superintended by British interests, to transport his soldiers to Tientsin. Upon his arrival in Peking, Chang, confident of his position, backed by his large force of soldiers stationed within hailing distance, demanded of President Feng the dismissal of the Cabinet, the appointment of his friend General Tuan as new prime minister, and the discharge of three military governors stationed in the Yangtse Valley. On top of these demands, Chang asked the President to create the new office of Inspector General of Manchuria and appoint him to that post.

When these demands were presented, what did the poor President do? He issued a lengthy "message" to the people, giving a painful recital of the chronic state of chaos in his country, and as usual invoked Heaven and Earth to witness the sincerity of his motives. He declared that the nation was faced with bankruptcy. Provincial remittances had ceased, foreign loans were no longer so easy as in the pre-war days, while military expenditure had doubled. Finally he bemoaned the fact that although he was nominally the chief executive of China his "orders are not obeyed outside the gates of the capital."

As for General Chang, he got almost all he demanded. Needless to say that he was appointed Inspector General of Manchuria, and has since become more and more powerful.

"Inspector General" seems to be the title favored by many military generals who think themselves powerful enough to exact additional power and money from the Central Government. In 1917, General Lu Yungting, who had risen to prominence from the unsavory class of freebooters, wrested from the Peking Government the high-sounding title and remunerative post of "Inspector General of the Two Kwangs." Even more

notorious a case of political blackmail is the exaction by General Lung Chi-kong of the profitable position of "Inspector General of the Mines of the Two Kwangs." A lieutenant of the late President Yuan Shi-kai, General Lung was sent to Canton by the deceased President in 1915 with instructions to suppress revolutionary activities there. When the Third Revolution came to an end by the sudden death of Yuan Shi-kai, the new administration at Peking desired to remove General Lung from Canton. But Lung had a formidable army which he threatened to employ in a manner by no means agreeable to Peking, should the Central Government deprive him of official honors. So Peking sought solution of the difficulty by the usual expedient of creating for the general the remunerative post of "Inspector General of Mines."

Early in 1918, a most glaring case of political blackmail was reported from Peking. When Yochow was captured by the Southern rebels in January, the Central Government sent General Feng Yu-hsiang to the South, authorizing him to combat the revolutionary forces on the Yangtse. The General started on his way, but when he arrived in Chi-chow on the Yangtse he refused, no one knows for what reasons, to proceed any further. On the other hand, he sent Peking telegram after telegram, all couched in dictatorial terms, urging the immediate suspension of hostilities between the North and the South. In a most arbitrary manner he detained six steamers of the China Merchant Navigation Company, exacted money from the revenue collecting offices in the neighborhood of Chi-chow, and commandeered $70,000 from the Salt Transportation Office and the Central Tax Office. And this is a general who had been very much admired by foreign missionaries because of his espousal of Christianity!

The significance of all these stories lies in the utter

helplessness of Peking in dealing with refractory generals and governors. If the Central Government fails to accommodate them, they point to the powerful troops under their command, which usually has a telling effect. The result is the creation of unnecessary offices, depleting the national treasury already heavily taxed. Unless this condition is radically altered it is idle to speak of efficient administration in China, let alone republican government.

The rival factions, eager to promote their own selfish interests, do not scruple at any scheme. If a clique wanted to upset the cabinet, it would accuse the Government of pro-Japanese policy, or anything that would sound plausible as a pretext for opposing the men in power. For that purpose, politicians and military chiefs often instigate students. Let us hear what J. O. P. Bland, a well-known British author and for many years an official of the Chinese Maritime Customs, has to say on this particular matter:

"The raw youths and school girls who periodically parade the streets of Shanghai, Tientsin, and Peking, demanding the execution of the Chiefs of Police or denouncing negotiations with Japan, may convey to the uninitiated observer a new and vivid impression of patriotic national consciousness, but those behind the scenes are well aware that all this fervor and ferment of turbulent youth is often skillfully stimulated by the opponents of the official clique in power at Peking for their own sordid ends. In the case of the student outbreak last winter [1920] at Tientsin, for instance, there is no doubt (I have seen documentary evidence of the fact) that the anti-Japanese processions and demonstrations were deliberately organized by paid agents, with a view to embarrassing, and, if possible, overthrowing, the Cabinet at Peking. The actual funds employed (some $200,000) were traced to the estate

of the late President, General Feng Kuo-chang, who died in possession of a vast fortune and a deep, unsatisfied grudge against his Prime Minister, Tuan-Chijui. In the present state of Chinese politics, the fact that Tuan and his adherents were maintained in power (at a price) by Japan, was quite enough to account for much of the fervor displayed by the Government's opponents on the subject of Shantung. Incidentally, it may be observed that the Shantung agitation has not been in any true sense a national, or even a provincial, movement. This, I think, is sufficiently proved by the fact that, in Manchuria, the Chinese-practically all Shantung men-have never organized any boycott or other manifestation of hostility towards the Japanese.'

To all appearances, "civil war" in China has become a profession, and a very profitable profession, to the few military-political chiefs who manipulate it. Up to a year or two ago the Western public had been beguiled by a vigorous propaganda conducted by a coterie of foreigners. It had been misled to believe that all this chronic military contest in China was a clash between constitutionalists and reactionaries. It is nothing of the sort. It may have been such at the time of the first revolution of 1911. As it is today, this contest is nothing but a means of looting and plundering, and of enabling a few generals and politicians to roll in opulence and luxury.

All this impels us to ask, What is China? And whither is she going? With a well-known novelist one may say, "If winter comes, can spring be far behind?" May we hope that the dreary political winter which holds China in its grip today may eventually be followed by a spring where chaos will vanish before order, and discord will give way to harmony?

CHAPTER XXI

SOLVING THE RIDDLE

Washington, January 30, 1922: In my letter of November 18, I voiced the apprehension that China, in putting forth pretentious claims in the so-called "Bill of Rights," hitched her wagon to a star, ignoring its rickety condition. I feared then that her pretentions might in the end alienate the sympathy of the wellinformed, who, however sympathetic towards her, could not close their eyes to the chaotic conditions prevailing in China. As I have watched the progress of the Conference and the drift of public sentiment in the past two months, I feel that my apprehension has been unfortunately justified.

Edwin L. James, Washington correspondent of The New York Times, seems to share this view when he writes on January 22 as follows:

"Indeed, it is fair to say that in Washington conference circles it is no longer fashionable to speak of the 'poor Chinese'; it is rather in style at this time to speak of the 'foolish Chinese.' In other words, there is less talk of the wrongs others have done to China and more talk about the wrongs China has done to herself.

"For the past week the American and British spokesmen have been insisting upon the fact that China cannot be saved from herself by outside nations; that she must work out her own salvation; that her present disorganization places a limit on what beneficial bargains may be made with her."