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An essential Mode is either primary or secondary.

A primary essential Mode is the first, or chief Thing, that constitutes any Being in its particular Effence or Nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from all other Beings : This is called the Difference in the Definition of Things, of which hereafter : So Roundness is the primary essential Mode, or Difference of a Bowl ; the meeting of two Lines is the primary essential Mode, or the Difference of an Angle; the Perpendicularity of these Lines to each other is the Difference of a right Angle: Solid Extension is the Primary Attribute, or Difference of Matter : Consciousness, or at least a Power of Thinking, is the Difference, or primary Attribute of a Spirit *; and to fear and love God is the primary Attribute of a pious Man.

A secondary essential Mode is any other Attribute I of a Thing, which is not of primary Considera

tion: This is called a Property : Sometimes indeed it goes toward making up the Essence, especially of a complex Being, so far as we are acquainted with it ; sometimes it depends upon, and follows from the Essence of it ; fo Volubility, or siptness to roll, is the Property of a Bowl, and is derived from its Roundness, Mobility, and Figure or Shape, are Properties of Matter ; and it is the Property of a pious Man to love bis Neighbour.

An accidental Mode, or an Accident, is such a Mode, as is not necessary to the Being of a Thing, for the Subject may be without it, and yet remain of the fame Nature that it was before; or it is that Mode, which may be separated or abolisht from its Subject; fo Smoothness or Roughness, Blackness or Whiteness, Motion or Rest, are the Accidents of a Bowl; for these may be all chang'd, and yet the Body remain a Bowl ftill: Learning, * Speihe Note in the foregoing Page.


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Justice, Folly, Sickness, Health, are the Accidents of a Man: Motion, Squareness, or any particular

Shape or Size, are the Accidents of Body: Yer ch

Shape and Size in general are essential Modes of it; for a Body must have some Size and Shape, nor can it be without them: So Hope, Fear, Wishing, Afsenting, and Doubting, are Accidents of the Mind, tho' Thinking in general seems to be effential to it.

Here observe, that the Name of Accident has been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetic Phi

losophers to all Modes, whether essential or acci1 dental

dental; but the Moderns confine this Word Accident to the Sense in which I have described it.

Here it should be noted also, that tho’ the Word Property be limited sometimes in logical Treatises to the secondary essential Mode, yet it is used in common Language to signify these four forts of Modes ; of which some are essential, and fome accidental.

(1.) Such as belong to every Subject of that kind, but not only to those Subjects. So yellow Colour and Duetility are Properties of Gold ; they belong to all Gold, but not only to Gold; for Saffron is also yellow, and Lead is duetile.

(2.) Such as belong only to one kind of Subject but not to every Subject of that kind. So Learning, Reading, and Writing, are Properties of buman Nature; they belong only to Man, but not to all Men.

(3.) Such as belong to every Subject of one kind, and only to them, but not always. So Speech or Language is a Property of Man, for it belongs to all Men, and to Men only; but Men are not always speaking

(4.) Such as belong to every Subject of one kind, and to them only and altvays. So Shape and


Divisibility are Properties of Body; fo Omniscience and Omnipotence are Properties of the divine Nature, for in this Sense Properties and Attributes are the same, and except in logical Treatises there is scarce any Distinction made between them. These are called Propria quarto Modo in the Schools, or Properties of the fourth Sort.

Note, Where there is any one Property or efential Attribute fo fuperior to the rest, that it appears plainly that all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient to give a full Distinction of that Subject from all other Subjects, this Attribute, or Property, is called the essential Dif. ference, as is before declared ; and we commonly fay, the Essence of the Thing consists in it ; so the Essence of Matter in general seems to consist in Solidity, or solid Extension. But for the most part, we are so much at a Loss in finding out the intimate Essence of particular natural Bodies, that we are forc'd to distinguish the esential Difference of most Things by a Combination of Properties. So a Sparrow is a Bird, which has such colour'd Feathers, and such a particular Size, Shape and Motion. So Wormwood is an Herb which has such a Leaf of such a Colour, and Shape, and Taste, and such a Root and Stalk. So beasts and Fishes, Minerals, Metals and Works of Art sometimes, as well as of Nature, are distinguished by such a Colle&tion of Properties.

The further Divisions of Mode.

II. HE second Division of Modes is into ab

is that which belongs to its Subject, without Re


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spect to any other Beings whatsoever : But a relative Mode' is derived from the Regard that one Being has to others. So Roundness and Smoothnefs are the absolute Modes of a Bowl; for if there were nothing else existing in the whole Creation, a Bowl might be round and smooth: But Greatness and Smallness are relative Modes; for the very Ideas of them are derived merely froin the Comparison of one Being with others : A Bowl of four Inches Diameter is very great, compared with one of an Inch and a half ; but it is very small in comparison of another Bowl, whose Diameter is eighteen or twenty Inches. Motion is the absolute Mode of a Body, but Swiftness or Slowness are relative Ideas; for the Motion of a Bowl on a Bowling Green is swift, when compared with a Snail; and it is sow, when compared with a Canon-Bullet.

These relative Modes are largely treated of by some logical and metaphysical Writers under the Name of Relation: And these Relations themselves are farther subdivided into such as arise from the Nature of Things, and such as arise merely from the Operation of our Minds ; one fort are called reai Relations, the other mental ; so the Likeness of one Egg to another is a real Relation, because it arises from the real Nature of Things ; for whether there was any Man or Mind to conceive it or no, one Egg would be like another : But when we consider an Egg as a Noun Substantive in Grammar, or as signified by the Letters e, f, g, these are mere mental Relations, and derive their very Nature from the Mind of Man. These sort of Relations are called by the Schools Entia Rationis, or second Notions, which have no real Being, but by the Operation of the Mind.

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III. The

III. The third Division of Modes shews us, they are either intrinsical or extrinsical. Intrinfical Modes are conceived to be in the Subject or Substance, as when we say a Globe is round, or Swift, rolling, or at rest : Or when we say a Man is tall, or learned, these are intrinsic Modes : But extrinsic Modes are such as arise from something that is not in the Subject or Substance it self; but it is a manner of Being which fome Substances attain by Reason of something that is external or foreign to the Subject; as, This Globe lies within two Yards of the Wall; or this Man is belov'd or hated. Note, Such fort of Modes, as this last Example, are called external Denominations,

IV. There is a fourth Division much akin to this, whereby Modes are said to be Inherent or Adherent, that is, Proper or Improper. Adherent or improper Modes arise from the joining of some accidental Substance to the chief Subject, which yet may be separated from it ; so when a Bowl is wet, or a Boy is clotb'd, these are adherent Modes; for the Water and the Cloaths are distinct Substances which adhere to the Bowl, or to the Boy : But when we fay, the Bowl is swift or round; when we say, the Boy is strong or witty, these are proper or inherent Modes, for they have a sort of In-being in the Substance it self, and don't arise from the Addition of any other Substance to it.

V. Astion and Passion are Modes or Manners which belong to Substances, and should not entirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a Hammer strikes a piece of Iron, the Hammer and the Smith are both Agents, or Subjects of Ac2

tion ;

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