, unless in so far as God is sometimes pleased to visit the sins of the fathers on the children: in which Adam has now nothing peculiar above other men. So much for the violation of the covenant by man. CHAPTER IX. Of the Abrogation of the Covenant of Works on the The contents J. HAVING sufficiently considered the violation of of the chapter. the covenant by sin, let us now inquire whether, and how far, it is made void or abrogated by God himself. Many things nant of eter II. And first, we are very certain that there are many in this cove- things of immutable and eternal truth in this covenant; nal truth. which we reckon up in this order. 1st, The precepts of the covenant, excepting that probatory one, oblige all and every one to a perfect performance of duty, in what state soever they are. 2dly, Eternal life, promised by the covenant, can be obtained upon no other condition than that of perfect, and in every respect complete, obedience. 3dly, No act of disobedience escapes the vengeance of God, and death is always the punishment of sin. But these maxims do not exclude a surety, who may come under engagements in man's stead, to undergo the penalty and perform the condition. But we shall speak of this afterwards, and now proceed to what has been proposed. to obedience. III. It is indeed a most destructive heresy to main- The sinner is tain that man, sinful and obnoxious to punishment, is still bound not bound to obedience. For by no misconduct of man can God forfeit his right and supremacy. But the right and supremacy of God réquires that man, and even every creature, be subject in all respects to God, so far as possible. Moreover, the rational creature, such as sinful man is, and does continue to be, can be subject, not only to the natural, but also to the moral providence of God; not only to his vindictive justice, but also to his legislative authority: and as he can, so he ought to be subject to him, as to the obligation of obedience; because every possible subjection is essential to the creature. more. IV. If the sinner, who deserves punishment, were otherwise he not subject to the law, he could no longer sin; and could sin no therefore by one sin he would set himself free from the danger of further sinning. For where no law is binding, there is no transgression, no sin, which John defines to be avoμía, "the transgression of the law," 1 John iii. 4. But nothing can be imagined more absurd, than that man by sin has acquired an impeccability. ners would be equal. V. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, all sinners And all sinwould be equal, and an equal degree of punishment remain for every one: which is contrary both to sound reason and scripture, where the inequality of sins and punishment is so often inculcated. The sinner's obligation appears from Gal. v. 3. VI. There is a plain passage, Gal. v. 3, which confirms, that even by the promulgation of the new Gospel covenant, the breakers of the covenant, who are without Christ, are not set free from that obligation of the law which demands perfect obedience, but continue "debtors to do the whole law." VII. Nay, even in a human court, the penal compact and is illusis deemed an additional compact, adding to the principal trated from convention, and consequently not abrogating, but accu- the civil law. mulating, the former obligation. Much less at the bar of God can the obligation to punishment, arising from the violation cf the covenant, abrogate the primary and principal obligation of the law, whereby the covenant was ratified. VIII. Arminius, therefore (in epist. præstantium vi- The opinion rorum, p. 173), very absurdly denies that God, when of Arminius. man once fell from the state of innocence, and became obnoxious to punishment, can of right require obedience of man; as if God had forfeited his right by man's disobedience. He makes use of these arguments: 1st, Because when man is in a state of sin, he is not in covenant with God; therefore, there is no contract between God and man by which he can require obedience: for by what reward, what punishment, can he give sanction to the law, since man, for the disobedience already committed, has forfeited the reward, and is become obnoxious to punishment? 2dly, As God has, because of sin, deprived man of ability and power to fulfil the law, so, by this very thing, he has signified that he will no longer require man to fulfil it, unless he restore his ability; nay, he cannot in justice do it. If any shall say, could therefore the creature be exempted from the right or authority of the Creator, as no longer to be bound to obey him? he answers, yes, indeed, if the creature be accursed, and the Creator reckon it unworthy to require obedience from it; for it is the highest punishment so to conclude the sinner under sin as not to require any more obedience from him, that being an evidence of irreconcileable anger; namely, in that state. 