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If the Subject be hiftorical or a Matter of Fact, we may then enquire whether the Action was done at all; whether it was done in fuch a manner, or by fuch Perfons as is reported; at what Time it was done; in what Place; by what Motive, and for what Defign; what is the Evidence of the Fact; who are the Witneffes; what is their Charafter and Credibility; what Signs there are of fuch a Fact; what concurrent Circumstances which may either fupport the Truth of it, or render it doubtful.

In order to make due Enquiries into all these and many other Particulars which go towards the complete and comprehenfive Idea of any Being, the Science of Ontology is exceeding neceffary. This is what was wont to be called the first Part of Metaphyficks in the Peripatetick Schools. It treats of Being in its most general Nature, and of all its Affections and Relations. I confefs the old Popish Schoolmen have mingled a Number of useless Subtilties with this Science; they have exhausted their own Spirits, and the Spirits of their Readers in many laborious and intricate Trifles, and fome of their Writings have been fruitful of Names without Ideas, which hath done much Injury to the facred Study of Divinity. Upon this Account many of the Moderns have most unjustly abandoned the whole Science at once, and thrown Abundance of Contempt and Raillery upon the very Name of Metaphyficks; but this Contempt and Cenfure is very unreasonable, for this Science feparated from fome Ariftotelian Fooleries and scholaftick Subtilties is fo neceffary to a diftinct Conception, folid Judgment, and just reasoning on many Subjects, that fometimes it is introduced as a Part of Logick, and not without Reason. And those who utterly defpife and ridicule it, either betray

betray their own Ignorance, or will be supposed to make their Wit and Banter a Refuge and Excufe for their own Lazinefs. Yet thus much I would add, that the later Writers of Ontology are generally the beft on this Account, because they have left out much of the ancient Jargon. See the Brief Scheme of Ontology in the Philofophick Eays by I. W.

Here let it be noted that it is neither ufeful, neceffary, or poffible to run thro' all the Modes, Circumstances and Relations of every Subject we take in hand; but in Ontology we enumerate a great Variety of them, that fo a judicious Mind may choose what are thofe Circumstances, Relations and Properties of any Subject, which are most neceffary to the prefent Design of him that speaks or writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to prove the Point.

As we arrive at the compleat Knowledge of an Idea in all its Parts, by that Act of the Mind which is called Divifion, fo we come to a comprebenfive Conception of a Thing in its feveral Properties and Relations, by that Act of the Mind which is called Abstraction, i. e. we confider each fingle Relation or Property of the Subject alone, and thus we do as it were withdraw and fepar. te it in our Minds both from the Subject it felf, as well as from other Properties and Relations in order to make a fuller Obfervation of it.

This Act of Abstraction is faid to be twofold, either Precifive or Negative.

Precifive Abstraction is when we confider those Things apart which cannot really exist apart; as when we confider a Mode without confidering its Subftance and Subject, or one effential Mode without another. Negative Abstraction is when we confider one Thing feparate from another, which

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may

may also exift without it; as when we conceive of a Subject without conceiving of its accidental Modes or Relations; or when we conceive of one Accident without thinking of another. If I think of reading or writing without the exprefs Idea of fome Man, this is precifive Abftraction; or if I think of the Attraction of Iron, without the exprefs Idea of fome particular magnetick Body. But when I think of a Needle without an Idea of its Sharpness, this is negative Abstraction; and it is the fame when I think of its Sharpness without confidering its Length.

SECT. X.

Of the extenfive Conception of Things, and of Diftribution.

A

S the Compleatness of an Idea refers to the several Parts that compofe it, and the Comprehenfion of an Idea includes its various Properties, fo the Extenfion of an Idea denotes the various Sorts or Kinds of Beings to which the fame Idea belongs And if we would be fully acquainted with a Subject, we must obferve

:

This fourth Rule to direct our Conceptions, viz. Conceive of Things in all their Extenfion, i. e. we muft fearch out the various Species or Special Natures which are contained under it as a Genus or general Nature. If we would know the Nature of an Animal perfectly, we must take Cognizance of Beafts, Birds, Fishes and Infects, as well as Men, all which are contained under the general Nature and Name of Animal,

As

As an integral Whole is diftinguifh'd into its feveral Parts by Divifion, fo the Word Distribution is moft properly used when we distinguish an univerfal Whole into its feveral Kinds of Species: And perhaps it had been better if this Word had been always confin'd to this Signification, tho' it must be confeft, that we frequently fpeak of the Divifion of an Idea into its feveral Kinds, as well as into several Parts.

The Rules of a good Diftribution are much the fame with thofe which we have before applied to Divifion, which may be just repeated again in the briefeft manner, in order to give Examples to them.

I. Rule. Each Part fingly taken must contain lefs than the Whole, but all the Parts taken collectively or together, muft contain neither more nor lefs than the Whole; or as Logicians fometimes exprefs it, the Parts of the Divifion ought to exhaust the whole Thing which is divided. So Medicine is juftly diftributed into Prophylactick, or the Art of preferving Health; and Therapeutick, or the Art of restoring Health; for there is no other fort of Medicine befides thefe two. But Men are not well diftributed into tall or fhort, for there are fome of a middle Stature.

II. Rule. In all Diftributions we should first confider the larger and more immediate Kinds or Species or Ranks of Being, and not divide a Thing at once into the more minute and remote. A Genus fhould not at once be divided into Individuals, or even into the lowest Species, if there be a Species fuperior. Thus it would be very improper to divide Animal into Trout, Lobster, Eel, Dog, Bear, Eagle, Dove, Worm and Butterfly, for

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these are inferior Kinds; whereas Animal ought first to be distributed into Man, Beaft, Bird, Fish, Infect: And then Beast should be diftributed into Dog, Bear, &c. Bird into Eagle, Dove, &c. Fish into Trout, Eel, Lobster, &c.

It is irregular alfo to join any inferior Species in the fame Rank or Order with the Superior; as if we would diftinguish Animals into Birds, Bears and Oysters, &c. it would be a ridiculous Distribution,

III. Rule. The feveral Parts of a Diftribution ought to be oppofite; that is, one Species or Clafs of Beings in the fame Rank of Divifion ought not to contain or include another; fo Men ought not to be divided into the Rich, the Poor, the Learned and the Tall; for poor Men may be both learned and tall, and fo may the rich.

But it will be objected, are not animated Bodies rightly diftributed into Vegetative and Animal, or (as they are usually called) Senfitive? Now the Senfitive contains the Vegetative Nature in it, for Animals grow as well as Plants. I answer that in this and all fuch Distributions the Word Vegetative fignifies merely Vegetative; and in this Senfe Vege tative will be fufficiently oppofite to Animal, for it cannot be faid of an Animal that it contains mere Vegetation in the Idea of it.

IV. Rule. Let not Subdivifions be too nume rous without Neceffity; therefore I think Quantity is better diftinguished at once into a Line, a Surface and a Solid, than to fay as Ramus does, that Quantity is either a Line, or a Thing lined; and a Thing lined is either a Surface or a Solid.

V, Rule,