The effect of all such treaties and agreements had been to maintain in China conditions which intimately affected the rights, prospects, and liberty of action of China herself.

It appeared, therefore, that the Chinese Government had an equitable right to be consulted in all agreements which dealt with, or pretended to deal with, the general situation in the Far East, including China. Even if such treaties were animated by an entirely friendly spirit toward China, yet their bearing was such that they might involve consequences which would result in limitations on Chinese freedom of action; even such treaties, therefore, should not be made without consultation with China.

It might, of course, be said that China, not being a party to such treaties, need in no way recognize them nor consider herself bound by any of their provisions. That was legally true. But the political effect produced by a group of such treaties, just as in the case of spheres of influence, tended so to modify the political and economic situation in China that no efforts on the part of the Chinese Government would succeed in preserving its liberty of action. Should recognition be given to the practice that China need not be consulted, the total results of a group of such cases must be examined. In that case it was plain that vital interests of China would be affected, and that the nature of activities and interests within China would be determined entirely by the action of outside powers. The Chinese Government would then find itself obliged to move along grooves laid down by others without having once had an opportunity of insisting upon her own life needs as seen by herself.

It must therefore be concluded that though an individual agreement might, on the face of it, concern only the action of outside powers, if that action related to China, the Chinese Government could not remain indifferent to it, because of the effect which the continued practice of making agreements of this kind would have upon the liberty of movement and the development of the Chinese Government and the nation itself.

Discussion. Following upon this statement by Dr. Koo, there was an extended discussion in which the

following objections to accepting, without qualification, the Chinese proposal were made.

Mr. Balfour thought that China could best be benefited, not by adopting the broad principle which her Delegation had proposed, but by dealing with her difficulties one by one, as the Conference had been doing, for example, with regard to spheres of interest, post offices, extraterritoriality and the like. "All that the Conference could do was to see that no undue limitations, no limitations which were not necessitated by the facts of the situation, were placed on China's sovereign independence, and to give all the help in its power toward the creation of a pure and vigorous administration." He also thought that the proposition put forward by Dr. Koo would, if accepted, involve a limitation of the treaty rights of the Powers. For example, if made of general international application, it would prevent France and Belgium from entering into a defensive treaty of any kind without consulting Germany. All agreed that the Powers had entered into treaties not only in regard to China but also as to other nations which reflected no credit on the parties to them, but the correction of this evil should be sought in publicity. Most of the nations represented at the Conference were members of the League of Nations and were bound by article XVIII of its covenant to publish their agreements. The United States, while not a member, was practically obligated by its Constitution to make its treaties public. He would ask the Chinese Delegation, therefore, not to press its proposition in the form in which it had been presented.

Secretary Hughes spoke somewhat along the same lines, stressing the four "Root Resolutions" that had been adopted by the Conference, and especially the one that provided that no advantage should be taken of China because of her present domestic difficulties, but that each Power should be left free to make agreements necessary for the preservation of its own proper interests, and that there should be no secret engagements.

Sir Auckland Geddes suggested that to the four Root Resolutions there might be added a fifth according to which the Powers would agree―

To enter into no treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another or individually or collectively, with any other Power or Powers which would infringe or impair the principles which they have herein declared.

Mr. Hanihara, speaking for the Japanese Delegation, expressed the view that this proposed resolution was practically included within the scope of the first of the Root Resolutions, and that to adopt it would have the effect of weakening that resolution; also that, if such proposed resolution were adopted, China herself should be brought within its application.

Resolution Adopted. As a result of these observations Sir Auckland's draft resolution was amended so as to read:

That the powers attending this conference, hereinafter mentioned, to wit, the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal declare that it is their intention not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or individually or collectively with any power or powers, which would in

fringe or impair the principles which have been declared by the resolution adopted November 21 by this committee.

In this form the resolution was unanimously approved by the Committee and reported to the Conference which adopted it at its fourth plenary session, held December 10.

As it appears as Article II of the Nine Power Treaty Relating to Principles and policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China, it reads:

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I [the four " Root Resolutions"].

CHAPTER XX

ARMS EMBARGO

As is well known the exportation of arms and ammunition to China by the Powers has, for a number of years, been a matter which has given concern to all the parties involved by reason of the fact that these arms and munitions have, to a considerable extent, found their way into the possession of bands of bandits operating in China, or have served to keep active the civil warfare which has prevailed in that country. In May, 1919, a diplomatic agreement, the purpose of which was to restrain this traffic, was arrived at but without completely satisfactory results.1

On January 22, 1922, a Resolution was approved by the President of the United States which had been adopted by Congress which provided that whenever the President should find that in any American country or in any country in which the United States exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction conditions of domestic violence existed which would be promoted by the use of arms and munitions if procured from the United States, he should make proclamation of

'It will be remembered that one of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 by Japan upon China sought to impose upon China the obligation to purchase fifty per cent or more of her munitions from Japan, and that there should be established in China a jointly worked Sino-Japanese arsenal. It has also been supposed that a somewhat similar agreement was included in the secret Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of 1918.