A fingle Propofition (which is alfo called cate gorical) may be divided again into fimple and complex*.

A purely fimple Propofition is that whofe Subject and Predicate are made up of fingle Terms; as, Virtue is defirable: Every Penitent is pardon'd: No Man is innocent.

When the Subject, or Predicate, or both, are made up of complex Terms, it is called a complex Propofition; as every fincere Penitent is pardon'd; Virtue is defirable for its own Sake: No Man alive is perfectly innocent.

If the Term which is added to the Subject of a complex Propofition be either effential or any Way neceffary to it, then it is called explicative, for it only explains the Subject: as every Mortal Man is a Son of Adam. But if the Term added to make up the complex Subject does not neceffarily or conftantly belong to it, then it is determinative, and limits the Subject to a particular part of its Extenfion; as, every pious Man fhall be happy. In the first Propofition the Word mortal is merely explicative in the fecond Propofition the Word pious is determinative.

Here note, that whatsoever may be affirmed or denied concerning any Subject with an explicative Addition, may be alfo affirmed or denied of that Subject without it; as we may boldly fay, every Man is a Son of Adam, as well as, every mortal Man: But it is not fo, where the Addition is determinative, for we cannot fay, every Man fhall be happy, tho' every pious Man fhall be fo.

*As fimple Ideas are oppofed to complex, and fingle Ideas to compound, to Propofitions are diftinguifhed in the fame Manner: The English Tongue in this Refpect having fome Advantage above the learned Languages, which. have no ufual Word to diftinguish fingle from fimple.

In a complex Propofition the Predicate or Subject is fometimes made complex by the Pronouns, who, which, whofe, to whom, &c. which make another Propofition; as every Man who is pious, Shall be faved: Julius, whofe Sirname was Cæfar, overcame Pompey: Bodies which are tranfparent, have many Pores. Here the whole Propofition is called the primary or chief, and the additional Propofition is called an incident Propofition. But it is till to be esteem'd in this Cafe merely as a part of the complex Term; and the Truth or Falfhood of the whole complex Propofition is not to be judged by the Truth or Falfhood of the incident Propofition, but by the Connection of the whole Subject with the Predicate. For the incident Propopofition may be falfe, and abfurd, or impoffible, and yet the whole complex Propofition may be true, as, a Horfe which has Wings, might fly over the Thames.

Befide this Complexion which belongs to the Subject or Predicate, logical Writers use to say, there is a Complexion which may fall upon the Copula alfo But this I have accounted for in the Section concerning modal Propofitions; and indeed it is not of much Importance whether it were placed there or here.

SECT VI.

Of compound Propofitions.

A Compound Propofition is made up of two or

more Subjects or Predicates, or both; and it contains in it two or more Propofitions, which are either plainly expreft, or conceal'd and imply'd.

The

The first fort of compound Propofitions are those wherein the Compofition is expreft and evident, and they are distinguish'd into thefe fix Kinds, (viz.) Copulative, Disjunctive, Conditional, Caufal, Relative and Difcretive.

I. Copulative Propofitions are those which have more Subjects or Predicates connected by affirmative or negative Conjunctions; as Riches and Honours are Temptations to Pride: Cæfar conquer'd the Gauls and the Britons: Neither Gold nor Jewels will purchafe Immortality. Thefe Propofitions are evidently compounded, for each of them may be refolved into two Propofitions, (viz.) Riches are Temptations to Pride; and Honour is a Temptation to Pride; and fo the rest.

The Truth of copulative Propofitions depends upon the Truth of all the Parts of them; for if Cæfar had conquered the Gauls, and not the Britons, or the Britons and not the Gauls, the second copulative Propofition had not been true.

Here note, thofe Propofitions, which cannot be refolved into two or more fimple Propofitions, are not properly copulative, tho' two or more Ideas be connected and coupled by fuch Conjunctions, either in the Subject or Predicate; as, two and three make five: Majefty and Meeknefs don't often meet: The Sun, Moon, and Stars are not all to be Seen at once. Such Propofitions are to be efteem'd merely complex, because the Predicate cannot be affirmed of each fingle Subject, but only of all of them together as a collective Subject.

II. Disjunctive Propofitions are when the Parts are disjoined or opposed to one another by difjunctive Particles; as, it is either Day or Night:

The Weather is either fhining or rainy Quantity is either Length, Breadth, or Depth.

The Truth of Disjunctives depends on the neceffary and immediate Oppofition of the Parts ; therefore only the last of these Examples is true; but the two first are not strictly true, because Twilight is a Medium between Day and Night; and dry, cloudy Weather is a Medium between shining and raining.

III. Conditional or hypothetical Propofitions are those whofe Parts are united by the conditional Particle if; as, If the Sun be fixt, the Earth must move: If there be no Fire, there will be no Smoke.

Note, The firft Part of these Propofitions, or that wherein the Condition is contained, is called the antecedent, the other is called the confequent.

The Truth of thefe Propofitions depends not at all on the Truth and Falfhood of their two Parts, but on the Truth of the Connection of them; for each part of them may be false, and yet the whole Propofition true; as, if there be no Providence, there will be no future Punishment.

IV. Caufal Propofitions are where two Propofitions are joined by caufal Particles; as, Houfes were not built that they might be destroyed: Rehoboam was unhappy because be followed evil Counsel.

The Truth of a caufal Propofition arifes not from the Truth of the Parts, but from the caufal Influence that the one Part of it has upon the other; for both Parts may be true, yet the Propofition falfe, if one Part be not the Caufe of the other.

Some Logicians refer reduplicative Propofitions to this Place, as Men, confidered as Men, are rational Creatures, i. e. because they are Men. V. Re

V. Relative Propositions have their Parts joined by such Particles, as express a Relation or Comparison of one Thing to another ; as, when you are filent I will speak : As much as you are worth, so much you Mall be esteemed : As is the Father, so is the Son: Where there is no Tale-Bearer, Contention will cease.

These are very much a-kin to conditional Propositions, and the Truth of them depends upon the Justness of their Connežtion.

VI. Discretive Propositions are such wherein various and seemingly opposite Judgments are made whose Variety or Distinction is noted by the Particles, but, tho', yet, &c. as Travellers may change their Climate but not their Temper: Job was Patient, tho' bis Grief was great.

The Truth and Goodness of a discretive Proposition depends on the Truth of both Parts, and their Contradistinction to one another ; for tho' both Parts should be true, yet if there be no seeming Opposition between them, it is an useless Affertion, tho' we cannot call it a false one; as, Descartes was a Philosopher, yet he was a Frenchman : The Romans were valiant, but they Spoke Latin ; both which Propositions are ridiculous, for want of a seeming Opposition between the Parts.

Since we have declared wherein the Truth and Falshood of these compound Propositions consist, it is proper also to give fome Intimations how

any

of these Propofitions when they are false

may

be

opposed or contradicted.

All compound Propositions, except Copulatives and Discretives, are properly denied or contradicted when the Negation affects their conjunctive Particles ; as, if the disjunctive Proposition as

serts,