the Powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built and the action of China thereunder and the obligations which they deem to be in the nature of a trust resulting from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government over the possession and administration of the railroad. Dr. Koo, who represented the Chinese Delegation on the second sub-committee, speaking upon this report and proposed resolution, said that as the interallied agreement provided for the supervision of the whole Trans-Siberian system, including the Chinese Eastern Railway, it might give rise to misgivings in China if that particular railway should be singled out for separate treatment; and, furthermore, that any arrangement concerning that road would be of only limited value if it did not also include the Ussuri Railway which connected it with the sea at Vladivostok. In the third place, the Chinese Eastern Railway lay entirely within Chinese territory and that, therefore, the sovereign rights of China needed to be safeguarded. The legal status of the railway, Dr. Koo pointed out, was expressly defined in the agreements between China and Russia and between China and the Railway Company and the Russo-Asiatic Bank, and that whatever changes might have taken place in the internal organization of the road had been effected by due process of law. As to this he had reference to the agreement of October 2, 1920, entered into between China and the Russo-Asiatic Bank. As to the extent of the trust that China had assumed, that applied only to the functions which had been exercised by the Russian Government under agreements with China and which China was now exercising as a provisional measure because of the absence, for the time being, of a recognized Russian Government: that the Chinese authorities had been handling the critical situation to the best of their abilities and if the protection afforded to the road and to those who used it had not been fully adequate that had been due more to the difficulties consequent upon the political disorganization in Russia than to any lack of determination on the part of China. A vote upon the first resolution was thereupon taken to which all the Powers, including China, gave their assent. At the sixth plenary session of the Conference, held February 4, 1922, the Resolution together with the Reservation to it by the Powers other than China, were unanimously approved. CHAPTER XIX INTER-POWER AGREEMENTS RELATING TO CHINA The third of the Chinese "Ten Points" had declared as follows: With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these regions without previously notifying China and giving to her an opportunity to participate. Chinese Statement. This proposition was brought before the Committee of the Whole at its fourteenth meeting, held December 8, by Dr. Koo, who called attention to the fact that, in the past, agreements relating to the Far East generally and to China in particular, had been made by the Powers between themselves without notification to China that such agreements were in contemplation and, therefore, without giving to her an opportunity to participate therein should she desire to do so. Dr. Koo then continued:1 'What follows is from the official minutes of the meeting of the Committee. The Chinese Delegation submitted the following tentative list of Inter-Power Agreements that had, in the past, been entered into with reference to China: 1. Franco-Japanese Agreement, June 10, 1907 (MacMurray 640). 2. Anglo-Japanese Treaty, July 13, 1911 (MacMurray 900). 3. Russo-Japanese Convention of July 30, 1907 (MacMurray 657). 4. Russo-Japanese Secret Convention of July 30, 1907 (text not available). These agreements, he said, fell roughly into two divisions, the one being in the nature of mutual engagements to abstain from certain action in special parts of China, the other being engagements for mutual assistance in support of the general interests of all foreign powers in China or of the special interests claimed by the parties to the agreement. As to these treaties and agreements, Mr. Koo said he felt that they were all so well known to the members of the committee that the complete enumeration of them or specific illustrations would be unnecessary. The first kind of agreements usually was in the nature of an engagement on the part of one contracting party not to seek any railway concessions in one part of China in return for a similar promise on the part of the other contracting parties not to seek railway concessions in another part of China. As first it might seem as if a nation were within its rights in promising another to forego certain opportunities within a specific region. But any deeper examination of this matter would immediately show that there were a great many objections to such a method of arranging the action of one nation upon the territory of another. In the first place, it involved an incipient national monopoly or preference within the region affected, because the nation which had secured a promise of abstention from one power would then proceed with efforts to secure a similar promise from others. 5. Russo-Japanese Convention of July 4, 1910 (MacMurray 803). 6. Russo-Japanese Secret Convention of July 4, 1910 (text not available). 7. Russo-Japanese Secret Convention of July 8, 1912 (text not available). 8. Russo-Japanese Convention of July 3, 1916 (MacMurray 1327). 9. Russo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, of July 3, 1916 (MacMurray 1328). 10. American-Japanese Exchange of Notes of November 30, 1908 (RootTakahira Agreement) (MacMurray 769). 11. American-Japanese Exchange of Notes of November 2, 1917 (Lansing-Ishii Agreement) (MacMurray 1394). 12. Anglo-French Agreement of January 15, 1896, Article IV (MacMurray 54). 13. Anglo-Russian Agreement, April 28, 1899 (MacMurray 204). Thus by the making of only one agreement two nations would be backing a system of artificial limitation of economic activities. The rights of China were involved both because she must wish that all the parts of her territory should be open on equal terms, or on such terms as she herself should determine, to foreign capitalists, merchants, and residents. As soon as such treaties as the above were made, without consultation with China, her territory was divided into distinct spheres for foreign enterprise. To this she could by no means be indifferent. The other group of treaties dealt with the safeguarding and defending of territorial rights or special interests in the Far East, including or specially mentioning China. These all had one or more of the following three features: (1) A declaration that the contracting parties had a special interest in having order and a pacific state of things guaranteed in the regions of China adjacent to the territories where the contracting powers had rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation, and an engagement to support each other for assuring peace and security in these regions; or (2) A declaration to support the independence and integrity of China and the maintenance of the open door for foreign commerce and to aid each other for the defense of the contracting parties' special interests in said regions; or (3) The recognition by one contracting power that, since propinquity creates special relations, the other contracting power had special interests in China. It was clear that any one of the foregoing three features must be of vital interest to China. The assurance of peace and order in any part of Chinese territory was a matter of great concern to China herself. The maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of China touched the supreme rights of China. As to the recognition of propinquity as creating special interests in China, it was equally obvious that such recognition could not be valid, because special interests on Chinese territory could not be created without the consent of China, and China had always contested the soundness of the doctrine of propinquity. |