procal Contradictions; and it frequently happens that a Debate about Opinions is turned into a mutual Reproach of Perfons.

The Prejudice of Credulity may in fome Meafure be cured by learning to fet a high Value on Truth, and by taking more Pains to attain it; remembring that Truth oftentimes lies dark and deep, and requires us to dig for it as hid Treafure; and that Falfhood often puts on a fair Difguife, and therefore we fhould not yield up our Judgment to every plaufible Appearance. It is no part of Civility or good Breeding to part with Truth, but to maintain it with Decency and Candor.

A Spirit of Contradiction is fo pedantick and hateful that a Man fhould take much Pains with himself to watch againft every Inftance of it: He fhould learn fo much good Humour at least as never to oppose any thing without just and folid Reafon for it: He fhould abate fome Degrees of Pride and Morofeness, which are never failing Ingredients in this fort of Temper, and fhould feek after fo much Honesty and Confcience as never to contend for Conqueft or Triumph; but to review his own Reasons, and to read the Arguments of his Opponents (if poffible) with an equal Indifferency, and be glad to fpy Truth, and to fubmit to it, tho' it appear on the oppofite Side.

(2.) There is another Pair of Prejudices deriv'd from two Tempers of Mind, near akin to thofe I have just mention'd; and these are the dogmatical and the fceptical Humour, i, e. always pofitive, or always doubting.

By what means foever the Dogmatist came by his Opinions, whether by his Senfes, or by his Fancy, his Education, or his own Reading, yet he believes them all with the fame Affurance that

he does a mathematical Truth; he has fcarce any mere Probabilities that belong to him; every thing with him is certain and infallible; every Punctilio in Religion is an Article of his Faith, and he anfwers all manner of Objections by a fovereign Contempt.

Perfons of this Temper are feldom to be convinced of any Mistake: A full Affurance of their own Notions makes all the Difficulties of their own Side vanish fo intirely, that they think every Point of their Belief is written as with Sun-beams, and wonder any one should find a Difficulty in it. They are amazed that learned Men fhould make a Controverfy of what is to then fo perfpicuous and indubitable. The lowest Rank of People both in learned and in vulgar Life is very subject to this Obftinacy.

Sceptifm is a contrary Prejudice. The Dogmatift is fure of every Thing, and the Sceptick believes nothing. Perhaps he has found himself often miftaken in Matters of which he thought himself well affured in his younger Days, and therefore he is afraid to give affent to any thing again. He fees fo much Shew of Reafon for every Opinion, and fo many Objections alfo arifing against every Doctrine, that he is ready to throw off the Belief of every Thing: He renounces at once the Pursuit of Truth, and contents himself to fay, There is nothing certain. It is well if thro' the Influence of fuch a Temper he does not caft away his Religion as well as his Philofophy, and abandon himself to a profane Course of Life, regardless of Hell and Heaven.

Both these Prejudices laft mentioned, tho' they are fo oppofite to each other, yet they arise from the fame Spring, and that is, Impatience of Study and Want of diligent Attention in the Search of

Truth

Truth. The Dogmatift is in hafte to believe fomething he can't keep himself long enough in Sufpence till fome bright and convincing Evidence appear on one Side; but throws himself cafually into the Sentiments of one Party or another, and then he will hear no Argument to the contrary, The Sceptick will not take Pains to fearch Things to the Bottom, but when he fees Difficulties on both Sides refolves to believe neither of them. Humility of Soul, Patience in Study, Diligence in Enquiry, with an honest Zeal for Truth, would go a great way towards the Cure of both thefe Follies.

(3.) Another fort of Temper that is very injurious to a right Judgment of things is an inconftant, fickle, changeable Spirit, and a very uneven Temper of Mind. When fuch Perfons are in one Humour, they pass a Judgment of Things agreeable to it; when their Humour changes, they reverse their firft Judgment, and embrace a new Opinion. They have no Steadiness of Soul; they want Firmnefs of Mind fufficient to establish themselves in any Truth, and are ready to change it for the next alluring Falfhood that is agreeable to their Change of Humour. This Fickleness is fometimes fo mingled with their very Constitution by Nature or by Diftemper of Body, that a cloudy Day and a lowring Sky fhall ftrongly incline them to form an Opinion, both of themselves and of Perfons and Things round about them, quite different from what they believe when the Sun fhines and the Heavens are ferene.

This fort of People ought to judge of Things and Perfons in their most fedate, peaceful and composed Hours of Life, and referve thefe Judgments for their Conduct at more unhappy Seafons,

(4.) Some

(4.) Some Perfons have a violent and turgid Manner both of Talking and Thinking; whatsoever they judge of, it is always with a Tincture of this Vanity. They are always in Extremes, and pronounce concerning every thing in the Superlative. If they think a Man to be learned, he is the chief Scholar of the Age: If another has low Parts, be is the greatest Blockhead in Nature: If they approve any Book on divine Subjects, it is the best Book in the World next to the Bible: If they speak of a Storm of Rain or Hail, it is the most terrible Storm that fell fince the Creation; and a cold Winter Day is the coldest that ever was known.

But the Men of this fwelling Language ought to remember that Nature has ten thousand moderate Things in it, and does not always deal in Extremes as they do.

(5.) I think it may be called another fort of Prejudices deriv'd from Humour, when fome Men believe a Doctrine merely because it is ancient and has been long believ'd; others are fo fond of Novelty, that nothing prevails upon their Affent fo much as new Thoughts and new Notions. Again there are some who fet a high Efteem upon every thing that is foreign, and far-fetch'd; therefore China Pictures are admired, how aukward foever : Others value Things the more for being of our own native Growth, Invention, or Manufacture, and these as much defpife foreign Things.

Some Men of Letters and Theology will not believe a Propofition even concerning a fublime Subject, till every thing myfterious, deep and difficult is cut off from it, tho' the Scripture afferts it never fo plainly; others are fo fond of a Myfery and things incomprehenfible, that they would fcarce believe the Doctrine of the Trinity if it could be explained; they incline to that foolifk

Rant

Rant of one of the Antients, Credo quia impoffibile eft; I believe it because it is impoffible.

To cure these Mistakes remember that neither antique or novel, foreign or native, mysterious or plain, are certain Characters either of Truth or Falfhood.

I might mention various other Humours of Men that excite in them various Prejudices, and lead them into rash and mistaken Judgments; but these are fufficient for a Specimen.

VII. There are feveral other Weaknesses which belong to human Nature, whereby we are led into Miftakes, and indeed are render'd almost uncapable of paffing a folid Judgment in Matters of great Depth and Difficulty. Some have a native Obfcurity of Perception, (or fhall I call it a want of natural Sagacity?) whereby they are hinder'd from attaining clear and diftinct Ideas.

Their

Thoughts always feem to have fomething confufed and cloudy in them, and therefore they judge in the dark. Some have a Defect in Memory, and then they are not capable of comparing their prefent Ideas with a great Variety of other, in order to fecure themfelves from Inconfiftency in. Judgment. Others may have a Memory large enough, yet they are fubject to the fame Errors from a Narrowness of Soul, and fuch a Fixation and Confinement of Thought to a few Objects, that they scarce ever take a furvey of Things wide enough to judge wifely and well, and to fecure themselves from all Inconsistencies.

Tho' these are natural Defects and Weaknesses, yet they may in fome measure be reliev'd by Labour, Diligence and a due Attention to proper Rules,

But