because it is the Government, without a reference to its composition or its measures, are equally beyond the reach of statutable provisions. Jobbers and party-men only remain. No one, who regards the independence of Parliament, will say a word in favour of Jobbers: But of Party-men there are two descriptions. Those who derive their seats from their personal weight and popularity, or from the confidence and good opi-. nion of their private friends, without the assistance of ministerial patronage, whether they vote for ministers or opposition, contribute in no degree to increase the influence of the Crown in the House of Commons. But those, who are brought into Parliament by the Treasury, or other departments of the Government, though equally honest in their votes and conduct with the others, are the persons that, with the Tories and the Jobbers, enable a government, otherwise weak and incapable, to maintain itself in power, long after it has lost the confidence and support of the country. If the object, then, of Parliamentary reform is to lessen the influence of the Crown, by diminishing the number of members in the House of Commons, who will support any, administration that has the favour and countenance of the Court, these are the persons to be excluded, if possible, from the House. Let us consider, then, by what avenues Jobbers and Treasury members usually find admission into that assembly.

The House of Commons may be divided into county members; representatives of cities and boroughs that have at least five hundred resident voters; representatives of places that have less than five hundred resident voters; and members for close boroughs.

1. Counties.-We know of no practical defect in our county representation, except that the great size of the counties, and consequent expense of contested elections, deprive the electors, in nine cases out of ten, of the substantial choice of their representative, because no man can afford to bring the freeholders of a great county to the poll, without a large fortune of his own, or a liberal subscription from his friends. We see no effectual remedy for this defect, but to diminish the size, and increase the number of the counties. It has been proposed to take the votes of the different hundreds in succession; but it is doubtful whether this expedient would lessen the expense of the election; and it is certain that it would prolong the duration of the contest. It has been also proposed to take, on the same day, the votes of every parish in the county, and to send the returns to the county town, to be there examined and compared, and the result proclaimed by the sheriff. A better expedi

ent, as it seems to us, could not well be devised, to deaden the spirit of a country, and extinguish all the pride and conse quence arising from the exercise of political rights;-an election by lot or raffle, could hardly produce less sympathy or connexion between the representative and his constituents. Some have recommended, that the elective franchise should be extended to copyholders; but unless this were accompanied by a reduction of the size of the counties, it would only multiply the number of voters, and increase the expense of elections. Others have suggested, that we should raise the qualification of freeholders, and confine the right of suffrage to men of independent circumstances. To this we object, that it would throw the county elections into the hands of the squires, and convert the squires into jobbers. This is our Scotch system of representation; and we know too well the effects of it in our own country, to recommend it with a safe conscience to our neighbours. The yeomanry and small freeholders may be influenced in their votes by the great proprietors, who are their neighbours or their landlords. But it is better that they should be led by kindness and courtesy, than that the county should be delivered over at every election to the minister.

County members stand much in awe of their constituents. Whenever public opinion is strongly expressed on any subject, we commonly find a large proportion of county members swimming with the stream, whatever course it takes. But at other times, unless decidedly party men, they are not inaccessible to the influence of the Treasury. They have so many measures to carry, and so many favours to ask for their constituents, that they are under strong temptations to support, in general, the existing government; and the slighter the tenure by which they hold their seats, the more subject are they to this influence. But there are limits to their support of any administration; and, in point of independence, there is no comparison between them, and members returned by ministerial patronage.

2. Towns having more than 500 resident voters. In some of these places, the right of suffrage is vested in the householders; in others, it is confined to freemen; and, in some again, it is enjoyed by both. The first constitute the most democratical part of our representation; and the members they send to Parliament may be considered the virtual representatives of the lower orders throughout the kingdom. In the two last, the elections are less democratical; but they might be equally independent, were it not for the votes of non-resident freemen, who are brought to the poll at an immense expense, and are, in general, ready to vote for any candidate, who will indulge them in

the riot and idleness of an election. On this subject we have expressed our opinion freely in a former Number, * and conceive it unnecessary to add a word to what we have there stated. The only effectual remedy for this evil is, to make residence a necessary qualification, to enable freemen of a corporation to give their votes at elections. The effect of the present system is to give an influence to money, without regard to character or to principle.

3. Towns having less than 500 resident voters, but not so much reduced in population and consequence, as to have become the undisputed property of an individual. Places of this description are the great source from which jobbers derive their seats, and Government its undue influence in the House of Commons. In a former Number, we have attempted a sketch of the manner in which this infamous traffic is carried on. But the modes of conducting it are various. It is sometimes managed by a Club or Society of the Electors. At other times it is in the hands of the Attorney, or Parson of the place, who act on behalf of their brethren. Sometimes the whole negotiation passes through the Treasury. At other times, his Majesty's government acts merely as a broker between the parties. Where the manager has acquired secure possession of his borough, he is sometimes tempted by a larger price to dispose of his seats to persons in opposi tion; but the necessity in which he is usually placed, of maintaining his influence by government patronage, renders him in general a faithful servant of administration; and, when ministers are changed, he transfers his allegiance to their successors. There was a borough-monger some years ago, who could return twelve members to the House of Commons; and, but for a misfortune that happened to him in the course of his trade, it was generally understood, that he was in a fair way of obtaining a peerage for his services. These illegal practices, however adroitly conducted, are sometimes brought to light, and in the instances of Shoreham and Cricklade, they were so clearly detected, that the boroughs were disfranchised by Act of Parliament, and thrown, the one into the rape of Bramber, and the other into the adjacent hundreds. We should recommend the extension of this principle to all boroughs of this description, where the election has been vacated under the Grenville act, on the ground of bribery and corruption proved against a majority or large proportion of the electors. But, instead of throwing the seats into the adjoining hundreds, we should recommend transferring them to the larger counties, which would at once

