the notion that Pennsylvania lay courts have a right to intermeddle with Episcopal jurisdiction.

From this absurd and illegal sentence the Bishop appealed to the Supreme Court of the State. This body being at the time, as charity would suggest, more equitably disposed than of late, sent the case back to be tried once more in Lycoming County Court. A Master in Chancery was appointed by the judge to examine more fully the facts, evidence, etc., and report upon the same. The Report, filed in January, 1875, was clear, logical, and comprehensive. It showed that Mr. Stack had no case, and that the Bishop had in no way made himself amenable to the civil law by his conduct, having only exercised a spiritual jurisdiction which the priest had voluntarily bound himself at the time of his ordination to obey. But this did not suit the purpose of those who were bent on harassing the Bishop in the exercise of his spiritual authority, and promoting rebellion and disaffection amongst worldly-minded priests. The Report, instead of being received, was, after nearly three years' delay, set aside by Judge Gamble, who further took it upon himself to qualify this able paper as " hasty and superficial.” The Judge reaffirmed his former decision, viz., that the removal of Mr. Stack, and the prohibition of his exercise of priestly functions in Williamsport were unlawful, that it was inexpedient to reinstate Mr. Stack, and, finally, that the Bishop be condemned to pay “the costs accruing from the cause, including the examiner's and master's charges, with expense of printing." Against this sentence, so manifestly unjust to both parties, both appealed. Whether the appeal on the part of the refractory priest was withdrawn or not is unknown to the writer. The name of the Bishop, as sole appellant, appears in the heading of the final decision of the Supreme Court, which was rendered October 14th, 1879. The appeal was dismissed, and the Bishop, besides former costs and charges, was condemned to pay the additional expenses of the appeal.

It has been said that the sentence of November 13th, 1877, now indorsed by the Supreme Court, was unjust to both sides; and it may be well to examine how far this is true with respect to the plaintiff, who has been for the last eight or nine years not only a mere suitor for justice at the hands of the County Court, but manifestly its theological guide. Judge Gamble and the judges of the highest State court all agree that the priest has been wronged. Then why do they not redress the wrong? If his

rights of property" (this is their favorite expression) have been wrested from him by fraud or violence, why are they not restored? For what other end than this were courts of justice instituted? Their very name implies as much. Justice, even for Pagan sages and lawyers, meant that every man should have his own, suum

cuique tribuere, as it has been defined by Ulpian. A "court of justice" means a tribunal organized by and representing civilized society, and which by the strong arm of the law upholds the citizen in the possession of what is his own, or restores it to him after due investigation, when he has been unjustly deprived of the same. But Pennsylvania justice, as expounded by its Supreme Bench, means neither of these things. Her judges cry out against wrong, but refuse to right the citizen who has been wronged. They sympathize with him and shed tears, figuratively speaking, over his misfortune. But it was not for this empty purpose that courts and judges were created by society. Any citizen can give his share of pity to the victim of misfortune or wrong, and it will be accepted at its just value. But when I see my neighbor wronged and refuse to right him, though it is my duty and I have the power to do it, should I, instead of help, tender him my sympathy, he will spurn it as hollow and unmeaning, or resent it as an insult. Well, at least they investigate wrong, discover and denounce it. Even if they do, what is that worth if they lack the will or the power to redress it? The editor of a newspaper can do as much, and often more effectually. A court that has no remedy for injustice has no right to investigate; for since the cure of the evil does not lie in its hands, neither does the investigation lie within its province.

