V. Rule. Diftribute every Subject according to the fpecial Defign you have in View, fo far as is neceffary or useful to your prefent Enquiry. Thus a Politician diftributes Mankind according to their civil Characters, into the Rulers and the Ruled; and a Phyfician divides them into the Sick or the Healthy; but a Divine diftributes them into Turks, Heathens, Jews, or Chriftians.

Here Note, that it is a very useless Thing to diftribute any Idea into fuch Kinds or Members as have no different Properties to be spoken of; as it is mere trifling to divide right Angles into fuch whofe Legs are equal, and whofe Legs are unequal, for as to the mere right Angle they have no different Properties.

VI. Rule. In all your Distributions obferve the Nature of Things with great Exactnefs; and don't affect any particular Form of Diftribution, as fome Perfons have done, by dividing every Genus into two Species, or into three Species; whereas Nature is infinitely various, and human Affairs and human Sciences have as great a Variety, nor is there any one Form of Diftribution that will exactly fuit with all Subjects.

Note, It is to this Doctrine of Distribution of a Genus into its feveral Species, we must also refer the Distribution of a Caufe according to its feveral Effects, as fome Medicines are beating, fome are cooling; or an Effect when it is distinguish'd by its Caufes, as Faith is either built upon divine Teftimony or human. It is to this Head we refer particular artificial Bodies, when they are distinguished according to the Matter they are made of, as a Statue is either of Brafs, of Marble, or Wood, &, and any other Beings when they are diftinguifh'd

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guish'd according to their End and Defign, as the Furniture of Body or Mind is either for Ornament or Ufe. To this Head alfo we refer Subjects when they are divided according to their Modes or Accidents; as Men are either merry, or grave, or fad; and Modes when they are divided by their Subjects, as Distempers belong to the Fluids, or to the folid Parts of the Animal.

It is alfo to this Place we reduce the Propofals of a Difficulty under its various Cafes, whether it be in Speculation or Practice: As to fhew the Reafon of Sun-beams burning Wood, whether it be done by a convex Glass or a concave; or to fhew the Construction and Menfuration of Triangles, whether you have two Angles and a Side given, or two Sides and an Angle, or only three Sides. Here it is neceffary to distribute or divide a Difficulty into all its Cafes, in order to gain a perfect Knowledge of the Subject you contemplate.

It might be obferved here, that Logicians have fometimes given a Mark or Sign to diftinguish when it is an integral Whole, that is divided into its Parts or Members, or when it is a Genus, an univerfal Whole, that is diftributed into its Species and Individuals. The Rule they give is this: Whenfoever the whole Idea can be directly and properly affirmed of each Part, as a Bird is an Animal, a Fish is an Animal, Bucephalus is a Horfe, Peter is a Man, then it is a Diftribution of a Genus into its Species or a Species into its Individuals: But when the whole cannot be thus directly affirmed concerning every Part, then it is a Divifion of an integral into its feveral Species or Mem-. bers; as we cannot fay the Head, the Breast, the Hand or the Foot is an Animal, but we fay the Head is a Part of the Animal, and the Foot is another Part.

This Rule may hold true generally in corporeal Beings, or perhaps in all Substances: But when we say the Fear of God is Wisdom, and so is human Civility: Criticism is true Learning, and so is Philofophy: To execute a Murderer is Justice, and to Save and defend the Innocent is Justice too: In these Cases it is not so easily determin’d, whether an integral Whole be divided into its Parts, or an univertál into its Species: For the Fear of God may be called either one Part, or one Kind of Wisdom : Criticism is one Part, or one Kind of Learning : And the Execution of a Murderer may be called a Species of Justice as well as a Part of it. Nor indeed is it a Matter of great Importance to determine this Controversy.

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SECT. XI.

Of an orderly Conception of Things.

TI

HE last Rule to direct our Conceptions, is

that we should rank and place them in a proper Method and just Order. This is of necesary Use to prevent Confusion ; for as a Trader who never places his Goods in his Shop or Wharehouse in a regular Order, nor keeps the Accounts of his buying and selling, paying and receiving in a just Method, is in utmost Danger of plunging all his Affairs into Confusion and Ruin; so a Student

; who is in the Search of Truth, or an Author or Teacher who communicates Knowledge to others, will very much obstruct his Design, and confound his own Mind or the Mind of his Hearers, unless he range his Ideas in just Order.

If we would therefore become successful Learners or Teachers, we must not conceive of Things in a confused Heap, but dispose our Ideas in some certain Method, which may be most easy and use

ful both for the Understanding and Memory; and be fure as much as may be To follow the Nature of Things, for which many Rules might be given, viz.

1. Conceive as much as you can of the Effentials of any Subject, before you confider its Accidentals.

2. Survey firft the general Parts and Properties of any Subject, before you extend your Thoughts to difcourfe of the particular Kind or Species of it.

3. Contemplate Things firft in their own fimple Natures, and afterward view them in Compofition with other Things; unless it be your prefent Purpofe to take a compound Being to pieces, in order to find out or to fhew the Nature of it by fearching and discovering of what Simples it is compofed.

4. Confider the abfolute Modes or Affections of any Being as it is in itself, before you proceed to confider it relatively, or to furvey the various Relations in which it ftands to other Beings, &c.

Note, Thefe Rules chiefly belong to the Method of Instruction which the Learned call Synthetick.

But in the Regulation of our Ideas there is seldom an abfolute Neceffity that we fhould place them in this or the other particular Method: It is poffible in fome Cafes that many Methods may be equally good, that is, may equally affift the Understanding and the Memory: To frame a Method exquifitely accurate, according to the ftrict Nature of Things, and to maintain this Accuracy from the Beginning to the End of a Treatife, is a moft rare and difficult Thing, if not im poffible. But a larger Account of Method would

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be very improper in this Place, left we anticipate what belongs to the fourth Part of Logick.

SECT. XII.

Thefe five Rules of Conception exemplified.

T may be useful here to give a Specimen of the

I five special Rules to direct our Conceptions, which

have been the chief Subject of this long Chapter, and represent them practically in one View.

Suppose the Theme of our Difcourse were the Paffions of the Mind.

Ift, To gain a clear and distinet Idea of Passion, we must define both the Name and the Thing.

To begin with the Definition of the Name; we are not here to understand the Word Paffion in its vulgar and most limited Senfe, as it fignifies merely Anger or Fury; nor do we take it in its moft extenfive philofophical Senfe, for the fuftaining the Action of an Agent; but in the more limited philofophical Senfe, Paffions fignify the various Affections of the Mind, fuch as Admiration, Love, or Hatred; this is the Definition of the Name.

We proceed to the Definition of the Thing. Paffion is defined a Senfation of fome Special Commotion in animal Nature, occafioned by the Mind's Perception of fome Object fuited to excite that Commotion. Here the Genus or general Nature of Paffion is a Sen

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