CHAPTER VI

THE "FORTIFICATIONS FOR PEACE"

Washington, February 1, 1922: The much belated announcement of the Naval Armament Treaty is made at last. It was formally adopted at the fifth plenary session this morning after a delay of some five weeks. For this undue delay Japan is to blame, because its main cause has been her indecisive attitude towards the fortification question.

Into the details of this treaty I need not enter. From the Japanese point of view, its most important features. are the provisions on the capital ship ratio and the fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. As for the naval ratio, it has been fully discussed in my previous letters. Here I must tell you the real involution of the fortification question.

When the Japanese delegation failed to secure the alteration of the capital ship ratio and was obliged to accept the 5-5-3 ratio as originally proposed by the American delegation, Admiral Baron Kato approached Mr. Hughes with a view to reach an agreement for the cessation of further work on the fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. To this idea the American delegation was favorably disposed. In several conversations between Hughes, Balfour and Kato it was agreed that the status quo should be maintained as to the fortifications and naval bases in the "region of the Pacific," with the exception of Australia, New Zealand, the Hawaiian Islands, and Japan proper. It was then under

stood that Japan proper did not include the Bonin Islands and Amami-Oshima, and that these islands should, therefore, come within the zone in which the status quo was to be maintained. In accordance with this interpretation, the original Article 19 was drafted. There is reason to believe that Admiral Kato readily subscribed to that interpretation. Whether he did so under definite instructions from the home government is not known. Certain it is that personally he saw no

reason why the Bonin group should be excluded from the status quo zone. As on the ratio question, so on the fortification question, he proved very liberal and conciliatory. He felt assured that Japan's safety was fairly protected by the four-power Pacific Treaty and the abandonment of the American project to develop naval bases at Guam and the Philippines.

To the embarrassment of the Japanese delegation, however, the home government took the view that the Bonin Islands should be excluded from the status quo zone, and that Japan should reserve the right to fortify them according to her own needs and discretion, because they formed a part of Japan proper. I am inclined to think that the Government at Tokyo took this attitude mainly because the United States reserved the right to strengthen the fortifications and naval bases in the Hawaiian Islands. Fair-minded critics must admit that this Japanese contention was not devoid of plausible reason. Hawaii is 2,100 sea miles from San Francisco, while the Bonin group is only 500 sea miles from Japan. If America must keep on increasing the fortifications and naval bases on islands whose distance from its Pacific Coast is about four times as great as the distance between Yokohama and the Bonin group, Japan can reasonably advance strong arguments for the exclusion of that group from the status quo zone. More

over, Pearl Harbor at Hawaii has already been converted into a magnificent naval base. If America really wished to be a harbinger of peace and looked forward to an age of amity and friendliness in the Pacific Ocean, why should she be so eager to keep on strengthening a naval base already well developed? It is quite likely that Admiral Kato wished to bring out the question of the Hawaiian fortifications in his conversations with Mr. Hughes, but he knew the American intention on this matter too well to hazard a proposal. To an idealist it seems regrettable that America could not have played big brother and decided of her own accord to stop work on the Hawaiian base.

Acting upon instructions from Tokyo, Admiral Kato asked Mr. Hughes whether he would agree to the exclusion of the Bonin Islands from the status quo region. Here Mr. Hughes was uncompromising. He would not listen to any proposal which would permit Japan to increase fortifications in the Bonin group. As a compromise, Kato proposed that the Bonin group be eliminated from the Naval Treaty, but that Japan should sign a separate note, pledging herself to maintain the status quo of the islands. Of course this compromise was flimsy and meaningless, because there was no difference between a treaty and a note as far as its binding force was concerned. As long as Japan insisted upon the fundamental point, namely, the exclusion of the Bonins from the status quo zone, she had good argument to back her. Once that point was conceded, there was no reason why she should hesitate to accept it in a treaty. And yet Japan allowed this quibbling to delay the conclusion of the Naval Treaty for a month. The only plausible explanation for this peculiar Japanese attitude may be found in the prevalent opinion in Japan that no outside power should be allowed to determine

what islands constituted Japan proper, and that Japan proper, as understood among the Japanese, included the Bonins, which are, strangely enough, under the direct control of the metropolitan government of Tokyo. It was the hackneyed conception of national dignity or "face" which entered the agreement.

It was while Mr. Hughes and Admiral Kato were engaged in these unprofitable conversations that Mr. Balfour proposed the novel scheme of a parallelogram within which all fortifications and naval bases were to maintain the status quo. The boundary lines of this zone were to be the equator on the south, the 30th degree of latitude on the north, the 110th degree of longitude on the west, and the 180th degree of longitude on the east. In presenting this novel scheme, Britain, it was surmised, had in view the increase of fortifications on certain islands south of the equator which were, in the original American plan, included in the status quo zone. It also permitted the strengthening of naval bases in the Aleutian group. At the same time it put the Bonins within the zone where further fortifications were to be prohibited. Naturally this met with vigorous opposition on the part of Japan and was finally abandoned.

After protracted negotiations Japan withdrew the contention that the Bonin group be excluded from the status quo zone. Article 19 of the Naval Treaty, as finally agreed upon, reads as follows:

"The United States of America, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present treaty with regard to fortifications and naval bases shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

"1. The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean,

except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

"2. Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean east of the meridian of 110 degrees east longitude except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand;

"3. The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: The Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

"The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified, that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval force, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defense of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of wornout weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.'

The above article explains itself. Japan has foregone the right of increasing the fortifications of the Bonin group and several other islands, but America is allowed that right with regard to the Hawaiian group. As for Guam, no practical work has been commenced on the naval base project contemplated by the American Government. The naval base in the Philippines has not yet assumed such a magnitude as to inspire fear in the Japanese mind. Although the fortifications there.