They cannot plead ignorance of the proper remedy. The plaintiff, whose words they seem to look upon as oracles, has often and plainly enough told them not only wherein lies his grievance, but wherein consists the proper mode of redress. He has been unjustly deprived of the revenue of the Williamsport church, and he demands to be reinstated as pastor. Why is the injustice of the deprivation admitted and decreed, and the remedy, the reinstatement, refused? Oh, no! exclaims Judge Gamble. I have not refused exactly; I tried to reinstate the plaintiff seven years ago, and would have done it had I been allowed, but the Supreme Court dissolved the injunction. In 1877 I again boldly reaffirmed that foul injustice had been committed, but on reflection decided that to remedy such injustice would be "inexpedient," " unwise, and injudicious." (Opinion and Decree, p. 49.) Oh, yes! cries out the Supreme Bench, in chorus; he ought to have prevented or remedied this violation of the rights of property, which is "contrary to the supreme law of the land," but he "thought it unwise " to do so. (Opinion of Supreme Court, delivered by Judge Mercur.) Expediency, then, and wisdom, worldly wisdom, are sufficient reasons for a judge to sanction the peaceful, unmolested triumph of fraud, robbery, and injustice over the rights of property and injured innocence, though a word of his might prevent it! It is expediency, not the eternal law of justice, that determines what is

right and what is wrong! There may be among the occupants of that bench those who, for aught the writer knows, are in the habit of taunting the Catholic Church with this very doctrine. Whether Catholics so believe or not, this is no place to examine. There must be something in the doctrine to recommend it, since Pennsylvania judges hold it and follow it in practice. But the character and grounds of this expediency deserve a little closer scrutiny. Let us hear the explanation from the judges themselves.

"A decree of restoration as asked for . . . . is deemed inexpedient under existing circumstances. Whatever may have been the condition of the Church of the Annunciation (Williamsport), its attachments and relations towards the plaintiff six years ago, it is now apparently harmonious and content. The wise and prudent course of their present pastor has secured to him their confidence and regard, which it would be unwise and injudicious to disturb." (Opinion, p. 49.)

All this reads very prettily, but, casting aside its verbiage, what is its substance? The plaintiff was unjustly deprived of his rights of property. Not content with this, the Bishop, who deprived him, sent another to enjoy these usurped rights and property. The plaintiff goes into court to recover his lost possession. The judge warmly espouses his cause and decrees his restoration; but an appeal causes loss of time, and when the judge is again ready to give sentence he once more denounces the injustice, but will do nothing to remedy the wrong which he officially recognizes. And why? The usurper who now holds the place by unlawful seizure, is well liked by the congregation, and gets on very well with them; so well, indeed, that it would be a pity to disturb him in the possession of his stolen goods! This is the plain English of the paragraph when stripped of its rhetoric. To illustrate still more Judge Gamble's theory of law and justice being made subservient to expediency, let me propose a case, which is quite in point, as he must admit. A landlord, by lease or other mode of legal tenure, grants, for twenty or thirty years (say a lifetime), a large tract of land to A. The latter makes the best use of his newly acquired possession, with its "rights and emoluments," improving the land, dividing it into small farms, and subletting to a numerous tenantry. In a year or two the capricious landlord gets tired of his bargain with A. In defiance of justice, and in spite of the lease, which holds good in law, he summarily evicts A and gives his place to B. A applies to the court for protection of his rights of property; the judge promises he shall have it, and, as a preliminary step, grants an injunction. This is followed by an appeal and counter litigation of some years. When the judge is at last free to pronounce sentence, he begins by denouncing the unlawful outrage that had been committed on A's rights of property, and assures him that his heart bleeds for the cruel injustice he has suffered and is yet suf

fering, for his wrong is "serious, irreparable, and continuing (Opinion of Judge Gamble, p. 47). He then goes on to say: "It would give me great pleasure to restore the plaintiff to the possession of his legitimate rights, and I would do so did I not deem it. inexpedient under existing circumstances. Whatever may have been the condition of the tenantry, its attachments and relations towards the plaintiff years ago, it is now apparently harmonious and content. Mr. B is such a nice man, and has acted so wisely and prudently, that the neighbors and tenants have become quite fond of him. It would be a pity, it would be unwise and injudicious to disturb the kindly relations existing between them." What would Judge Gamble and his brother judges of the higher court think of this decision? Let them not condemn it, for it is their own. It is the very way in which they have dealt with Mr. Stack. If he has not a good case to-day he never had one. If expediency now can warrant the leaving him without redress, it is plain that he never was the victim of injustice. Winning ways with tenantry or with a congregation can never legitimate usurpation of rights of property; and it was on the rights of property that Mr. Stack based his claim for redress, not on the good will and attachment of his parishioners.

