one can tell how long the present state of chaos and disintegration in Siberia will continue, and Japanese public opinion will not permit our troops to remain there indefinitely.

The history of Siberian intervention may be briefly told. Towards the end of January, 1918, the world began to talk about possible intervention in Siberia. It was rumored at that time that the Japanese foreign minister informally consulted the British, American and French Governments with a view to ascertaining their attitude towards the Siberian situation which had become extremely dangerous by reason of the downfall of the Kerensky Government and the appearance of the Bolshevist regime. France immediately responded in favor of intervention. In the judgment of the Quai d'Orsay, intervention was not only Japan's right but her duty. England, though somewhat undecided, was favorably inclined towards intervention. President Wilson, on the other hand, could not see his way to agree with the French and British foreign offices on this question. In March, 1918, Mr. Wilson addressed a note to the Japanese Government setting forth his view on the Siberian question.

In the meantime, anti-Bolshevik Russians throughout Siberia appealed to Japan for aid. In their judgment a vigorous intervention, backed by a strong army, was the only salvation for Siberia. Certain elements in the responsible quarters in Japan were undoubtedly inclined. to lend ear to this appeal. This attitude of the Japanese was evidently strengthened by the ascendancy which the Bolsheviki were gaining in Eastern Siberia. It was reported that the Soviet Government at Moscow had entered into an agreement with the German General Staff, promising to send Russian agitators and agents of destruction out of Vladivostok and to the ports of

the United States, Japan and the British colonies. They had also agreed to ship across Siberia three submarines in parts, to be put together at Vladivostok, and employed in the Pacific for the detriment of allied shipping. That these rumors were well founded was later proven by the evidence made public by the American Committee on Public Information on September 14, 1918. To make the situation worse, the Bolsheviki were everywhere fraternizing with German and Austrian prisoners of war whom they had released. East of Lake Baikal they were fighting against General Semenov, the leader of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Eastern Siberia. The number of liberated war prisoners in that region was estimated variously at between 30,000 and 60,000.

All these conditions intensified Japanese fear of the Bolshevist advance towards the Pacific. By May, 1918, the British and French Governments recognized more clearly than ever the necessity of an intervention. President Wilson was also compelled to see the danger that was developing in Siberia. By June Mr. Wilson had entirely changed his mind on the Siberian question and took the initiative to negotiate with Japan for an allied intervention or military action. He found a plausible reason for intervention in the appearance of a large number of Czecho-Slovaks who had deserted the Austrian army and were forcing their way through Siberia in an effort to reach Vladivostok. The rescue of these Czecho-Slovaks was the primary reason attributed by Mr. Wilson to the allied action. On August 3, the American Government, having arrived at an agreement with the Government at Tokyo, issued a statement defining its attitude towards Siberia. The statement said:

"As the Government of the United States sees the

present circumstances, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or selfdefense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance.

"In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs-not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy-and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny."

On the same date the Japanese Government also issued a statement conveying much the same message as was contained in the American statement. Japanese note said:

The

"In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military." As the result of the agreement reached between

Japan and America the first contingent of allied forces landed at Vladivostok on August 10, 1918, and was received with great enthusiasm by the Russians. But this enthusiasm soon faded and in its place a feeling of disappointment, suspicion, and fear began to assert

itself.

CHAPTER XXXVI

JAPAN'S DISCORD WITH AMERICA

Washington, January 25, 1922: The Chita Government holds the American Government partly responsible for the continued stay of Japanese troops on Siberian soil. On April 10, 1921, the National Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic addressed a note to the American Government, arguing that the United States was under obligation to compel the withdrawal of Japanese soldiers simultaneously with American evacuation.

Upon receipt of this note, the State Department ordered Dr. Abbott and Colonel Davis, the commercial and the military attaché, respectively, of the American Embassy at Tokyo, to proceed to Chita and investigate the real status of the new Republic. The American mission was most cordially received by the authorities of the Far Eastern Republic, who hoped that American recognition would soon follow. Upon their return to Washington, Dr. Abbott and Colonel Davis submitted to the State Department a report which is said to be very favorable to Chita. And yet no step has been taken by the American Government.

In the eyes of the Chita Government, the American initiative taken in the organization of the interallied expedition imposes upon America the responsibility of ending that expedition, not independently of, but concurrently with, her allies and associates interested in the undertaking. But in January, 1920, the American Government, without consulting Japan, suddenly de