We further think it proper to examine whether, even if the deeds be found to have been executed by Issur-chunder Biswas against the letter of any expressed authority enjoyed by him, the proceeds of this bargain were applied to the reduction of a joint debt, and that too, with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and others, and to take in to consideration whether with reference to his conduct, plaintiff is entitled to any equitable consideration. We find that although in the agreement, executed by Issur in favor of his co-parceners, there is a provision to the effect, that if he makes any alienation or permanent settlement it will be null and void, yet in the deed executed in his favor by way of authority, no such provision is found. In this deed the co-sharers after reciting that" during your (Issur's) life-time, none of us will sell, or give in gift, or create a dur-putnee of, or give a farm of, our shares" state to the address of Issur "that you are not authorized by any way to alienate or injure our shares, if you do, you will be held responsible." From this difference in the two deeds, it is clear that any one reading only the power given to Issur and taking into consideration out of it the words quoted above, might very easily be led to suppose that as in favor of an innocent purchaser, Issur had full power to execute deeds like those in dispute. We are justified from all this as well as from the conduct of the. plaintiff and other co-sharers, from which we have already inferred consent and ratification, to infer upon fair and sure grounds, that a large portion of the consideration money, received from Mr. Hill. was used towards the payment of the joint debts. On all these grounds we think it proper to decree the Appeals and dismiss the plaint. The 16th of May 1863. H. C. D. Vol. II, p. 567. MISCELLANEOUS. Ahollya Bai Debea (defendant) Appellant versus Luckee-monce Debea (plaintiff) Respondent. A Hindoo widow, who for no improper purpose, leaves her husband's family, does not thereby forfeit her right to maintenace.- Abstract of the above case, decided on the 25th of June 1866. Vide Weekly Reporter, vol. vi, p. 37. The 11th of September 1866.* Dukkhina Dossee (one of the defendants) Appellant vereus RashBeharee Mojoonder and others (plaintiffs) Respondents. The special appellant contends that the lower Courts have wrongly decided against her, that Ram-ruttun did not leave a son, and that Parus-monee, the daughter of Ram-ruttun, succeeded to, and held as heir, the property of her father, without taking steps to procure the attendance of her witness Bhugwan, and without allowing his pleader to examine Ram-chunder Bagish, the priest of both the parties. It is further pleaded that the lower Appellate Court should have allowed the special appellant to retain the property for the adopted son, whom she is authorized to adopt, and who on being adopted would be entitled to succeed as a nearer heir than the plaintiff. The adopted son, if he had been in existence at the time of the death of Ram-ruttun, or of his widow, or of his daughter, would have been the nearer heir to the deceased Ram-ruttun than the plaintiff; but the Hindoo law does not appear to us to require that inheritance can be kept suspended either because the special appellant had been left pregnant by her husband till she brings forth, or kept suspended till the defendant may adopt or lose her right to adopt by non-exercise of the right for more than 12 years, because she may, as is urged here, have obtained a power to adopt. In some cases of pregnancy, the inheritance remains suspended, but not in a case like this, even if the appellant had been left pregnant by her husband.-Abstract of the above case. Vide Weekly Reporter, Vol. V1, p. 221. The 28th of June 1866 Gopaul-chunder Manna (plaintiff) Appellant versus Gour-monee Dossee and others (defendants) Respondents. The very strongest and most reliable evidence is required in the case of a claim to a share in an estate larger than the Hindoo law allows. In the absence of proof of collusion between the purchaser and the decree-holder, the decree is binding against the heir in expectancy of the judgment-debtor. • Note by the court-"This is not intended to disturb any decision holding the necessity of a suspention in Bengal during the pregnancy of the deceased's sister" (See ante, pp. 6, 7, 234, 260. The fact of a reversioner being an attesting witness to a conveyance by a Hindoo widow, is an acquiescence on his part, which precludes him from impeaching the sale on the ground of waste. A decree against a Hindoo widow for a loan to pay Government revenue is binding on the reversioner. The 28th-Abstract of the above case. Vide Weekly Reporter, Vol. vi p. 52. Hara-dhun Naugh (plaintiff) Appellant versus Issur-chunder Bose (defendant) Respondent. The claim of the plaintiff is for setting aside the deed of sale, as well as for recovery of possession, and so far as this last relief is concerned, the special appellant has undoubtedly no right to dispossess the widow, or the purchaser holding under her, during the life-time of the said widow. But as far as the right of the Apellant is confined to his obtaining a declaration that the sale is invalid against him, on his establishing that the sale was made without the necessity recognized by the Hindoo law, we think (vide page 165 of the Special number of Sudderland's Weekly Reporter) that the plaintiff, special appellant, is entitled to sue for, only that special relief.-Abstract of the above case decided on the 11th of September 1866. Vide Weekly Reporter, Vol. VI, p. 222. Kisto-moyee Dossee and others (defendants) Appellants versus ProsunnoNarain Choudhoory and others (plaintiffs) Respondents. Where only the rights and interest of the widow in the property left by her husband were sold in execution of a decree against her, on account of a debt contracted by her, and neither the decree or the sale proceedings declared the property itself liable for the debt,HELD that the purchase conveyed an interest in the estate only during the widow's life-time.--Abstract of above case, decided on the 14th of December 1866.-Vide Weekly Reporter, vol. vi, p. 303. Finis. INDEX. A. ABDICATION, (see extinction of worldly affairs) .. ABSENT PERSON UNHEARD OF- Page. 10,12,13 the period for which he must be waited for, and 10,12,13 1039 et seque. 1 preface. ABSTRACT, of the law of inheritance &c. as current in ACHÁRA-KANDA or ADHYAYA ACQUISITION, made by the use of the joint stock, or with the 192,465,469,478,521,570 of property acquired by the aid or funds of the joint ... 511,512,514,515,516,521 made through valour or science with the aid of the liable to partition, and exem pt from partition.. 500-503 et seque. 469,502 ACQUIRER, takes two shares of the acquisition made by the use of page. 468,470,192,450 takes over and above his share one fourth of the land ... ADDICTED TO VICE, or expelled from society, excluded from inheritance ADOPTED DAUGHTERS, are also of different kinds.. 429,473,503 997,1009 different descriptions of (See substitutes for the ADOPTED SON, 747,748 (note,) 153 753,747,917 what kind or kinds of, allowed in the present can be received by whom and under what circumstances (See adoption).. cannot be received by whom or under what circumstances (See adoption)... can be given by whom and under what circumstances a prohibited relation is not, however, in-eligible .. in the form of dwyámushyάyana (son of two fathers,) defined... in the form of Nitya Dwyámushyayana (completely son of two fathers) and in that of Anitya Dwyámushyayana (incompletely son of two fathers) defined his merit and demerit in preference to the nature of gift, acceptance, relation, age, form, ceremonies &c. .. 880-983 |