* No. 39.

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June increase the or arty representation, and enable us to remedy the only defect in our present county elections. Yorkshire might in the manner be gradually divided into three or four separate districts; Lincolnshire, Devonshire, and other large courtles into two; and some additional scot and lot boroughs might be created in large unrepresented towns. By this operation, the independence of the House of Commons would be gradually improved, at the expense of that part of it which is most under the infrence of ministers. The electors of the disfranchised boroughs, who were not disqualified by their participation in acts of bribery, might be declared freeholders of the county.

4. Close Boroughs, the members for which are returned by one or two indivi usls, without assistance from government, and without the risk of a contest. Against this description of boroughs, the strongest prejudices in general prevail. We are far from considering them the worst part of our representative System. The members for close boroughs are often the men of greatest talent and independence in the House. There is one advantage attending their situation, which belongs to no other description of persons. Firmness to oppose the People, is sometimes as necessary a quality, as independence to resist the Crown. But the members for close boroughs are the only persons in the House who stand in awe neither of the Crown nor of the People. County members are in constant dread of their constituents; and though this is on the whole a salutary terror, it prevents them from resisting popular clamour, when the clamour of the people is unfounded and unjust. The proprietors of close boroughs are, in general, party men, and dispose of their seats to persons of the same way of thinking with themselves. This, however, is not universally the case. There are instances where close boroughs are made objects of traffic at the Treasury, by persons who have no party connexion with the existing administration. But if the lists of the House of Commons for the last forty years were consulted, we should find that a large proportion of the steadiest advocates of the people have been members for close boroughs.

On Triennial parliaments, we have only a few words to offer. We doubt whether frequent elections are favourable to the independence of the House of Commons. We fear the tendency of short Parliaments is to increase the power of government, by breaking down and destroying all independent opposition. Let no one imagine that by penal laws, or other devices, he can prevent the expense of elections. While a seat in the House of Commons is an object of desire, it will be an object of expense. But the pecuniary cost on such occasions is, in general, greatest

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on the side of Opposition. The friends of Ministry have the aid and influence of government patronage in support of their pretensions; and the more frequently elections are repeated, the greater is the amount of this advantage over their opponents.Short Parliaments, it must be owned, would lessen the terrors of a dissolution, which, after the examples of 1784 and 1807, must have great effect in destroying the spirit and independence of the House of Commons. The advisers of these two measures may be justly reckoned among the men who, in our times, have done the most irreparable injury to the constitutional liberties of their country.

* While the preceding sheets have been passing through the press, some additional authorities have occurred to us in support of the argument stated above, that the suitors of the county courts, and original electors of knights of the shire, were freeholders of all descriptions, whether holding in chief of the King, or of a subject superior.

In the rolls of Parliament [I. 15.], there is a grant of Richard I. to the Bishop of Coventry, and his successors in that see,-" ut omnes homines sui-in perpe"tuum liberi sint et quieti-de sectis Shir' & Hundr'." Among the Placita in Parliamento 19. Edw. I. [Rolls, I. 69.], there is a case between William Martin and William de Valenciis, which proves that subtenants owed suit and presence in the same courts; and there is a question between the Crown and William de Breouse 50. Edw. I. [Rolls, I. 148.], which proves the same.

ART. V. The Narrative of ROBERT ADAMS, a Sailor, who was wrecked on the Western Coast of Africa in the Year 1810; was detained three Years in Slavery by the Arabs of the Great Desert; and Resided several months in the City of Tombuctoo. With a Map, Notes, and an Appendix. 4to. pp. 272. don, Murray. 1816.

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E have more than once had occasion to suggest, that the accounts received from persons accidentally led to visit the interior of Africa, might possibly afford that information regarding its great towns and rivers, which the enterprize of professed travellers has hitherto failed to procure; and we have hinted, that the regular journeys of the caravans for commercial purposes, might furnish an opportunity of sending some African of intelligence from the neighbourhood of the coast, to the most inland parts, and of learning through him the state of those distant and interesting regions. It still remains unexplained, why no such means of investigation have ever been attempted. There must surely be negroes of sufficient information in the colony of Sierra Leone, if no Moor should be found trustworthy for the proposed undertaking. To join one of the Bb

VOL. XXVI. NO. 52.