Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of ReasonThis book is a sustained defence of traditional internalist epistemology. The aim is threefold: to address some key criticisms of internalism and show that they do not hit their mark, to articulate a detailed version of a central objection to externalism, and to illustrate how a consistent internalism can meet the charge that it fares no better in the face of this objection than does externalism itself. This original work will be recommended reading for scholars with an interest in epistemology. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
The Connection to Truth | 35 |
Internalism Externalism and the Metaregress | 54 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
Alston Alvin Plantinga analysis argue argument balls Bernoulli's theorem BonJour C. D. Broad causal challenge Chapter claim classical concepts conclusion connection to truth counterexamples deductive inference defense deviant deviant logics direct inference empirical entailment epistemic circularity epistemic principles epistemic probability epistemology evidence example externalism externalist extrinsic connection fact false falsehood Foundationalism Fumerton Gettier problem grasp guarantee Haack Hume's Ibid infallible inference forms internal rationality intrinsic intuition involve justification justified in believing logical McGrew meaning metalevel metatheory modus ponens nature necessary truth Nogot non-deductive inference notion object level one's Oxford University Press Philosophical Plantinga population positive epistemic status possible premises priori knowledge probability problem of induction Proper Function properly basic proposition question randomness reason relevant reliability requirement rules of inference Russell Russellian solution S's belief sample sense skeptical sort statement subject's belief temic theorem theory tion true beliefs truth tables validity virtue