3dly, The law itself, to be performed, is such as it would be unbecoming it should be performed by a sinner who is out of the favour of God. He is commanded to have God for his God; to love, honour, and adore him; to put his trust in him, to use his name with reverence, &c. Is it probable that such an obedience is required of him who is under the curse of God? Thus far Arminius, whose arguments deserve to be carefully examined. It is false, that all obligation pro ceeds from the covenant. IX. We begin with the first. Arminius supposes a great many things in this argument, which we cannot admit; such as, that all the obligation of man arises. from the covenant; that the law does not oblige but in so far as it is enforced by rewards and punishments; that God cannot threaten a greater punishment, after man is once become obnoxious to the penalty. Now, since we deny all this, so, if we prove them to be false, as we hope to do, there will not remain the least appearance of force in this argument. The obligation of man to obedience is not founded, first and principally, on a covenant, but in the supereminent sovereignty, majesty, and holiness of God; and every rational creature, from a consideration of these, is bound to be subject to his sovereignty, adore his majesty, and form himself according to the example of his holiness. God would not be the absolute sovereign, if any rational creature existed which was not bound to take the rule of its actions from him, and which therefore, in regarding its actions, was not subject to God. God would not be the Supreme Majesty, if there were any rational creature who was not bound to acknowledge, worship, adore, and be subject to him in every respect. God would not be perfect in holiness, if any rational creature existed who was not bound to acknowledge that holiness, as most worthy of its imitation. As God is such a being, he cannot but require to be acknowledged to be so. The creature cannot acknowledge him in this manner without owning its obligation, at the same time, to obey him, who is the first, the most high and most holy God. Which we have already ex And that the law does not obligate, but of the sanction of rewards plained and proved more fully, chap. iii. sect. viii. Moreover, it is not true, that the law is not binding, but because of the sanction of rewards and punishments. The principal obligation of the law arises from the authority of the lawgiver, and the perfect equity of and punishall his commands. Though God had enforced his law ments, neither by rewards nor punishments, we had been no less bound to obedience: lest self-love, whereby we are led to obtain the reward and avoid the penalty, should be the only motive to stir us up to obey God, the reverence of the Supreme Being, and the love of holiness, are to hold the chief place here. In fine, it is also false, that no further punishment will be inflicted, after that man, having once broken the covenant, is become obnoxious to the penalty; for there are degrees in condemnation. And if that were true, it would not take off the obligation to obedience. It would not be lawful for a robber, condemned to be burnt alive, or broken on the wheel, or to the most cruel death that man can devise, to commit, in the mean time, a new capital crime. For, as we have said, the obligation arises neither primarily nor chiefly from the penal sanction, but from the authority of the lawgiver. And that no further punishment can be in flicted on man when he had broken the Covenant. quire obe a God has right to redience from unable to man, though give it. X. To the second, I answer: 1st, Man himself is not only the meritorious, but also the physical, cause of his own impotence, which he brought upon himself by his misconduct as if an insolent and naughty servant should put out the candle, by which he ought to carry on his master's business; or, by drinking to excess, willingly render himself unfit for the service of his master. In this case, that master does by no means forfeit his right of requiring every piece of service properly due to him, and of punishing that naughty servant for non-performance. 2dly, Though God, as a just judge, had deprived man of ability to fulfil the law, yet, on that account, he both will in point of right, and can, require the performance of it by man. He can very justly; because no wickedness of man, justly punished by God, can diminish God's authority over him; otherwise, it would be in man's power, at his own pleasure, either to extend or limit the authority of God; which is contrary to the immutable perfection and blessedness of God. He also does require this for wise reasons; of which this is one, that sinful man may, by that means, be convinced of his irreparable misery, upon finding such things justly required of him, which he has rendered himself incapable to perform. And since he is as unwilling as unable to obey God, he is the more inexcusable, the more clearly the duty of the law is inculcated upon him. 3dly, It is absurd to say, that God's not it is the greatest punishment that God inflicts on man, dience from requiring obe |