An effential Mode is either primary or fecondary. A primary effential Mode is the first, or chief Thing, that conftitutes any Being in its particular Effence or Nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from all other Beings: This is called the Difference in the Definition of Things, of which hereafter: So Roundness is the primary effential Mode, or Difference of a Bowl; the meeting of two Lines is the primary effential Mode, or the Difference of an Angle; the Perpendicularity of thefe Lines to each other is the Difference of a right Angle: Solid Extenfion is the Primary Attribute, or Difference of Matter: Consciousness, or at least a Power of Thinking, is the Difference, or primary Attribute of a Spirit *; and to fear and love God is the primary Attribute of a pious Man.

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A fecondary effential Mode is any other Attribute /of a Thing, which is not of primary Confideration: This is called a Property: Sometimes indeed goes toward making up the Effence, especially of a complex Being, fo far as we are acquainted with it; fometimes it depends upon, and follows from the Effence of it; fo Volubility, or Aptness to roll, is the Property of a Bowl, and is derived from its Roundness, Mobility, and Figure or Shape, are Properties of Matter; and it is the Property of a pious Man to love bis Neighbour.

An accidental Mode, or an Accident, is fuch a Mode, as is not neceffary to the Being of a Thing, for the Subject may be without it, and yet remain of the fame Nature that it was before; or it is that Mode, which may be separated or abolifht from its Subject; fo Smoothness or Roughness, Blackness or Whiteness, Motion or Reft, are the Accidents of a Bowl; for thefe may be all chang'd, and yet the Body remain a Bowl ftill: Learning,

See the Note in the foregoing Page.

Justice,

Justice, Folly, Sickness, Health, are the Accidents of a Man: Motion, Squareness, or any particular Shape or Size, are the Accidents of Body: Yet Shape and Size in general are effential Modes of it; for a Body muft have fome Size and Shape, nor can it be without them: So Hope, Fear, Wishing, Affenting, and Doubting, are Accidents of the Mind, tho' Thinking in general feems to be effential to it.

Here observe, that the Name of Accident has been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetic Philofophers to all Modes, whether effential or accidental; but the Moderns confine this Word Accident to the Senfe in which I have defcribed it.

Here it fhould be noted alfo, that tho' the Word Property be limited fometimes in logical Treatifes to the fecondary effential Mode, yet it is used in common Language to fignify these four forts of Modes; of which fome are effential, and fome accidental.

(1.) Such as belong to every Subject of that kind, but not only to thofe Subjects. So yellow Colour and Ductility are Properties of Gold; they belong to all Gold, but not only to Gold; for Saffron is alfo yellow, and Lead is ductile.

(2.) Such as belong only to one kind of Subject but not to every Subject of that kind. So Learning, Reading, and Writing, are Properties of buman Nature; they belong only to Man, but not to all Men.

(3.) Such as belong to every Subject of one kind, and only to them, but not always. So Speech or Language is a Property of Man, for it belongs to all Men, and to Men only; but Men are not always fpeaking.

(4.) Such as belong to every Subject of one kind, and to them only and always. So Shape and Divifibility

Divisibility are Properties of Body; fo Omniscience and Omnipotence are Properties of the divine Nature, for.in this Sense Properties and Attributes are the same, and except in logical Treatises there is scarce any Distinction made between them. These are called Propria quarto Modo in the Schools, or Properties of the fourth Sort.

Note, Where there is any one Property or effential Attribute fo fuperior to the rest, that it appears plainly that all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient to give a full Distinction of that Subject from all other Subjects, this Attribute, or Property, is called the essential Dif. ference, as is before declared ; and we commonly fay, the Esence of the Thing consists in it ; so the Elence of Matter in general seems to consist in Solidity, or solid Extension. But for the most part, we are so much at a Loss in finding out the intimate Essence of particular natural Bodies, that we are forc'd to distinguish the essential Difference of most Things by a Combination of Properties. So a Sparrow is a Bird, which has such colour'd Feathers, and such a particular Size, Shape and Motion. So Wormwood is an Herb which has such a Leaf of such a Colour, and Shape, and Taste, and such a Root and Stalk. So beasts and Fishes, Minerals, Metals and Works of Art sometimes, as well as of Nature, are distinguished by such a Colle&tion of Properties.

SECT. IV.
The further Divisions of Mode.

II. THE fecond Division of Modes is into ab.

folute and relative. An absolute Mode is that which belongs to its Subject, without Re

spect

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spect to any other Beings whatsoever: But a relative Mode is derived from the Regard that one Being has to others. So Roundness and Smoothnefs are the abfolute Modes of a Bowl; for if there were nothing else existing in the whole Creation, a Bowl might be round and fmooth: But Greatness and Smallness are relative Modes; for the very Ideas of them are derived merely from the Comparison of one Being with others: A Bowl of four Înches Diameter is very great, compared with one of an Inch and a half; but it is very small in comparison of another Bowl, whofe Diameter is eighteen or twenty Inches. Motion is the abfolute Mode of a Body, but Swiftness or Slowness are relative Ideas; for the Motion of a Bowl on a Bowling-Green is fwift, when compared with a Snail; and it is flow, when compared with a Canon-Bullet.

Thefe relative Modes are largely treated of by fome logical and metaphyfical Writers under the Name of Relation: And thefe Relations themfelves are farther fubdivided into fuch as arise from the Nature of Things, and fuch as arife merely from the Operation of our Minds; one fort are called real Relations, the other mental; fo the Likenefs of one Egg to another is a real Relation, because it arifes from the real Nature of Things; for whether there was any Man or Mind to conceive it or no, one Egg would be like another: But when we confider an Egg as a Noun Subftantive in Grammar, or as fignified by the Letters e,g, g, these are mere mental Relations, and derive their very Nature from the Mind of Man. These fort of Relations are called by the Schools Entia Rationis, or fecond Notions, which have no real Being, but by the Operation of the Mind.

III. The

III. The third Divifion of Modes fhews us, they are either intrinsical or extrinsical. Intrinfical Modes are conceived to be in the Subject or Substance, as when we fay a Globe is round, or Swift, rolling, or at reft: Or when we fay a Man is tall, or learned, these are intrinfic Modes: But extrinfic Modes are fuch as arise from fomething that is not in the Subject or Subftance it felf; but it is a manner of Being which fome Subftances attain by Reafon of fomething that is external or foreign to the Subject; as, This Globe lies within two Yards of the Wall; or this Man is belov'd or hated. Note, Such fort of Modes, as this last Example, are called external Denominations.

IV. There is a fourth Divifion much akin to this, whereby Modes are faid to be Inherent or Adherent, that is, Proper or Improper. Adherent or improper Modes arife from the joining of fome accidental Subftance to the chief Subject, which yet may be separated from it; fo when a Bowl is wet, or a Boy is cloth'd, these are adherent Modes; for the Water and the Cloaths are diftinct Subftances which adhere to the Bowl, or to the Boy: But when we fay, the Bowl is fwift or round; when we fay, the Boy is ftrong or witty, thefe are proper or inherent Modes, for they have a fort of In-being in the Substance it felf, and don't arife from the Addition of any other Subftance to it.

V. Action and Paffion are Modes or Manners which belong to Substances, and should not entirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a Hammer ftrikes a Piece of Iron, the Hammer and the Smith are both Agents, or Subjects of Ac

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tion;