The Poet Juvenal has long ago given us a hint of this Accuracy and Diftinction when he fays of Brutes and Men,

Indulfit mundi communis Conditor illis
Tantum Animas; nobis Animum quoque.
Sat. xvi. v. 134.

may

Exception. There is one Cafe wherein fome of these last Rules concerning the Definition of Words be in fome measure difpenfed with; and that is, when ftrong and rooted Prejudice hath eftablifh'd fome favourite Word or Phrafe, and long used it to exprefs fome mistaken Notion, or to unite fome inconfiftent Ideas; for then it is sometimes much easier to lead the World into Truth by indulging their Fondness for a Phrafe, and by affigning and applying new Ideas and Notions to their Favourite Word; and this is much fafer also than to awaken all their Paffions by rejecting both their old Words, and Phrafes, and Notions, and introducing all new at once: Therefore we continue to fay, There is Heat in the Fire, there is Coldness in Ice, rather than invent new Words to exprefs the Powers which are in Fire or Ice, to excite the Senfations of Heat or Cold in us. For the fame Reason fome Words and Phrafes which are lefs proper may be continued in Theology, while People are led into clearer Ideas with much more Eafe and Succefs, than if an Attempt were made to change all their beloved Forms of Speech.

In other Cafes these logical Directions should generally be obferved, and different Names affixt to different Ideas.

Here I cannot but take Occafion to remark, that it is a confiderable Advantage to any Language to have a Variety of new Words introduced

into it, that when in Courfe of Time new Objects and new Ideas arise, there may be new Words and Names affign'd to them: And also where one fingle Name has fuftain'd two or three Ideas in Time paft, these new Words may remove the Ambiguity by being affixt to fome of those Ideas. This Practice would by degrees take away part of the Uncertainty of Language. And for this Reafon I cannot but congratulate our English Tongue, that it has been abundantly enrich'd with the Translation of Words from all our neighbour Nations, as well as from antient Languages, and these Words have been as it were enfranchised amongst us; for French, Latin, Greek and German Names will fignify English Ideas, as well as Words that are antiently and intirely English.

It may not be amifs to mention in this Place, that as the Determination of the particular Senfe in which any Word is ufed is called the Definition of the Name, fo the Enumeration of the various Senfes of any equivocal Word is fometimes call'd the Divifion or Distinction of the Name; and for this Purpose good Dictionaries are of excellent Ufe.

This Diftinction of the Name or Word is greatly neceffary in Argumentation or Difpute; when a fallacious Argument is ufed, he that answers it diftinguishes the feveral Senfes of fome Word or Phrafe in it, and fhews in what Senfe it is true and in what Senfe it is as evidently falfe.

SECT. IV.

Of the Definition of Things.

S there is much Confufion introduced into our Ideas, by the Means of those Words to which they are affixed; fo the mingling our Ideas with each other without Caution, is a farther Occafion whereby they become confufed. A Court Lady, born and bred up amongst Pomp and Equipage, and the vain Notions of Birth and Quality, conftantly joins and mixes all these with the Idea of her felf, and fhe imagines these to be effential to her Nature, and as it were necessary to her Being; thence she is tempted to look upon menial Servants, and the lowest Rank of Mankind, as another Species of Beings quite diftinct from her felf. A Plough Boy that has never travelled beyond his own Village, and has feen nothing but thatch'd Houfes and his Parish-Church, is naturally led to imagine that Thatch belongs to the very Nature of a House, and that that must be a Church which is built of Stone, and especially if it has a Spire upon it. A Child whofe Uncle has been exceffive fond, and his Schoolmaster very fevere, easily believes that Fondness always belongs to Uncles, and that Severity is effential to Mafters or Inftructors. He has feen alfo Soldiers with red Coats, or Minifters with long black Gowns, and therefore he perfuades himself that these Garbs are effential to the Characters, and that he is not a Minifter who has not a long black Gown, nor can he be a Soldier who is not dreffed in red. It would be well if all fuch Miftakes ended with Childhood.

It might be alfo fubjoined, that our complex Ideas become confused, not only by uniting or blending together more fimple or fingle Ideas than really belong to them, as in the Inftances juft mention'd; but Obfcurity and Confufion fometimes come upon our Ideas alfo, for want of uniting a fufficient Number of fingle Ideas to make the complex one: So if I conceive of a Leopard only as a Spotted Beaft, this does not diftinguish it from a Tyger or a Lynx, nor from many Dogs or Horfes, which are spotted too; and therefore a Leopard must have some more Ideas added to complete and distinguish it.

I grant that it is a large and free Acquaintance with the World, a watchful Obfervation and diligent Search into the Nature of Things that must fully correct this kind of Errors: The Rules of Logick are not fufficient to do it: But yet the Rules of Logick may inftruct us by what means to diftinguish one thing from another, and how to fearch and mark out as far as may be the Contents and Limits of the Nature of diftinct Beings, and thus may give us great Affiftance towards the Remedy of these Mistakes.

As the Definition of Names frees us from that Confufion which Words introduce, fo the Definition of Things will in fome Measure guard us againft that Confufion which mingled Ideas have introduced: For as a Definition of the Name explains what any Word means, fo a Definition of the Thing explains what is the Nature of that thing.

In order to form a Definition of any thing we muft put forth these three Acts of the Mind.

1st, Compare the thing to be defined with other things that are moft like to itself, and fee

wherein its Effence or Nature agrees with them; and that is call'd the general Nature or Genus in a Definition: So if you would define what Wine is, first compare it with other Things like itself, as Cyder, Perry, &c. and you will find it agrees effentially with them in this, that it is a fort of Juice.

2dly, Confider the most remarkable and primary Attribute, Property, or Idea wherein this Thing differs from those other Things that are most like it ; and that is its essential or Specific Difference: So Wine differs from Cyder and Perry, and all other Juices, in that it is preffed from a Grape. This may be called its special Nature, which distinguishes it from other Juices.

3dly, Join the general and special Nature together, or (which is all one) the Genus and the Difference, and these make up a Definition. So the Juice of a Grape, or Juice preft from Grapes is the Definition of Wine.

So if I would define what Winter is, I confider firft wherein it agrees with other Things which are moft like it (viz.) Summer, Spring, Autumn, and I find they are all Seafons of the Year; therefore a Seafon of the Year is the Genus. Then I observe wherein it differs from thefe, and that is in the fhortness of the Days; for it is this which does primarily diftinguish it from other Seafons; therefore this may be called its Special Nature or its Difference. Then by joining thefe together I make a Definition. Winter is that Seafon of the Year where in the Days are shorteft. I confefs indeed this is but a ruder Definition of it, for to define it as an accurate Aftronomer I muft limit the Days, Hours and Minutes.

After the fame manner if we would explain or define what the Picture of a Man is, we confider.