proposal which it was known in advance would not be favorably acted upon by the Conference, for, by failure to obtain action, the existing status quo would be rendered all the more fixed. Such being the case, a Delegation concerned would be justified in asking of the Conference action which it knew would be refused only if it were convinced that the disadvantage resulting from such refusal would be more than compensated for by the moral advantage of publicly asserting upon its part a policy that it deemed just and by thus, as it were, bringing before the bar of the conscience of the world those nations that would oppose it, or whose past actions had not been consistent with it. In two conspicuous instances the Powers concerned deemed it thus desirable to bring before the Conference matters upon which it was practically known that no favorable action could be obtained. The United States Delegation presented a severe indictment of Japan's policies in Eastern Siberia, and the Chinese Delegation brought forward the question of the fundamental validity of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Agreements of May 25, 1915-those resulting from Japan's "Twenty-One Demands " upon China.

Preliminary Correspondence. For the purposes of this volume it is not necessary to speculate as to the more obscure causes which led to the convening of the Conference at Washington, nor to consider the diplomatic correspondence which preceded the issuance by the American President of the formal invitation to the Powers to participate in its deliberations and decisions. It is sufficient to say that, as was but

proper, the American Government did not send its final and formal invitation until it had obtained assurance from the Powers to be addressed that they would give to it a favorable reply. All of the Powers addressed, with the exception of Japan, as will presently appear, gave full and prompt approval to the American proposal.

In an official statement given out July 10, 1921, by the American Department of State, it was said:

The President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the question of limitation of armament, has approached with informal but definite inquiries the group of Powers heretofore known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, that is, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a Conference on this subject, to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon. If the proposal is found to be acceptable, formal invitations for such a Conference will be issued.

It is manifest that the question of limitation of armament has a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President has suggested that the Powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with this Conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East. This has been communicated to the Powers concerned and China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern problems.2

'In connection with this statement it is of interest to note the following statements made in the British House of Commons by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George:

On July 7 he was asked: "Whether at any time the suggestion of a Pan-Asiatic Conference has been brought to his notice; and whether if this is not the case he will consider the desirability of issuing the necessary invitations to the United States, Japan, and China with the object of terminating the controversies which threaten the peace of the Far East

Japan's Hesitancy. That the Japanese Government was not willing to give immediate and unreserved approval to the American project appeared when a memorandum was made public on July 23, which the American Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo had handed to the Japanese Government. In this memorandum the

and the trade of this country." Questions were also asked as to the status of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

To these queries the Prime Minister replied that he hoped to be able to make a statement on the following Monday, July 11. "It depends," he said, "upon whether replies are received from the United States, Japan, and China."

On July 11 the Prime Minister said (in part):

"I am very glad to be able to inform the House today that the views of the government of the United States reached me last night, and are extremely satisfactory. The Chinese Government is also favorable. We have not yet had a formal reply from the government of Japan, but we have good reason to hope that it will be in the same sense. Now that these views have been received, I am glad to be at liberty to inform the House of Commons fully regarding the course which our discussions in the Imperial Cabinet took. I do this with particular satisfaction, because it will show how very valuable a step forward we have been able to take by common consent in the sphere of foreign affairs."

After discussing at some length the broad lines of policy in the Pacific and Far East as considered in the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet, and especially with reference to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Prime Minister concluded:

"The views of the President of the United States were made public by the American Government this morning. As is known to the House, Mr. Harding has taken the momentous step of inviting the Powers to a Conference on the limitation of armaments, to be held in Washington in the near future, and he also suggests a preliminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern questions between the Powers most directly interested in the peace and welfare of that great region, which is assuming the first importance in international affairs. I need not say that we welcome with the utmost pleasure President Harding's wise and courteous initiative. In saying this I know that I speak for the Empire as a whole. The world has been looking to the United States for such a lead. I am confident that the House will esteem it as an act of farseeing statesmanship and will whole-heartedly wish it success. I need hardly say that no effort will be lacking to make it so on the part of the British Empire, which shares to the full the liberal and progressive spirit inspiring it."

American Government expressed the hope that the Japanese Government would not press its inquiry as to a fuller statement of the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions which were to be discussed. The precise agenda of the Conference, the American Government declared, could be later arrived at.

To this communication Japan replied on July 27, accepting the invitation, with, however, the understanding that the United States, prior to the meeting of the Conference, would proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions to be discussed. The Japanese reply continued:

The Japanese Government have been made aware through the communications and the published statement of the American Government and the conversations between the Secretary of State and Baron Shidehara that the proposition of the American Government to discuss the Pacific and Far Eastern problems is based on the close bearing they have on the question of the limitation of armament which is the original and principal aim of the Conference, and that therefore the main object of discussing these problems is to reach a common understanding in regard to general principles and policies in the Pacific and the Far East. Desiring, as they do, to contribute to the establishment of an enduring peace and to the advancement of human welfare, the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the proposed Conference may attain the expected results and their ideals. may thereby be brought nearer to realization.

In order to ensure the success of the Conference, the Japanese Government deem it advisable that the agenda thereof should be arranged in accordance with the main object of the discussions as above defined, and that introduction therein of problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular Powers or such matters that may be regarded accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided.

Finally, on August 24, the Japanese Government expressed itself as in full accord with the purposes of the Conference, but nevertheless, in its communication of that date to the American Government, repeated its understanding that the scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions to be discussed was to be fixed by an exchange of opinions prior to the assembling of the Conference, and, furthermore, expressed the hope that the agenda of the Conference would in this way be arranged in harmony with the suggestions made in its prior memorandum.

The foregoing correspondence gives ample evidence to the fact that the government of Japan did not look to the Conference without misgivings. It was clearly evident that it felt that, so far as the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions was concerned, it might be called upon to give justifications of certain of its acts which it would be difficult to give and that from the Conference might result policies or determinations which would not be agreeable to itself.

The Formal Invitation to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. All of the Powers addressed having thus given their approval to the proposition that a Conference should be convened at Washington which should consider not only questions of Armament but Pacific and Far Eastern political questions as well, the President of the United States, on August 11, 1921, sent the following formal invitation to Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan:

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed.