bility for the massacre of 700 Japanese, including the Japanese Consul, at Nikolaievsk in March, 1920.

7. If the Chita Government pledges itself to undertake the tasks above mentioned Japan will withdraw all troops without delay.

The latest advices from Dairen indicate that the conference may yet reach an agreement. The chief difficulty now seems to center upon the Japanese occupation of northern Saghalien which was undertaken as the result of the Nikolaievsk massacre of March, 1920. Undoubtedly, Japan is now insisting that the Chita Government shall shoulder the responsibility for that incident and agree upon a plan of settlement before she will remove her troops from Saghalien.

The chief obstacle to the Chita Government is the secession of Maritime Province, which deprives the Far Eastern Republic of the all-important port of Vladivostok, the key to Siberia. When the Chita Government was organized a year ago, it sent to Vladivostok a man named Antonov as its representative. But last May the Antonov administration at Vladivostok was overthrown by S. D. Merkulov, a lawyer, who called himself a moderate Social Democrat. Merkulov was supported by the Kappel forces, a part of what was left of the Kolchak army. The radicals who were ousted by Merkulov did not fail to blame the Japanese for their downfall. They asserted that the Japanese commander secretly aided the conservative leader and thus enabled him to defeat their government. On the other hand, the Japanese military authorities in Vladivostok emphatically stated that they maintained a strict neutrality in the conflict and that their entire interest was in the preservation of law and order.

Nevertheless the feeling seems to be universal both among the Russians and among the Japanese at Vladi

vostok that the Merkulov Government will not be able to stand once the Japanese troops are withdrawn. Its existence is made possible by the peace and order maintained by the Japanese. The Bolsheviki and other radical elements are acquiescing in the new administration mainly because of the presence of the Japanese troops. It is, therefore, but natural that the Chita Government should denounce the Japanese troops. It is the avowed intention of Chita to destroy the present conservative government at Vladivostok and install in its place a radical government which will faithfully represent the Far Eastern Republic.

Another obstacle to the Far Eastern Republic is the increasing control by the Chinese authorities of the Russian line called the Chinese Eastern Railway which runs through Manchuria and links Chita with the Pacific metropolis of Vladivostok. Since the fall of the Kerensky Government this railroad, some 900 miles long, has gradually passed under Chinese control. The Russians have been accusing the Chinese railway authorities of mismanagement, corruption, and discrimination. Of this railway I shall have more to say, for the Conference is now considering it.

CHAPTER XXXV

SHIDEHARA TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

Washington, January 23, 1922: Baron Shidehara, the Japanese delegate, took the Siberian bull by the horns today and put Japan's case in Siberia squarely before the Far Eastern Committee before any other delegation brought out the question. It was good strategy. For the first time the Japanese have taken the offensive. A similar course should have been followed with regard to China, as I argued in my letter of December 30.

Baron Shidehara recapitulates the history of the allied military action in Siberia, and states that at present no part of Siberia is under Japanese "military occupation." Although Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern part of Maritime Province, they have nowhere set up any civil or military administration to displace the local authorities. These troops will be retained pending the conclusion of the negotiations now going on at Dairen. In Baron Shidehara's language, those negotiations have "in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region, and the prohibition of Bolshevist propaganda over the Siberian border. Should adequate provisions be arranged on the lines indicated the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the

complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from Maritime Province."

In the case of Saghalien, the Japanese delegate makes exception to the above statement. He says that Japan will occupy certain points on that island, pending the "establishment of a responsible authority with whom Japan can communicate for the purpose of obtaining due satisfaction" for the massacre of 700 Japanese by Russians at Nikolaievsk in the spring of 1920. Such, in short, is the Japanese official view of the Siberian situation. (See Appendix XIII, A.) But a historian's point of view is somewhat different. It cannot be denied that Japanese public opinion has been almost unanimous in opposing the Siberian policy of the Government. Since last August, the Foreign Office at Tokyo has been negotiating with the Chita Government, with a view to obtaining some sort of a pledge for the guarantee of life and property in Siberia. But the Japanese press believes that the attitude of the Foreign Office is wrong. In the opinion of the newspaper, Japan should withdraw her troops without exacting any pledge from the Far Eastern Republic. For what is the Chita Government after all? Is it in a position to guarantee the security of foreign lives and property? It is not sure whether it can protect itself. No one knows how long that government is going to last. What is the use of obtaining any pledge from such a shaky government? This, in short, is the general attitude of the Japanese press.

The Government at Tokyo is in a very awkward position. It knows that the Siberian expedition has been a failure, but it is afraid to decide upon evacuation without obtaining some plausible promise from the Siberian Government, which will enable it to go before the people and tell them that the expedition has ac

complished its purpose The Conference at Dairen, from the non-official Japanese point of view, has been arranged mainly for political effect at home.

The Chita Government, instead of giving Japan the pledge which it can afford to give, has followed a mistaken course. It was the height of folly on the part of the Chita delegation at Washington to publish the obviously fabricated documents alleged to have passed between France and Japan, because such acts will not only alienate the sympathy of the United States and the Powers associated with it, but will make the Japanese militarists all the more stubborn, thus deferring to a more distant date the Japanese evacuation of Siberia.

г In retrospect the interallied Siberian expedition is an extremely interesting subject of study. Of course Japan blundered most, but the United States and Great Britain are not free from mistakes. From the beginning, the Siberian policies of the Powers have been vacillating, uncertain, and feeble. Japan is probably the only country which has followed a consistent policy, even though that policy was based upon a mistaken idea. Japan's primary purpose in the Siberian expedition was to oppose the spread of Bolshevism and to restore law and order, and she has consistently pursued that policy. But Bolshevism is an ideal, an intangible thing, whose spread cannot be prevented by a "sanitary cordon" formed by the guns of soldiers. The best way to prevent its propagation in Japanese territories would be to recall Japanese soldiers from Siberian soil and expend the money thus saved on necessary internal reform both in Korea and in Japan. As for the restoration of law and order in Siberia, Japan certainly is not in a position to undertake such an interminable task at the sacrifice of countless treasure. No