V. Direct. Since the Evidence of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas is the Ground of our Affent to any Propofition, or the great Criterion of Truth; therefore we should fufpend our Judgment, and neither affirm or deny till this Evidence appear.

This Direction is different from the fecond for tho' the Evidence of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas moft times depend on the Clearness and Diftinctness of the Ideas themselves, yet it does not always arise thence. Teftimony may be a fufficient Evidence of the Agreement or Difagreement of two obfcure Ideas, as we have seen juft before in the Exception under the Second Direction. Therefore, tho' we are not univerfally and in all Cafes bound to fufpend our Judgment till our Ideas of the Objects themselves are clear and diftinct, yet we must always fufpend our Judgment, and withhold our Affent to, or Denial of any Propofition, till fome juft Evidence appear of its Truth or Falfhood. It is an Impatience of Doubt and Sufpence, a Rashnefs and Precipitance of Judgment, and Haftiness to believe something on one Side or the other, that plunges us into many Errors.

This Direction to delay and fufpend our Affent, is more particularly neceffary to be observed when fuch Propofitions offer themselves to us as are fupported by Education, Authority, Custom, Inclination, Intereft, or other powerful Prejudices; for our Judgment is led away infenfibly to believe all that they dictate; and where Prejudices and Dangers of Error are multiplied, we should set the ftricter Guard upon our Affent.

Yet remember the Caution or Limitation here which I gave under the first Direction, (viz.) that this is not to be too ftrictly applied to Matters of daily Practice, either in human Life or Religion;' Q4

but

but when we confider our felves as Philofophers o Searchers after Truth, we fhould always with-hold our Affent where there is not juft Evidence : And as far and as faft as we can in a due Confiftence with our daily neceffary Duties we fhould also reform and adjust all our Principles and Practices both in Religion and the civil Life by these Rules.

VI. Direct. We must judge of every Propofition by those proper and peculiar Mediums or Means whereby the Evidence of it is to be obtained, whether it be Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, or Teftimony. All our Faculties and Powers are to be employed in judging of their proper Objects.

If we judge of Sounds, Colours, Odours, Sapors, the Smoothness, Roughness, Softness, or Hardness of Bodies, it must be done by the Use of our Senfes : But then we must take heed that our Senfes are well difpofed as fhall be fhewn afterward.

And fince our Senfes in their various Exercises are in fome Cafes liable to be deceived, and more especially when by our Eyes or Ears we judge of the Figure, Quantity, Diftance and Pofition of Objects that are afar off, we ought to call our Reason into the Aflistance of our Senfes, and correct the Errors of one Senfe by the help of another.

It is by the Powers of Senfe and Reafon joined together that we muft judge philofophically of the inward Nature, the fecret Properties and Powers, the Caufes and Effects, the Relations and Proportions of a thoufand corporeal Objects which furround us on Earth, or are placed at a distance in the Heavens. If a Man on the one hand confines himself only to fenfibie Experiments, and does not exercife Reafon upon them, he may furprise

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himself and others with ftrange Appearances, and learn to entertain the World with Sights and Shews, but will never become a Philofopher: And on the other hand, if a Man imprison himself in his Closet, and employ the most exquifite Powers of Reason to find out the Nature of Things in the corporeal World, without the Ufe of his Senfes, and the Practice of Experiments, he will frame to himself a Scheme of Chimeras instead of true Philofophy. Hence came the Invention of fubftantial Forms and Qualities, of Materia Prima and Privation, with all the infignificant Names ufed by the Peripatetick Writers; and it was for want of more Experiments that the Great Def cartes failed in feveral Parts of his philofophical Writings.

Part II. Powers which we find in ourselves confider'd as Men or Creatures made up of a Mind and an Animal; and by just Reasonings deduce proper Confequences, and improve our Knowledge in these Subjects.

If we have Occafion to judge concerning Matters done in paft Ages, or in diftant Countries, and where we ourselves cannot be prefent, the Powers of Senfe and Reafon (for the most part) are not fufficient to inform us, and we must therefore have recourfe to the Teftimony of others: and this is either divine or buman.

In Matters of mere human Prudence we fhall find the greatest Advantage by making wife Obfervations on our own Conduct, and the Conduct of others, and a Survey of the Events attending fuch Conduct. Experience in this Cafe is equal to a natural Sagacity, or rather fuperior. A Treasure of Obfervations and Experiences collected by wife Men, is of admirable Service here. And perhaps there is nothing in the World of this kind equal to the facred Book of Proverbs, even if we look on it as a mere human Writing.

In Questions of Natural Religion we must exercife the Faculty of Reafon which God has given us; and fince he has been pleased to afford us bis Word, we fhould confirm and improve or correct our Reasonings on this Subject by the Divine Affiftance of the Bible.

In Matters of reveal'd Religion, that is, ChriAtianity, Judaifm, &c. which we could never have known by the Light of Nature, the Word of God is our only Foundation and chief Light; tho' here our Reason must be used both to find out the true Meaning of God in his Word, and to derive juft Inferences from what God has written, as well as to judge of the Credentials whereby Divine Teftimony is diftinguished from mere human Teftimony, or from Imposture.

As

As Divine Revelation can never contradict right Reason, (for they are two great Lights given us by our Creator for our Conduct) so Reason ought by no Means to assume to itself a Power to contradict Divine Revelation.

Tho’ Revelation be not contrary to Reafon, yet there are four Classes wherein Matters of Revelation may be said to rise above, or go beyond our Reason.

1. When Revelation asserts two Things of which we have clear Ideas, to be join'd, whose Conne&tion or Agreement is not discoverable by Reason ; as when Scripture informs us that The Dead fall rise, that The Earth fali be burnt up, and the Man Chris Jesus Mall return from Heaven, none of these Things could ever be found out or proved by Reason.

2. When Revelation affirms any Proposition, wbile Reason has no clear and distinkt Ideas of the Subječt, or of the Predicate ; as God created all Things by Jesus Christ : By the Urim and Thummim God gave forth Divine Oracles. The Predicate of each of these Propositions is to us an obscure Idea, for we know not what was the peculiar Agency of Jesus Christ when God the Father created the World by him ; nor have we any clear and certain Conception what the Urim and Thummin were, nor how God gave Answers to his People by them.

3. When Revelation, in plain and express Language, declares fome DoEtrine which our Reason at present knows not with evidence and certainty bow or in what Sense to reconcile to some of its own Principles ; as, that the Child Jesus is the mighty God, Efa. ix. 6. which Proposition carries a leeming Opposition to the Unity and Spirituality of the Godbead, which are Principles of Reason.