dresses to Heaven, and implore the God of Truth to lead him into all Truth, and to ask Wisdom of him who giveth liberally to them that ask it, and upbraideth us not with our own Follies. Such a devout Practice will be an excellent Preparative for the best Improvement of all the Directions and Rules proposed in the two following Chapters. CHAP. IV. General Directions to assist us in judging aright. THE HE chief Design of the Art of Logick is to assist us in forming a true Judgment of Things ; a few proper Observations for this End have been dropt occasionally in some of the foregoing Chapters: Yet it is necessary to mention them again in this Place, that we may have a more compleat and simultaneous View of the general Directions, which are necessary in order to judge aright. A Multitude of Advices may be framed for this purpose; the chief of them may, for Order fake, be reduced to the following Heads. 1. Direet. When we consider our felves as Phibosophers, or Searchers after Truth, we should examine all our old Opinions afresh, and enquire what was the Ground of them, and whether our Ajent were built on just Evidence ; and then we should caft off all those Judgments which were formed. heretofore without due Examination. A Man in pursuit of Knowledge should throw off all those Preju dices I dices which he had imbibed in Times paft, and guard against all the Springs of Error mentioned in the preceding Chapter, with utmost Watchfulnefs for Time to come. Obferve here, that this Rule of cafting away all our former prejudicate Opinions and Sentiments, is not proposed to any of us to be practised at once, confidered as Men of Bufinefs, or Religion, as Friends or Neighbours, as Fathers or Sons, as Magiftrates, Subjects or Chriftians; but merely as Philofophers and Searchers after Truth: And though it may be well prefumed that many of our Judgments, both true and falfe, together with the Practices built thereon in the natural, the civil and the religious Life were formed without fufficient Evidence ; yet an universal Rejection of all these might destroy at once our present Senfe and Practice of Duty with Regard to God, our Selves, and our FellowCreatures. Mankind would be hereby thrown into fuch a State of Doubting and Indifference, that it would be too long e're they recovered any Principles of Virtue or Religion by a Train of Reasonings. Befides, the common Affairs of human Life often demand a much speedier Determination, and we must many times act upon prefent Probabilities: The Bulk of Mankind have not Time and Leifure, and Advantages fufficient to begin all their Knowledge anew, and to build up every ingle Opinion and Practice afresh upon the jufteft Grounds of Evidence. Yet let it be observed alfo, that fo far as any Perfon is capable of forming and correcting his Notions and his Rules of Conduct in the natural, civil and religious Life by the strict Rules of Logick; and fo far as he hath Time and Capacity to review his old Opinions, to re-examine all those which are any Way doubtful, and to determine nothing without juft Evidence, he is likely to become fo much the wifer, and the happier Man. and (if Divine Grace affift him) so much the better Chriftian. And tho' this cannot be done all at once, yet it may be done by prudent Steps and Degrees, till our whole Set of Opinions and Principles be in time corrected and reformed, or at least established upon jufter Foundations. II. Direct. Endeavour that all your Ideas of thofe Objects concerning which you pass any Judgment, be clear and diftinét, compleat, comprehenfive, extenfive and orderly, as far as you have Occafion to judge concerning them. This is the Subftance of the last Chapter of the firft Part of Logick. The Rules which direct our Conceptions, must be reviewed, if we would form our Judgments aright. But if we will make hafte to judge at all Adventures, while our Ideas are dark and confufed and very imperfect, we fhall be in Danger of running into many Mistakes. This is like a Perfon who would pretend to give the Sum total of a large Account in Arithmetick, without furveying all the Particulars; or as a Painter who profeffes to draw a fair and diftinct Landskip in the Twilight, when he can hardly diftinguish a House from a Tree. Obferve here, that this Direction does not require us to gain clear, diftinct, compleat Ideas of Things in all their Parts, Powers, and Qualities in an abfolute Senfe, for this belongs to God alone, and is impoffible for us to attain: But it is expreft in a relative or limited Senfe; that is, our Ideas fhould be clear, diftinct and comprehenfive, &c. at least fo far as we have Occafion at that time to judge concerning them. We may form many true and certain Judgments concerning God, Angels, Animals, Part II. Animals, Men, Heaven, Hell, &c. by those partial and very imperfect Conceptions of them to which we have attained, if we judge no farther concerning them than our Conceptions reach. We may have a clear and distinct Idea of the Existence of many Things in Nature, and affirm that they do exift, tho' our Ideas of their Intimate Effences and Caufes, their Relations and Manners of Action are very confused and obfcure. We may judge well concerning Several Properties of any Being, tho' other Properties are unknown, for perhaps we know not all the Properties of any Being whatsoever. Sometimes we have clear Ideas of the abfolute Properties of an Object; and we may judge of them with Certainty, while the relative Properties are very obfcure and unknown to us. So we may have a clear and just Idea of the Area of a Parallelogram without knowing what Relation it bears to the Area of a Triangle or a Polygon. I may know the length of the Diameter of a Circle, without knowing what Proportion it has to the Circumference. There are other Things whofe external Relative Properties with refpect to each other, or whose Relations to us we know better than their own inward and abfolute Properties, or their effential diftinguishing Attributes.. We perceive clearly, that Fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate Water; and that Water will allay our Thirst, or quench the Fire, tho' we know not the inward diftinguishing Particles or prime effential Properties of Fire or Water. We may know the King, and Lord Chancellor, and affirm many Things of them in their legal Characters, tho' we can have but a confused Idea of their Perfons or natural Features, if we have never feen their Faces. So the Scrip ture 235 ture has revealed God himself to us, as our Creator, Preferver, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and as the Object of our Worship in clearer Ideas than it has revealed many other abftrufe Questions which may be raised about his own Divine Effence or Subftance, his Immenfity or Omniprefence. This therefore is the general Obfervation in order to guide our Judgments, that we should not allow our felves to form a Judgment concerning Things farther than our clear and diftinet Ideas reach, and then we are not in danger of Error. But there is one confiderable Objection against this Rule which is neceffary to be answered; and there is one just and reafonable Exception, which is as needful to be mentioned. The Objection is this: May we not judge fafely concerning fome total or compleat Ideas, when we have a clear Perception only of fome Parts or Properties of them? May we not affirm, that All that is in God is eternal, or that all his unknown Attributes are infinite, tho' we have fo very imperfect an Idea of God, Eternity, and Infinity? Again, May we not fafely judge of particular Objects whofe Idea is obfcure by a clear Idea of the General? May I not affirm, that every unknown Spe-. cies of Animals has inward Springs of Motion, becaufe I have a clear Idea that these inward Springs belong to an Animal in general? Answer. All thofe fuppofed unknown Parts, Properties or Species are clearly and diftinctly perceived to be connected with, or contained in the known Parts, Properties or general Ideas, which we fuppofe to be clear and diftinct as far as we judge of them: And as we have no particular Idea of thofe unknown divine Attributes, or unknown Species of Animals; fo there is nothing particular affirmed concerning them beyond what belongs to the |