It is hard to believe that men whose position compels them daily to scrutinize narrowly what is adduced as evidence, to pursue and detect error lurking under cover of specious argument, could have been so misled by their own sophistry as to really take for granted that there was a time at any stage of the case when it was wise or expedient, or at all possible, for them to restore Mr. Stack to his pastoral office. Not all the law courts of the State, nor Congress, with its legitimate, or even its lately assumed, powers could do it, without first rooting out of existence the American Constitution, and the principles on which it rests. It is a pity they did not try to do as well as talk, and make the attempt to quash the Bishop's spiritual jurisdiction and force a pastor bearing their commission on a reluctant congregation! They did not attempt it because they knew it was impossible, and because failure, which they knew to be inevitable, would cover them with shame and ridicule. This, perhaps, furnishes the true key to explain the words, inexpedient and unwise. They may be only mild expressions to avoid the use of that unpleasant word impossible, and to smooth the descent from their own lofty promises and the great expectations they had encouraged in the plaintiff. So that all the fine talk about restoration to rights of property, reinstatement in the pastorate due to plaintiff, but unfortunately hindered by the agreeable relations now existing between the congregation and the present occupant, had no meaning, was in fact mere Buncombe! The old-fashioned, unprogressive

judges of a former generation, to their credit, knew as little of this language as of its name.

In their Opinion the Pennsylvania judges are never tired of repeating that the plaintiff had rights of property in the Williamsport church. This church has no revenues, but depends on the voluntary contributions of the members, which are of their nature fluctuating and uncertain. Granting, however, that it was fixed, certain revenue or property, and that plaintiff had a right to it, of what nature was that right? Was it absolute, indefeasible right, derived from inheritance, free gift, lawful purchase, or any other way known to the law by which ownership comes? Evidently not. The right to the property or its use, for he could have no more, was purely conditional. As long as he was the pastor he was entitled to its use; as soon as he ceased to be pastor, ipso facto his right and title were forfeited. How does a priest cease to be pastor? According to the discipline hitherto prevalent in these United States, by death, resignation, or removal. The bishop, who has the removing power, removes sometimes for cause assigned; at others without giving any reason. But in either case the removal holds equally good. The system occasionally works harm and suffering. But for this the civil court has no remedy; and the priest has bound himself at his ordination to abide by it "for better, for worse."

It is scarcely worth while to notice the ludicrous way in which the judges set about proving that the Williamsport church revenues, though derived from voluntary sources, are constant and certain. Instead of consulting the Church treasurer's book they have consulted the Catechism, and found there that Catholics are bound by precept of the Church to support their pastors. Therefore Rev. Mr. Stack, as pastor, had a certain support. In the first place it is too kind of them to take for granted that Catholics never fail in this as in other duties. But admitting that a congregation never fails to support its "pastor," would Mr. Stack be such if, after having been removed by his bishop, he were imposed on the congregation by a court of lay judges? And if not considering him their lawful pastor they should use their own discretion in interpreting the Catechism and refuse to support him, would their refusal have to be remedied by pains and penalties at the hands of the same lay court? It is to be feared that these wise judges were nodding, not to see the mass of absurdities to which their arguments open the door.

But, they add, “a priest's profession is his property." As long as he has spiritual jurisdiction from proper authority, no doubt. But a lay court can neither give nor take away that jurisdiction. Let them look at their own profession. The name of an attorney, who has by the study of a lifetime qualified himself for the law and for nothing else, may be stricken from the rolls at any moment by