as the Cases of well contrived Shelves in a large Library wherein Folio's, Quarto's, Octavo's, and lesser Volumes, are disposed in such exact Order under the particular Heads of Divinity, History, Mathematicks, ancient and miscellaneous Learning, &c. that the Student knows where to find every Book, and has them all as it were within his Command at once, because of the exact Order wherein they are placed.

The Man who has such Asistances as these at Hand, in order to manage his Conceptions and regulate his Ideas, is well prepared to improve his Knowledge, and to join these Ideas together in a regular manner by Judgment, which is the second Operation of the Mind, and will be the Subject of the second Part of Logick.

THE

SECOND PART

OF

LOGIC K.

Of Judgment and Propofition.

W

HEN the Mind has got Acquaintance with Things by framing Ideas of them, it proceeds to the next Operation, and that is, to compare these Ideas together, and to join them by Affirmation, or disjoin them by Negation, according as we find them to agree or difagree. This Act of the Mind is called Judgment; as when we have by Perception obtained the Ideas of Plato, a Philofopher, Man, Innocent, we form thefe Judgments; Plato was a Philofopher;

no Man is innocent.

Some Writers have afferted, that Judgment confifts in a mere Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas. But I rather think there is an Act of the Will (at least in moft Cafes) neceffary to form a Judgment for tho' we do perceive, or think we perceive Ideas to agree or difagree, yet we may fometimes refrain from judging or affenting to the Perception, for fear left the Perception fhould

not

not be fufficiently clear, and we should be miftaken: And I am well affured at other Times, that there are Multitudes of Judgments formed, and a firm Affent given to Ideas join'd or disjoined, before there is any clear Perception whether they agree or disagree; and this is the Reafon of fo many falfe Fudgments or Miftakes among Men. Both these Practices are a Proof that Judgment bas Something of the Will in it, and does not merely confift in Perception, fince we fometimes judge (tho unhappily) without perceiving, and fometimes we perceive without immediate judging.

As an Idea is the Refult of our Conception or Apprehenfion, fo a Propofition is the Effect of Judgment. The foregoing Sentences which are Examples of the Act of Judgment are properly called Propofitions, Plato is a Philofopher, &c.

Here let us confider,

1. The general Nature of a Propofition, and the Parts of which it is compofed.

2. The various Divifions or Kinds of Propofi tions.

3. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the Doctrine of Prejudices.

4. General Directions to affist us in judging aright. 5. Special Rules to direct us in judging particular Objects.

CHAP. I.

Of the Nature of a Propofition, and its feveral Parts.

A

or

Propofition is a Sentence wherein two more Ideas or Terms are join'd or disjoin'd by one Affirmation or Negation, as Plato was a Philofopher: Every Angle is formed by two Lines meeting: No Man living on Earth can be compleatly happy. When there are never fo many Ideas or Terms in the Sentence, yet if they are joined or disjoined merely by one fingle Affirmation or Negation, they are properly called but one Propofition, tho' they may be refolved into feveral Propofitions which are implied therein, as will appear

ing compleatly happy, is the proper Predicate of the third.

The Subject and Predicate of a Propofition taken together are called the Matter of it; for these are the Materials of which it is made.

The Copula is the Form of a Propofition; it répresents the Act of the Mind affirming or denying, and it is expreft by the Words, am, art, is, are, &c. or, am not, art not, is not, are not, &c.

It is not a Thing of Importance enough to create a Difpute, whether the Words no, none, not, never, &c. which disjoin the Ideas or Terms in a negative Propofition, fhall be called a Part of the Subject of the Copula, or of the Predicate. Sometimes perhaps they may feem most naturally to be included in one, and fometimes in another of these, tho' a Propofition is usually denominated affirmative or negative by its Copula, as hereafter.

Note 1. Where each of these Parts of a Propofition is not expreft diftinctly in fo many Words, yet they are all understood and implicitly contained therein; as, Socrates difputed, is a compleat Propofition, for it fignifies, Socrates was difputing. So, I die, fignifies I am dying. I can write, i, e. I am able to write. In Latin and Greek one single Word is many Times a compleat Proposition.

Note 2. Thefe Words, am, art, is, &c. when they are used alone without any other Predicate fignify both the Act of the Mind judging, which includes the Copula, and fignify also actual Exiftence, which is the Predicate of that Propofition. So Rome is, fignifies Rome is exiftent: There are fome Strange Monsters, that is, fome ftrange Monfters are exiftent. Carthage is no more, i, e. Carthage has no Being.