of refuge for their fishermen. Upon this proposal the Duke of Newcastle writes as follows to the Earl of Hardwicke:

"August 7th, 1761.

"THE method I would propose to your consideration is this, that after M. Bussy has received and executed his orders, and Mr. Pitt has had Mr. Stanley's full account and observations which he has promised, we should propose to state our real ultimatum, which we should make as low and as near to that we may judge would be accepted as possible. The great point is that of the fisheries; the rest, I think, may be accommodated.

"Whether there is a right to fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, or whether that part of the sea is properly called Mare Clausum or Mare Liberum,* I can't pretend to say, but it is what Mr. Pitt has ever been fencing against, and is, to be sure, in itself a considerable question in point of interest and navigation. The next point is the giving some unfortified place, a port in those seas as a place of refreshment or refuge for their seamen.

"But the great point to be thoroughly weighed and considered is what will, what must be the consequence of our breaking off this negociation for peace, and continuing this dangerous and expensive war, and whether after many more millions spent, and many thousand more valuable lives lost, we may not be in a condition to accept a much worse peace than we even

* This is in allusion to two celebrated treatises by Selden and Grotius in the preceding century.

26

LORD HARDWICKE

[1761.

now may have, and infinitely worse than we might have had three years ago."

At the same time that M. de Bussy presented the French ultimatum to our Government, he wrote to Mr. Pitt to beg for a conference upon its contents. The British Minister drew up an answer to the application, and laid it before the Cabinet Council on the 13th of the month; "Not," writes the Duke of Devonshire, "as a document to be deliberated upon, but as a decision to be adopted."*

This statement is confirmed in the following letter, which furnishes a forcible illustration of the haughty tone which Pitt habitually adopted towards such of his colleagues as happened to differ from him.

EARL OF HARDWICKE TO VISCOUNT ROYSTON.

"Grosvenor Square, August 15th, 1761.

"TIRED with the attendance of two very long disagreeable days, I sit down to thank you for your kind letter of the 11th. Our first meeting was on Thursday (13th), when we sat from half-an-hour past one till half-an-hour past seven; and yesterday (14th), from two till half-an-hour after five. Very stormy they were; but we rid out the tempest. Mr. P had no conference with Bussy, though the latter had asked one by letter. The reasons assigned for declining it,

* Wiffen's House of Russell, ii. 472. "M. de Bussy to Mr. Pitt.

August 5th, 1761:- If your

were taken from some passages in the letter, relative to the return of the French memorial concerning Spain, and of the other concerning the King of Prussia's countries and places conquered by the arms of France;* but more particularly by reason of a strong complaint made of the Ton impératif et peu fait pour la négotiation,' used in the letter, sending back those two memorials, and in the paper of points. We know that the draught of Bussy's letter was transmitted to him in hæc verba by the Duc de Choiseul, with orders to send it as it was. You guess who was much hurt by this; though in my conscience, I think the balance of words is still on our side. After much altercation, and some thumps of the fist on the table, it was at last carried (on my motion), that the conference should be had; but not without an answer to Bussy's letter, by which the interview was to be appointed. The meeting of yesterday was professedly upon the draught of that answer. It was produced much too long and too irritating. + Several objections were humbly made, and strongly supported; but not a word would be parted with. We would not suffer our draught to be cobbled!' Neither side receded, but it will go as drawn. If, after this letter,

excellency is desirous of having a conference with me on the subject of the ultimatum, I will attend your commands.”—Par. Hist. xv. 1055.

French Ultimatum.-"As to what concerns Wesel, Gueldres, and other countries in Westphalia, belonging to the King of Prussia, which are actually in the possession of the Empress Queen, the King (of France) cannot stipulate to surrender the conquests of his allies." -Par. Hist. + See Parliamentary History, xv. 1059.

28

CHARACTER OF

[1761.

Bussy agrees to the conference without fresh orders from his Court, I shall think it a good sign, that France has no mind to break off the negociation. A long letter was read from your friend Stanley,* of just half a quire of folio paper, in a close hand. It is a very able one, though with a mixture of flights and improprieties. But he says in so many words, that he is absolutely convinced and sure, that the French Court will as soon part with a province of old France, as with the entire fishery, and that he is no more attended to when he talks upon that subject, than if he talked of Japan. M. de Choiseul says he should be pulled to pieces in the streets of Paris. There are also some civil but strong observations upon the style of his principal,† which you may be sure contributed not a little to the ill-humour. I remember Sir Robert Walpole used to say that two nations might be writ into a war, and so I think they may into perpetuating a war."

All the members of the Whig cabinet were opposed to this warlike policy, with the exception of Pitt himself, and his brother-in-law Lord Temple. But the real, if not the acknowledged leader of the advocates of peace, was John Russell, fourth Duke of Bedford. Upon him alone the loud thunders and supercilious bearing of the great commoner, made no impression.

"Article IV. of the answer of the British Minister to the ultimatum of France."-See Par. Hist. xv. 1063.

+ Mr. Pitt.

"When they wanted to combat Pitt," says Horace Walpole, "they always summoned the Duke of Bedford." The noble author of the Reform Bill, has, I think, successfully rescued his great grandfather's reputation from the virulence of Junius and other assailants. For that virulence, there were at the time many pretexts. The Duke's character presented several points of attack to his adversaries. His abilities were rather solid than brilliant. He was an inelegant speaker; although, in the opinion of an admirable judge of parliamentary eloquence,* "he was not without some reasoning matter, and method." But neither by his oratory nor by his pen was he qualified to demolish argument, or to blunt and intimidate invective. He filled with credit to himself, many of the highest offices in the state, and while at the head of the Admiralty, contributed greatly to improve the efficiency of the navy. His feelings were naturally warm; but neither in friendship nor in enmity was he very discriminating. He was more under the influence of domestic and social prepossessions, than was quite salutary for his public character: for his relations were Tories, and his companions profligates, and the prejudices and excesses of his own circle reacted upon his own estimation with the world. Hence the Duke of Bedford was often held responsible for errors of conduct from which he was himself really exempt. In his case, the proverb "noscitur ex sociis," was applied in its full extent, and to his general disadvantage. Partly through the vices im

*Chesterfield.