CHAP. I.

Of the Nature of Ideas.

IRST, the Nature of Conception or Perception + fhall just be mentioned, tho' this may feem to belong to another Science rather than Logick.

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Perception is that Act of the Mind (or as fome Philofophers call it, rather a Paffion or Impreffion) whereby the Mind becomes confcious of any Thing, as when I feel Hunger, Thirst, or Cold, or Heat when I fee a Horse, a Tree, or a Man; when I hear a buman Voice, or Thunder, I am confcious of thefe Things, and this is called Perception. If I Study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am confcious of thefe inward Acts alfo, and my Mind perceives its own Thoughts, Wifhes, Fears, &c.

An Idea is generally defined a Representation of Thing in the Mind; it is a Representation of fomething that we have feen, felt, heard, &c. or been confcious of. That Notion or Form of a Horse, a Tree, or a Man, which is in the Mind, is called the Idea of a Horfe, a Tree, or a Man. That Notion of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Colour, Thought, or Wifh, or Fear, which is, in the Mind, is called the Idea of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Wifh, &c.

It is not the outward Object, or Thing which is perceived, (viz.) the Horfe, the Man, &c. nor

† Note, The Words Conception and Perception are often ufed promiscuously, as I have done here, because I would not embarrass a Learner with too many Diftinctions; but if I were to diftinguish them, I would fay Percep tion is the Confcioufnefs of an Object when prefent: Conception is the forming an Idea of the Object whether prefent or abfent.

is it the very Perception or Senfe, and Feeling, (viz.) of Hunger, or Cold, &c. which is called the Idea; but it is the Thing as it exifts in the Mind by Way of Conception or Reprefentation, that is properly called the Idea, whether the Object be present or absent.

As a Horse, a Man, a Tree, are the outward Objects of our Perception, and the outward Archetypes or Patterns of our Ideas; so our own Senfations of Hunger, Cold, &c. are also inward Archetypes or Patterns of our Ideas: But the Notions or Pictures of these Things, as they are confidered, or conceived in the Mind, are precifely the Ideas that we have to do with in Logick. To fee a Horfe, or to feel Cold is one Thing; to think of, and converse about a Man, a Horfe, Hunger, or Cold, is

another.

Among all these Ideas, fuch as represent Bodies, are generally called Images, efpecially if the Idea of the Shape be included. Those inward Reprefentations which we have of Spirit, Thought, Love, Hatred, Caufe, Effect, &c. are more pure and mental Ideas, belonging more especially to the Mind, and carry nothing of Shape or Senfe in them. But I fhall have occafion to speak more particularly of the Original and the Distinction of Ideas in the third Chapter. I proceed therefore now to confider the Objects of our Ideas.

CHAP.

СНАР. II.

Of the Objects of Perception.

SECT. I.

Of Being in general.

THE Object of Perception is that which is reprefented in the Idea, that which is the Archetype or Pattern, according to which the Idea is formed; and thus Judgments, Propofitions, Reafons, and long Difcourfes, may all become the Objects of Perception; but in this Place we fpeak chiefly of the first and more fimple Objects of it, before they are join'd and form'd into Propofitions or Difcourfes.

Every Object of our Idea is call'd a Theme, whe ther it be a Being or Not Being; for Not Being may be proposed to our Thoughts, as well as that which has a real Being. But let us first treat of Beings, and that in the largest Extent of the Word.

A Being is confider'd as poffible, or as actual.

When it is confidered as poffible, it is faid to have an Effence or Nature; fuch were all Things before their Creation: When it is confidered as actual, then it is faid to have Existence alfo; fuch are all Things which are created, and God himself the Creator.

Effence therefore is but the very Nature of any Being, whether it be actually exifting or no. A Rofe in Winter has an Effence, in Summer it has Existence alfo,

Note,

Note, There is but one Being which includes Existence in the very Effence of it, and that is God, who therefore actually exifts by natural and eternal Neceffity: But the actual Existence of every Creature is very distinct from its Effence, for it may be or may not be, as God please.

Again, Every Being is confider'd either as fubfifting in and by its felf, and then it is called a Subftance; or it fubfifts in and by another, and then it is called a Mode or Manner of Being. Tho' few Writers allow Mode to be call'd a Being in the fame perfect Senfe as a Subftance is; and fome Modes have evidently more of real Entity or Being than others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. Thefe Things will furnish us with Matter for larger Discourse in the following Sections.

SECT. II.

Of Substances and their various Kinds.

Subftance is a Being which can fubfift by it

A felf, without Dependence upon any other

created Being. The Notion of fubfifting by itself gives occafion to Logicians to call it a Subftance. So a Horfe, a House, Wood, Stone, Water, Fire, a Spirit, a Body, an Angel are called Substances, because they depend on nothing but God for their Existence.

It has been usual alfo in the Description of Subftance to add, it is that which is the Subject of Modes or Accidents; a Body is the Subftance or Subject, its Shape is the Mode.

But left we be led into Mistakes, let us here take Notice, that when a Substance is said to fubfift without Dependence upon another created Being, all that we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroy'd and reduced to nothing, by any Power inferior to that of our Creator; tho' its prefent particular

B

particular Form, Nature and Properties may be alter'd and destroy'd by many inferior Causes: a Horfe may die and turn to Duft; Wood may be turned into Fire, Smoak and Afbes; a Houfe into Rubbish, and Water into Ice or Vapour; but the Substance or Matter of which they are made ftill remains, tho' the Forms and Shapes of it are altered. A Body may ceafe to be a Houfe or a Horfe, but it is a Body ftill; and in this Sense it depends only upon God for its Existence.

Among Substances fome are thinking or conscious Beings, or have a Power of Thought, fuch as the Mind of Man, God, Angels. Some are extended and folid or impenetrable, that is, they have Dimenfions of Length, Breadth, and Depth, and have also a Power of Refiftance, or exclude. every thing of the fame kind from being in the fame Place. This is the proper Character of Matter or Body.

As for the Idea of Space, whether it be void or full, i. e. a Vacuum or a Plenum, whether it be interfpers'd among all Bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the Bounds of the Creation, it is an Argument too long and too hard to be difputed in this Place what the Nature of it is: It has been much debated whether it be a real Substance, or a mere Conception of the Mind, whether it be the Immensity of the Divine Nature, or the mere Order of co-exiftent Beings, whether it be the manner of our Conception of the Distances of Bodies, or a mere Nothing. Therefore I drop the Mention of it here, and refer the Reader to the first Effay among the Philofophical Effays by I. W. published 1733.

Now if we feclude Space out of our Confideration, there will remain but two Sorts of Substances in the World, i. e. Matter and Mind, or as we other