Britain's traditional enemies, Germany and Russia, has lessened the usefulness of the alliance. As a graceful means to terminate the alliance with Japan, Britain would advocate an American-British-Japanese entente. That at least seems to be the situation as I see it today.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN DECIDES

Washington, December 7, 1921: There is now little doubt that the Foreign Office at Tokyo, counselled by the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, has made up its mind to give up the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is also certain that this decision is predicated upon the materialization of an understanding or entente between America, Britain, and Japan, possibly to be joined by France.

Today optimism prevails at the headquarters of the Japanese delegation, indicating that it is satisfied with the development of the situation both here and at home. The general feeling among them is one of gratification and confidence. They are especially gratified that the American Government, as well as the American public, has been exceedingly generous towards them.

When President Harding's invitation to the Conference reached Tokyo, there was a feeling of uneasiness and suspicion among the Japanese. They knew that the Senate at Washington, as well as American public sentiment as expressed in the press, had been decidedly hostile towards them. Some Japanese went as far as to say that America summoned Japan much as a judge would summon a defendant. Some newspapers saw in the proposed conference the greatest crisis in Japan's relations with America.

All this feeling of suspicion and uneasiness evapo

rated into thin air soon after the Japanese delegates arrived at Washington. With the work of the Conference half finished today, they are confident that, when the Conference comes to an end, Japan and America will have become better friends than they have been in the past fifteen years.

As far as the alliance with the British is concerned, Japan's attitude and the latest developments are exactly what I forecast a few days before the opening of the Conference. In arriving at the conclusion that the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is the best thing for Japan, the leaders at Tokyo have been unquestionably moved by their knowledge of the antipathy and suspicion prevailing in America towards the alliance. They realize that the Pacific era, as prophesied by the late Colonel Roosevelt, is about to take the place of the Atlantic era, and that America is bound to be the greatest political and economic factor in this dawning era. It is but natural that they should be willing to go a long way in meeting the American Government and people. It is even expected that Baron Kato, the head of the Japanese delegation, will in some way make this Japanese attitude clear before the close of the Conference. Just how that will be done it is not possible to ascertain at this moment.

Japan will part with England with the confident feeling that she has served her ally honorably and faithfully. She is in a position to say to the world that whenever she enters into an alliance with any nation her sincerity and honesty can be absolutely relied upon. Mr. Lloyd George, in a recent address in the House, plainly admitted this. A prominent British writer on international affairs in a recent essay agrees that the Japanese have not got much from the alliance and that it has been an arrangement for the benefit of England.

This is an extreme statement, for there is no doubt that Japan owes much to the alliance. Nevertheless Japan feels satisfied that she has always adhered to the spirit and letter of the alliance.

CHAPTER XI

THE NEW TREATY

Washington, December 10, 1921: As the peals of applause, which greeted the announcement by Senator Lodge of the four-power pact yesterday, give way to calmer reflection, we are in a mood to look upon the new international instrument with critical eyes.

The heart of this treaty is, of course, Article 1, binding each contracting party to respect the rights of the other in the Pacific. All other provisions matter little. Article 2, which has been compared by some critics to Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, is not important, because the elimination of Germany as a sea power has made it impossible to think of any nation, which is outside of this new international group, and which will be strong enough to threaten in the coming ten years any of the Pacific possessions and dominions of the Powers bound by this new treaty.

In my letter of November 10 I said that a probable entente between America, England and Japan would adopt the principles embodied in the Root-Takahira note of 1908. The substance of the new pact justifies that prediction, with the exception that France has been added to the group and that the problem of China is not dealt with in the treaty. As far as the rights of the Powers in the region of the Pacific are concerned, the new instrument differs little in principle from the American-Japanese understanding drafted by Mr. Root twelve years ago.