timately united in Nature, nor unite thofe Things into one Part which Nature has evidently difjoined Thus it would be very improper in treating of an Animal Body to divide it into the fuperior and inferior Halves; for it would be hard to fay how much belongs by Nature to the inferior Half, and how much to the fuperior. Much more improper would it be ftill to divide the Animal into the right Hand Parts and left Hand Parts, which would bring greater Confufion. This would be as unnatural as a Man who should cleave a Hazel Nut in Halves thro' the Husk, the Shell and the Kernel at once, and fay a Nut is divided into these two Parts; whereas Nature leads plainly to the threefold Diftinction of Husk, Shell and Kernel.

(2.) Do not affect Duplicities nor Triplicities, nor any certain Number of Parts in your Divifion of Things; for we know of no fuch certain Number of Parts which God the Creator has observed in forming all the Varieties of his Creatures, nor is there any uniform determined Number of Parts in the various Subjects of human Art or Science ; yet fome Perfons have disturbed the Order of Nature, and abused their Readers by an Affectation of Dichotomies, Trichotomies, Sevens, Twelves, &c. Let the Nature of the Subject, confidered together with the Defign which you have in view, always determine the Number of Parts into which you divide it.

After all, it must be confefs'd that an intimate Knowledge of Things and a judicious Obfervation will affift in the Bufinefs of Divifion, as well as of Definition, better than too nice and curious an Attention to the mere Formalities of logical Writers, without a real Acquaintance with Things.

I

SECT.

Too great a Number of Subdivifions has been affected by fome Perfons in Sermons, Treatises, Inftructions, &c. under pretence of greater Accuracy: But this fort of Subtilties hath often given great Confufion to the Understanding, and fometimes more Difficulty to the Memory. In thefe Cafes it is only a good Judgment can determine what Subdivifions are needful.

5. Rule. Divide every Subject according to the Special Defign you have in view. One and the fame Idea or Subject may be divided in very different Manners according to the different Purposes we have in difcourfing of it. So if a Printer were to confider the several Parts of a Book, he must divide it into Sheets, the Sheets into Pages, the Pages into Lines, and the Lines into Letters. But a Grammarian divides a Book into Periods, Sentences and Words, or Parts of Speech, as Noun, Pronoun, Verb, &c. A Logician confiders a Book as divided into Chapters, Sections, Arguments, Propofitions, Ideas; and with the Help of Ontology, he divides the Propofitions into Subject, Object, Property, Relation, Action, Paffion, Cause, Effect, &c. But it would be very ridiculous for a Logician to divide a Book into Sheets, Pages and Lines ; or for a Printer to divide it into Nouns and Pronouns, or into Propofitions, Ideas, Properties or Caufes.

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SECT. IX.

Of a comprehenfive Conception of Things, and of Abstraction.

THE third Rule to direct our Conception requires us to conceive of Things comprehenfively. As we muft furvey an Object in all its Parts to obtain a compleat Idea of it, fo we must consider it in all its Modes, Attributes, Properties and Relations, in order to obtain a comprehenfive Conception of it.

The Comprehenfion of an Idea, as it was explain'd under the Doctrine of Univerfals, includes only the effential Modes or Attributes of that Idea; but in this Place the Word is taken in a larger Senfe, and implies alfo the various occafional Properties, accidental Modes and Relations.

The Neceffity of this Rule is founded upon the fame Reafon as the former, viz. That our Minds are narrow and fcanty in their Capacities, and as they are not able to confider all the Parts of a complex Idea at once, fo neither can they at once contemplate all the different Attributes and Circumftances of it: We must therefore confider Things fucceffively and gradually in their various Appearances and Circumftances: As our natural Eye cannot at once behold the fix Sides of a Dye or Cube, nor take Cognizance of all the Points that are marked on them, and therefore we turn up the Sides fucceffively, and thus furvey and number the Points that are marked on each Side, that we may know the whole.

In order to a comprehenfive View of any Idea, we must first confider whether the Object of it has an Existence as well as an Effence; whether it be a fimple or a complex Idea; whether it be a Subftance or a Mode; if it be a Subftance, then we muft enquire what are the effential Modes of it, which are neceffary to its Nature, and what are thofe Properties or Accidents of it, which belong to it occafionally, or as it is placed in fome particular Circumftances: We muft view it in its internal and abfolute Modes, and obferve it in those various external Relations in which it ftands to other Beings: We muft confider it in its Powers and Capacities either to do or fuffer: We must trace it up to its various Caufes, whether fupreme or fubordinate. We must descend to the Variety of its Effects, and take notice of its feveral Ends and Designs which are to be attained by it. We muft conceive of it as it is either an Object or a Subject; what are the Things that are akin to it, and what are the Oppofites or Contraries of it; for many things are to be known both by their contrary and their kindred Ideas.

If the thing we difcourfe of be a mere Mode, we muft enquire whether it belong to Spirits or Bodies; whether it be a phyfical or moral Mode: If moral, then we muft confider its Relation to God, to our felves, to our Neighbours; its Reference to this Life, or the Life to come. If it be a Virtue, we must seek what are the Principles of it, what are the Rules of it, what are the Tendencies of it, and what are the false Virtues that counterfeit it, and what are the real Vices that oppofe it, what are the Evils which attend the Neglect of it, what are the Rewards of the Practice of it both here and hereafter.