If Remark. The fame Propofition may be known to us by different kinds of Evidence: That the whole is bigger than a part is known by our Senfes, and it is known by the Self-Evidence of the Thing to bar Mind That God created the Heavens and the Earth is known to us by Reaĵon, and is known alfo by Divine Teftimony or Faith.

IId Remark. Among these various Kinds of Evidence, fome are generally stronger than others in their own Nature, and give a better Ground for Certainty. Inward Consciousness and Intelligence, as well as Divine Faith and Infpiration, ufually carry much more Force with them than Senfe or buman Faith, which are often fallible; tho' there are Inftances wherein human Faith, Senfe and Reasoning lay a Foundation alfo for compleat Affurance, and leave no room for Doubt.

Reafon in its own Nature would always lead us into the Truth in Matters within its Compafs, if it were used aright, or it would require us to fufpend our Judgment where there is want of Evidence. But it is our Sloth, Precipitancy, Senfe, Paffion, and many other Things that lead our Reafon aftray in this degenerate and imperfect Eftate: Hence it comes to pafs that we are guilty of fo many Errors in Reafoning, especially about divine Things, because our Reafon either is bufy to enquire, and refolved to determine about Matters that are above our prefent Reach; or because we mingle many Prejudices and fecret Influences of Senfe, Fancy, Paffion, Inclination, &c. with our Exercifes of Reafon, and judge and determine according to these irregular Influences.

Divine Faith would never admit of any Controverfies or Doubtings, if we were but affur'd that God had spoken, and that we rightly underftood his Meaning.

III Remark. The greatest Evidence and Certainty of any Propofition does not depend upon the Variety of the Ways or Kinds of Evidence, whereby it is known, but rather upon the Strength and Degree of Evidence, and the Clearness of that Light in or by which it appears to the Mind. For a Propofition that is known only one Way may be much more certain, and have stronger Evidence than another that is fupposed to be known many Ways. Therefore these Propofitions, Nothing has no Properties, Nothing can make itself, which are known only by Intelligence, are much furer and truer than this Propofition, The Rainbow has real and inherent Colours in it, or than this, the Sun rolls round the Earth; tho' we feem to know both these last by our Senfes, and by the common Testimony of our Neighbours. So any Propofition that is clearly evident to our own Consciousness or Divine Faith, is much more certain to us than a thousand others that have only the Evidence of feeble and obfcure Senfations, of mere probable Reasonings and doubtful Arguments, or the Witness of fallible Men, or even tho' all thefe fhould join together.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the Doc

trine of Prejudices.

INTRODUCTION.

I ,

N the End of the foregoing Chapter, we

have survey'd the several sorts of Evidence, on which we build our Aflent to Propositions. These are indeed the general Grounds upon which we form our Judgments concerning Things. What remains in this second part of Logick is to point out the several Springs and Causes of our Mistakes in judging, and to lay down some Rules by which we should conduct ourselves in pafling a Judgment of every Thing that is proposed

to us.

I confess many Things which will be mentioned in these following Chapters might be as well referrd to the third Part of Logick, where we fhall treat of Reasoning and Argument ; for most of our falfe Judgments seem to include a secret bad Reasoning in them; and while we shew the Springs of Error, and the Rules of true Judgment, we do at the same time discover which Arguments are fallacious, which Reasonings are weak, and which are just and strong. Yet since this is usually called a judging ill, or judging well, I think we may without any Impropriety treat of it here; and this will lay a surer Foundation for all sorts of Ratiocination and Argument.

Raih Judgments are called Prejudices, and so are the Springs of them. This Word in common Life signifies an ill Opinion which we have

conceive of fome other Perfon, or fome Injury done to him. But when we use the Word in Matters of Science, it fignifies a Judgment that is formed concerning any Perfon or thing before fufficient Examination; and generally we fuppofe it to mean a falfe Judgment or Mistake: At least, it is an Opinion taken up without folid Reafon for it, or an Affent given to a Propofition before we have juft Evidence of the Truth of it, tho' the thing itself may happen to be true.

Sometimes these rafh Judgments are called Prepoffeffions whereby is meant, that fome particular Opinion has poffeffed the Mind, and engaged the Affent without fufficient Search or Evidence of the Truth of it.

There is a vast Variety of these Prejudices and Prepoffeffions which attend Mankind in every Age and Condition of Life; they lay the Foundations of many an Error, and many an unhappy Practice, both in the Affairs of Religion, and in our civil Concernments, as well as in Matters of Learning. It is neceffary for a Man who purfues Truth to enquire into these Springs of Error, that as far as poffible he may rid himself of old Prejudices and watch hourly againit new ones.

The Number of them is fo great, and they are fo interwoven with each other, as well as with the Powers of human Nature, that it is fometimes hard to diftinguifh them apart; yet for Method Sake we shall reduce them to these four general Heads, (viz.) Prejudices arifing from Things, or from Words, from our felves, or from other Perfons; and after the Defcription of each Prejudice, we fhall propofe one or more Ways of curing it.

T

HE first sort of Prejudices are those which

arise from the Things themselves about which we judge. But here let it be observed that there is nothing in the Nature of Things that will neceffarily lead us into Error, if we do but use our Reason aright, and with-hold our Judgment till there appear fufficient Evidence of Truth. But since we are so unhappily prone to take Advantage of every doubtful Appearance and Circumstance of Things to form a wrong Judgment, and plunge ourselves into Mistake, therefore it is proper to consider what there is in the Things tbemselves that may occasion our Errors. .

I. The Obscurity of some Truths, and the Difficulty of searching them out, is one Occasion of rash and mistaken Judgment.

Some Truths are difficult because they lye remote from the first Principles of Knowledge, and want a long Chain of Argument to come at them : Sach are many of the deep Things of Algebra and Geometry, and some of the Theorems and Problems of most Parts of the Mathematicks. Many Things also in natural Philosophy are dark and intricate upon this Account, because we cannot come at any certain Knowledge of them without the Labour of many and difficult, as well as chargeable Experiments.

There are other Truths which have great Darkness upon them, because we have no proper Means or Mediums to come at the Knowledge of them. Tho' in our Age we have found out many of the

deep