troduce Difference, which is the primary effential Mode, and Property, or the fecondary effential Mode, and Accident or the accidental Mode; and thefe they call the five Predicables, because every Thing that is affirm'd concerning any Being, muft be either the Genus, the Species, the Difference, fome Property, or fome Accident: But what farther is neceffary to be faid concerning these Things, will be mentioned when we treat of Definition.

Having finished the Doctrine of universal and particular Ideas, I fhould take notice of another Divifion of them, which also hath Refpect to their Objects; and that is, they are either real or imaginary.

Real Ideas are fuch as have a juft Foundation in Nature, and have real Objects, or Exemplars, which did, or do, or may actually exist, according to the present State and Nature of Things; fuch are all our Ideas of Long, Broad, Swift, Slow, Wood, Iron, Men, Horfes, Thoughts, Spirits, a cruel Mafter, a proud Beggar, a Man feven Foot high.

Imaginary Ideas, which are alfo called fantastical, or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarging, diminishing, uniting, dividing real Ideas in the Mind, in such a manner, as no Objects, or Exemplars, did or will ever exift, according to the present Course of Nature, tho' the feveral Parts of these Ideas are borrowed from real Objects; fuch are the Conceptions we have of a Centaur, a Satyr, a golden Mountain, a flying Horfe, a Dog without a Head, a Bull less than a Moufe, or a Mouse as big as a Bull, and a Man twenty Foot high.

Some of these fantastic Ideas are poffible, that is, they are not utterly inconfiftent in the Nature of Things; and therefore it is within the reach of Divine Power to make fuch Objects; fuch are moft of the Inftances already given: But Impoffibles

4

carry

carry an utter Inconfiftence in the Ideas which are join'd; fuch are felf-active Matter, and infinite or eternal Men, a pious Man without Honesty, or Heaven without Holiness.

SECT. IV.

The Divifion of Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities.

IDE

DEAS, with Regard to their Qualities, afford us these several Divifions of them. 1. They are either clear and diftinet, or obfcure and confused. 2. They are vulgar or learned. 3. They are perfelt or imperfect. 4. They are true or false.

I. Our Ideas are either clear and diftinct, or obfcure and confufed..

Several Writers have diftinguished the clear Ideas from thofe that are diftinet; and the confused Ideas from those that are obfcure; and it must be acknowledg'd, there may be fome Difference between them; for it is the Clearness of Ideas for the most part makes them diftinct; and the Obfcurity of Ideas is one Thing that will always bring a fort of Confufion into them. Yet when these Writers come to talk largely upon this Subject, and to explain and adjust their Meaning with great Nicety, I have generally found that they did not keep up the Diftinction they first defign'd, but they confound the one with the other. I fhall therefore treat of clear or diftinet Ideas, as one and the fame fort, and obfcure or confused Ideas, as another.

A clear and diftinet Idca is that which represents the Object of the Mind with full Evidence and Strength, and plainly diftinguishes it from all other Objects whatsoever.

An

Part I. An obfcure and confused Idea reprefents the Object either fo faintly, fo imperfectly, or fo mingled with other Ideas, that the Object of it doth not appear plain to the Mind, nor purely in its own Nature, nor fufficiently diftinguished from other Things.

When we see the Sea and Sky nearer at Hand, we have a clear and diftinet Idea of each; but when we look far toward the Horizon, especially in a mifty Day, our Ideas of both are but obfcure and confufed, for we know not which is Sea and which is Sky. So when we look at the Colours of the Rainbow, we have a clear Idea of the red, the blue, the green in the Middle of their feveral Arches, and a diftinet Idea too, while the Eye fixes there; but when we confider the Border of thofe Colours, they fo run into one another that renders their Ideas confufed and obfcure. So the Idea which we have of our Brother, or our Friend, whom we see daily, is clear and diftinct; but when the Abfence of many Years has injured the Idea, it becomes obfcure and confused.

Note, bere, that fome of our Ideas may be very clear and diftinct in one Refpect, and very obfcure and confused in another. So when we speak of a Chiliagonum, or a Figure of a thousand Angles, we may have a clear and diftinct rational Idea of the Number one thousand Angles; for we can demonftrate various Properties concerning it by Reason: But the Image, or fenfible Idea, which we have of the Figure, is but confused and obfcure; for we cannot precisely diftinguish it by Fancy from the Image of a Figure that has nine hundred Angles, or nine hundred and ninety. So when we speak of the infinite Divifibility of Matter, we always keep in our Minds a very clear and diftinct Idea of Divifion and Divifibility: But after we have made a

little Progrefs in dividing, and come to Parts that are far too fmall for the Reach of our Senfes, then our Ideas, or fenfible Images of these little Bodies, become obfcure, and indiftin&t, and the Idea of Infinite is very obfcure, imperfect and confufed.

II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vulgar Idea reprefents to us the most obvious and fenfible Appearances that are contained in the Object of them: But a learned Idea penetrates farther into the Nature, Properties, Reasons, Caufes and Effects of Things. This is beft illuftrated by fome Examples.

It is a vulgar Idea that we have of a Rainbow when we conceive a large Arch in the Clouds, made up of various Colours parallel to each other; But it is a learned Idea which a Philofopher has when he confiders it as the various Reflections and Refractions of Sun-Beams, in Drops of falling Rain. So it is a vulgar Idea which we have of the Colours of folid Bodies, when we perceive them to be, as it were, a red, or blue, or green Tincture of the Surface of thofe Bodies: But it is a philofophical Idea when we consider the various Colours to be nothing else but different Senfations excited in us by the variously refracted Rays of Light, reflected on our Eyes in a different Manner, according to the different Size, or Shape, or Situation of the Particles of which the Surfaces of those Bodies are compofed. It is a vulgar Idea which we have of a Watch or Clock, when we conceive of it as a pretty Inftrument, made to fhew us the Hour of the Day: But it is a learned Idea which the Watchmaker has of it, who knows all the feveral Parts of it, the Spring, the Balance, the Chain, the Wheels, their Axles &c. together with the various Connections and

Adjustments

Partl Adjustments of each Part, whence the exact and uniform Motion of the Index is derived, which points to the Minute or the Hout. So when a common Understanding reads Virgil's Æneid, he has but a vulgar Idea of that Poem, yet his Mind is naturally entertained with the Story, and his Ears with the Verfe: But when a Critick or a Man who has skill in Poefy, reads it, he has a learned Idea of its peculiar Beauties, he taftes and relishes a fuperior Pleafure; he admires the Roman Poet, and wifhes he had known the Chriftian Theology, which would have furnish'd him with nobler Materials and Machines than all the Hea then Idols.

It is with a vulgar Idea that the World beholds the Cartoons of Raphael at Hampton-Court, and every one feels his Share of Pleafure and Entertainment: But a Painter contemplates the Wonders of that Italian Pencil, and fees a thousand Beauties in them which the vulgar Eye neglected: His learned Ideas give him a transcendent Delight, and yet, at the fame time difcover the Blemishes which the common Gazer never obferv'd.

III. Ideas are either perfect or imperfect, which are otherwise called adequate or inadequate.

Thofe are adequate Ideas which perfectly reprefent their Archetypes of Objects. Inadequate Ideas are but a partial, or incomplete Reprefentation of those Archetypes to which they are referred.

All our fimple Ideas are in fome Senfe adequate or perfect, becaufe fimple Ideas, confider'd merely as our firft Perceptions, have no Parts in them: So we may be faid to have a perfect Idea of White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Length, Light, Motion, Reft, &c. We have alfo a perfect Idea of various Figures, as a Triangle, a Square, a Cylin

der,