That following this revision there shall be periodical revisions of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China every seven years for the same purpose in lieu of the decennial revision authorized by existing treaties with China.

That in order to prevent delay such periodical revisions shall be effected in accordance with rules to be settled by the special conference mentioned in Article I herein.

IV. That in all matters relating to customs duties there shall be effective equality of treatment and of opportunity for all Powers parties to this convention.

V. That the principle of uniformity in the rate of customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China is hereby recognized; that the special conference above provided for shall make arrangements to give practical effect to this principle; and it is authorized to make equitable adjustments in those cases in which the customs privilege to be abolished was granted in return for some local economic advantage.

In the meantime, any increase in the rates of customs duties resulting from tariff revision or any surtax hereafter imposed, in pursuance of the present convention, shall be levied at a uniform rate ad valorem at all land and maritime frontiers of China.

VI. That the charge for transit passes shall be at the rate of 2 per cent ad valorem, until the arrangements contemplated in Article I herein come into force.

VII. That the powers not signatory to this convention, but whose present treaties with China provide for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per cent ad valorem, shall be invited to adhere to the present convention, and upon such adherence by all of them this convention shall override all provisions of treaties between China and the respective contracting powers which are inconsistent with its terms.

That the United States Government, as convener of the present conference, undertake to make the necessary communications for this purpose and to inform the Governments of the contracting powers of the replies received.

VIII. Ratification clause of usual form.

Mr. Root said that, in accordance with the resolution already adopted, there should be inserted some words in Article VII, so that it would read:

That the powers not signatory to this convention having Governments at present recognized by the powers represented at this conference, but whose present treaties with China provide for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per cent ad valorem, shall be invited to adhere to the present convention, and upon such adherence by all of them this convention shall override all provisions of treaties between China and the respective contracting powers which are inconsistent with its terms.

Mr. Root said, with reference to the first paragraph of Article III, that the sense of the paragraph was that, following the immediate revision of the schedules or duties which the commission would raise under the resolution that had been adopted, there should be a further revision to take effect at the expiration of four years following the completion of the aforesaid revision in order to insure that the customs duties should correspond to the ad valorem rates fixed by the special conference as in the treaty. It was not to make the customs duties correspond to the ad valorem rates in force, but to the ad valorem rates fixed by the special conference, and to make the customs duties correspond to the new ad valorem rates, if there should be any, not the ad valorem rates already in force.

Mr. Sarraut said that he would ask to be enlightened with respect to Article I, especially with respect to the phrase "and other powers which adhere to this convention to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of likin and for the fulfillment of the other conditions laid down in Article VIII of the treaty

of September 5, 1902, between Great Britain and China, in Articles IV and V of the treaty of October 8, 1903, between the United States and China, and in Article I of the supplementary treaty of October 8, 1903, between Japan and China, with a view to levying the surtaxes provided in those articles."

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Mr. Sarraut said he believed that there had been certain changes from the first text prepared by Mr. Kammerer in which special reference had been made to Articles IV and VIII of the treaties between the United States and China and to Article I of the supplementary treaty of October 8 between Japan and China." These references had not been made in the original text. Referring to the text of these treaties, Mr. Sarraut said he would like to ask the following questions: Was it the intention of the articles as drafted to oblige all nations to bind themselves by the terms of the most-favored-nation clause or was this done by error? If an automatic application of the most-favored-nation clause was intended, he must make a reservation, as his own Government might not agree. He believed that it would be better to omit the clauses referring to the most-favored-nation clause or to say that it was not desired to apply them automatically.

Mr. Root said the treaties referred to in Article I were the same treaties which were referred to in the original report of the committee on Chinese revenue. The only difference was that this draft specified the particular articles of those treaties which were supposed to be relevant to the subject matter of this instrument. It was rather to limit than to enlarge

the reference in the original report, and the conditions which were referred to in Article I were the conditions upon which the powers entering into these treaties with China undertook to consent to the increase of duties; i. e., they agreed to consent to an increase of duties on condition that China did thus and so. No conditions were imposed upon any other power, so that no obligation whatsoever could be found in this article upon any of the powers other than China in respect of the most-favored-nation clauses. That was his understanding of it.

Mr. Sarraut said that he took note of Mr. Root's statements, and would refer to them, if necessary. He felt he must point out, however, that if the text of the resolutions alone was considered it did not directly appear that the most-favored-nation clause did not automatically apply. In view of Mr. Root's explanation, however, he would not insist further upon the matter.

Sir Auckland Geddes said he assumed that it was quite clear this was the way in which he read this paragraph-that, so far as the treaties in question bound countries other than China at the present time, they would bind only those countries afterwards, and that the provisions, for instance, of the ChineseAmerican treaty would not be extended to ChineseBritish? Mr. Root said he had no doubt of that.

A vote being taken, the draft agreements and resolutions were then unanimously approved by the Committee of the Whole. However, before being reported to the Conference in plenary session, these agreements were further discussed and amended in the last ses

sion of the Committee when they were brought before it in what was then expected to be their final form.

Mr. Balfour at that time raised the point that, as then drafted, the reform of the Chinese tariff which all the Delegations desired would not come into effect until every Power that had a treaty with China providing for an export and import tariff of not greater than five per cent had given its adherence to the agreements then before the Committee. He suggested, therefore, that there should be inserted in the draft the words "the provisions of the present treaty shall override all stipulations of treaties between China and the respective Powers which are inconsistent therewith, other than stipulations according mostfavored-nation treatment." The effect of this provision would of course be that so long as any Power, not party to the proposed treaty, should refuse adherence to it, and therefore, under its treaties with China, be entitled to claim of China that imports from itself to China or exports from China to itself should not bear a tariff higher than five per cent, the other Powers, signatory to the treaty would themselves be entitled to make the same claim upon China.

Senator Underwood's View as to Power of China to Denounce Tariff Treaties. This proposal gave to Senator Underwood an opportunity, in supporting Mr. Balfour's amendment, to make an argument with regard to China's obligations under her tariff treaties that is of sufficient interest to deserve quotation. As reported in the Minutes of the Committee, Senator Underwood said: