3

Note 3. The Subject and Predicate of a Propo

3 sition are not always to be known and distinguish'd by the placing of the Words in the Sentence, but by reflecting duly on the Sense of the Words, and on the Mind and Design of the Speaker or Writer: As if I say, in Africa there are many Lions, I mean mạny Lions are existent in Africa : Many Lions is the Subject, and existent in Africa is the Predicate. It is proper for a Philosopher to understand Geometry ; here the Word Proper is the Predicate, and all the rest is the Subject, except Is the Copula,

Note 4. The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition ought always to be two different Ideas, or two different Terms; for where both the Terms and Ideas are the same, it is called an identical ProPosition, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to promote Knowledge, such as, a Rule is a Rule, or a good Man is a good Man.

But there are some Propositions, wherein the Terms of the Subject and Predicate seein to be the fame, yet the Ideas are not the same; nor can these be calld purely identical or trifling Propofitions ; such as Home is Home ; that is, Home is a convenient or delightful Place; Socrates is Socrates still; that is, the Man Socrates is still a Philofopher : The Hero was not a Hero; that is, the Hero did not Mew his Courage: What I have written, 1 bave written : that is, what I wrote I still approve and will not alter it: What is done, is done ; that is, it cannot be undone. It may be easily observed in these Propositions the Term is equivocal, for in the Predicate it has a different Idea from what it has in the Subje£t.

There are also fome Propositions wherein the Terms of the Subject and Predicate differ, but the Ideas are the same ; and these are not merely iden

tical or trifling Propositions ; as, impudent is sameless ; a Billow is a Wave ; or Flutus (in Latin) is a Wave; a Globe is a round Body. In these Propositions either the Words are explain’d by a Definition of the Name, or the Ideas by a Definition of the Thing, and therefore they are by no Means useless, when formed for this Purpose.

CHA P. II.

Of the various kinds of Propofitions. Propositions may be distributed into various

Kinds according to their Subječt, their copula, their Predicate, their Nature or Composition, their Sense, and their Evidence, which Distributions will be explained in the following Sections,

Sect. I.

Of universal, particular, indefinite, and fingular,

Propositions.
P to

Subječt into universal and particular ; this is usually callid a Division arising from the Quantity.

An universal Proposition is when the Subject is taken according to the whole of its Extension ; so if the Subject be a Genus or general Nature, it includes all its Specics or Kinds : If the Subject be a Species, it includes all its Individuals. This Universality is usually signified by these Words, all, every, no, none, or the like; as, all Men mult

Part II. die: No Man is Almighty: Every Creature had a beginning.

A particular Propofition is when the Subject is not taken according to its whole Extenfion; that is, when the Term is limited and restrained to some one or more of thofe Species or Individuals, whofe general Nature it expreffes, but reaches not to all; and this is ufually denoted by the Words, fome, many, a few, there are which. &c. as fome Birds can fing well: Few Men are truly wife: There are Parrots which will talk a hundred Things.

Under the general Name of univerfal Propofitions, we may justly include those that are fingular, and for the most Part those that are indefinite alfo.

A fingular Propofition is when the Subject is a fingular or individual Term or Idea; as Descartes was an ingenious Philofopher: Sir Ifaac Newton bas far exceeded all his Predeceffors: The Palace at Hampton Court is a pleafant Dwelling: This Day is very cold. The Subject here must be taken according to the whole of its Extenfion, because being an individual, it can extend only to one, and it must therefore be regulated by the Laws of univerfal Propofitions.

An indefinite Propofition, is, when no Note, either of Univerfality or Particularity, is prefixed to a Subject, which is in its own Nature general; as a Planet is ever changing its Place: Angels are noble Creatures. Now this fort of Propofition, especially when it defcribes the Nature of Things, is ufually counted univerfal also, and it fuppofes the Subject to be taken in its whole Extenfion; for if there were any Planet which did not change its Place, or any Angel that were not a noble

Creature,

Creature, these Propofitions would not be strictly

true.

Yet in order to fecure us against Mistakes in Judging of univerfal, particular and indefinite Propofitions, it is neceffary to make these following Remarks.

I. Concerning univerfal Propofitions.

Note 1. Univerfal Terms may either denote a metaphyfical, a phyfical, or a moral Univerfality.

A metaphyfical, or mathematical Univerfality, is when all the Particulars contained under any general Idea have the fame Predicate belonging to them without any Exception whatsoever; or when the Predicate is fo effential to the universal Subject, that it deftroys the very Nature of the Subject to be without it; as, all Circles have a Centre and Circumference: All Spirits in their own Nature are immortal.

A phyfical or natural Universality, is, when according to the Order and common Courfe of Nature, a Predicate agrees to all the Subjects of that Kind, tho' there may be fome accidental and preternatural Exceptions; as, all Men ufe Words to express their Thoughts, yet dumb Persons are excepted, for they cannot fpeak. All Beasts have four Feet, yet there may be fome Monsters with five; or maim'd, who have but three.

A moral Univerfality, is when the Predicate agrees to the greatest part of the Particulars which are contained under the univerfal Subject; as all Negroes are stupid Creatures: All Men are govern'd by Affection rather than by Reafon: All the old Romans loved their Country: And the Scripture uses this Language, when St. Paul tells us, The Cretes are always Liars.

Now

Now it is evident, that a fpecial or fingular Conclufion cannot be inferr'd from a moral Univerfality, nor always and infallibly from a phyfical one, tho' it may be always inferred from a Univerfality which is metaphyfical, without any Danger or Poffibility of a Miftake.

Let it be observed alfo, that usually we make little or no Diftinction in common Language, between a Subject that is phyfically or metaphyfically. univerfal.

Note 2. An univerfal Term is fometimes taken collectively for all its particular Ideas united together, and fometimes diftributively, meaning each of them fingle and alone.

Inftances of a collective Univerfal are fuch as thefe: All these Apples will fill a Bufhel: All the Hours of the Night are fufficient for Sleep: All the Rules of Grammar overload the Memory. In thefe Propofitions it is evident, that the Predicate belongs not to the Individuals feparately, but to the whole collective Idea; for we cannot affirm the fame Predicate if we change the Word all into one, or into every, we cannot fay one Apple or every Apple will fill a Bushel, &c. Now fuch a collective Idea when it becomes the Subject of a Propofition, ought to be esteemed as one fingle Thing, and this renders the Propofition fingular or indefinite, as we fhall fhew immediately.

A diftributive Universal will allow the Word all to be changed into every, or into one, and by this Means is diftinguish'd from a collective.

Inftances of a diftributive Univerfal, are the moft common on every Occasion; as, all Men are mortal: Every Man is a Sinner, &c. But in this fort of Univerfal there is a Diftinction to be made, which follows in the next Remark.

Note