7th Obferv. The perfect Definition of any Being always includes the Definition of the Name whereby it is called, for it informs us of the Senfe or Meaning of that Word, and fhews us what Idea that Word is affixed to: But the Definition of the Names does by no means include a perfect Definition of the Thing; for as we have faid before, a mere fynonymous Word, a Negation of the contrary, or the Mention of any one or two diftinguishing Properties of the Thing may be a fufficient Definition of the Name. Yet in thofe Cafes where the effential Difference or Effence of a Thing is unknown, there a Definition of the Name by the chief Properties, and a Defcription of the Thing are much the fame.

And here I think it neceffary to take Notice of one general Sentiment that feems to run thro' that excellent Performance, Mr. Locke's Effay of human Understanding, and that is, "That

the Effences of Things are utterly unknown "to us, and therefore all our Pretences to diftin"guifh the Effences of Things can reach no far"ther than mere nominal Effences; or a Collecti"on of fuch Properties as we know; to fome of "which we affix particular Names, and others "we bundle up, feveral together, under one "Name: And that all our Attempts to rank Be

66

ings into different Kinds of Species can reach

no farther than to make mere nominal Species; "and therefore our Definitions of Things are but "mere nominal Defcriptions or Definitions of the "Name.

Now that we may do Justice to this great Author, we ought to confider that he confines this Sort of Difcourfe only to the Effence of fimple Ideas, and to the Effence of Substances, as appears evident in the fourth and fixth Chapters of his

H 4

Third

Third Book: for he allows the Names of mixed Modes always to fignify the real Effences of their Species, Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial Things to have real diftinct Species; and that in the Diftinction of their Effences there is generally lefs Confufion and Uncertainty than in natural, Chap. VI. Sect. 40, 41. tho' it must be confefs'd that he scarce makes any Diftinction between the Definition of the Name and the Definition of the Thing, as Ch. IV. and fometimes the Current of his Difcourfe decries the Knowledge of Effences in fuch general Terms as may juftly give Occafion to miftake.

It must be granted, that the Effence of moft of our fimple Ideas and the greatest part of particular natural Substances are much unknown to us; and therefore the effential Difference of fenfible Qualities and of the various Kinds of Bodies, (as I have faid before) lye beyond the Reach of our Understandings: We know not what makes the primary real inward Diftinctions between Red, Green, Sweet, Sour, &c. between Wood, Iron, Oil, Stone, Fire, Water, Flesh, Clay, in their general Natures, nor do we know what are the inward and prime Diftinctions between all the particular Kinds or Species in the Vegetable, Animal, Mineral, Metallick, or Liquid World of Things. See Philofoph. Effays. Eff. xi. Sec. 1.

But ftill there is a very large Field for the Knowledge of the Effences of Things, and for the Ufe of perfect Definitions amongst our complex Ideas, the modal Appearances and Changes of Nature, the Works of Art, the Matters of Science, and all the Affairs of the civil, the moral and the religious Life: And indeed it is of much more Importance to all Mankind to have a better Acquaintance with the Works of Art for their own Livelihood and

daily Ufe, with the Affairs of Morality for their Behaviour in this World, and with the Matters of Religion, that they may be prepared for the World to come, than to be able to give a perfect Definition of the Works of Nature.

If the particular Effences of Natural Bodies are unknown to us, we may yet be good Philofophers, good Artists, good Neighbours, good Subjects and good Chriftians without that Knowledge, and we have juft Reason to be content.

Now that the Effences of fome of the modal Appearances and Changes in Nature, as well as Things of Art, Science and Morality are fufficiently known to us to make perfect Definitions of them, will appear by the Specimen of a few Definitions of thefe Things.

Motion is a Change of Place. Swiftness is the paffing over a long Space in a fhort Time. A natural Day is the Time of one alternate Revolution of Light and Darkness, or it is the Duration of twenty four Hours. An Eclipfe of the Sun is a Defect in the Sun's Tranfmiffion of Light to us by the Moon interpofing. * Snow is congealed Vapour. *Hail is congeal'd Rain. An* Island is a Piece of Land rifing above the furrounding Water. An* Hill is an elevated Part of the Earth, and a Grove is a Piece of Ground thick fet with Trees. An House is a Building made to dwell in. A Cottage is a mean House in the Country. A Supper is that Meal which we make in the Evening. A Triangle is a Figure compofed of three Sides. A Gallon is a Measure containing eight Pints. A Porter is a Man who carries Burdens for Hire. A

*Note, Iland, Hill, Grove, are not defigned here in their more remote and fubftantial Natures, (if I may fo exprefs it) or as the Matter of them is Earth; for in this Senfe we know not their Effence, but only as confider'd in their modal Appearances, whereby one part of Earth is diftinguifht from another. The fame may be faid of Snow, Hail, &c.

Part I. King is the chief Ruler in a Kingdom. Veracity is the Conformity of our Words to our Thoughts. Covetousness is an exceffive Love of Money, or other Poffeffions. Killing is the taking away the Life of an Animal. Murder is the unlawful killing of a Man. Rhetorick is the Art of speaking in a manner fit to perfuade. Natural Philofophy is the Knowledge of the Properties of Bodies and the various Effects of them, or it is the Knowledge of the various Appearances in Nature and their Causes; and Logick is the Art of ufing our Reason well, &c.

Thus you fee the effential Differences of various Beings may be known, and are borrowed from their Qualities and Properties, their Caufes, Effects, Objects, Adjuncts, Ends, &c. and indeed as infinitely various as the Effences of Things are, their Definitions muft needs have very various Forms.

After all it must be confeffed, that many Logicians and Philofophers in the former Ages have made too great a Buftle about the Exactnefs of their Definitions of Things, and entered into long fruitless Controverfies and very ridiculous Debates in the feveral Sciences about adjusting the Logical Formalities of every Definition; whereas that fort of Wrangling is now grown very justly contemptible, fince it is agreed that true Learning and the Knowledge of Things depends much more upon a large Acquaintance with their various Properties, Caufes, Effects, Subject, Object, Ends and Designs, than it does upon the formal and fcholaftick Niceties of Genus and Difference.

SECT

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SECT. VII.

Of a compleat Conception of Things.

AVING dwelt fo long upon the first Rule to direct our Conceptions, and given an Account of the Definition both of Names and Things in order to gain clear and diftinct Ideas, we make hafte now to the fecond Rule to guide our Conceptions and that is, Conceive of Things compleatly in