the scrapping of ten older ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons.

The total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down or for which materials have been assembled (taking the tonnage of the new ships when completed) would be 448,928 tons.

LIMIT FOR THREE NAVIES

Thus, under this plan, there would be immediately destroyed, of the navies of the three powers, sixty-six capital fighting ships, built and building, with a total tonnage of 1,878,043 tons.

It is proposed that it should be agreed by the United States, Great Britain and Japan that their navies, with respect to capital ships, within three months after the making the agreement, shall consist of certain ships, designated in the proposal, and numbering for the United States 18, for Great Britain 22, for Japan 10.

The tonnage of these ships would be as follows: Of the United States 500,650, of Great Britain 604,450, of Japan 299,700. In reaching this result the age factor in the case of the respective navies has received appropriate consideration.

CHAPTER II

JAPAN DELAYS DECISION

Washington, November 24, 1921: Each succeeding day dawns with the conviction growing among the Japanese delegates that the Conference is going to accomplish results in a comparatively short time. They have come prepared for a protracted session. Some of them thought they might have to stay here through the spring. Now they think the main business of the Conference will be finished within the year, and that they may be starting for home in the latter part of January. They are also confident that they will leave Washington in the friendliest feeling towards the American Government and people.

Ever since the opening of the Conference, the Japanese delegates have been deeply impressed with the systematic, businesslike, and withal straightforward manner in which Mr. Hughes has been conducting the meetings. They are absolutely convinced of the sincerity and earnestness of the American delegates and are glad to deal with them in like spirit.

And yet the Japanese delegation has allowed two weeks to pass without arriving at any decision on the Hughes proposal. The public is beginning to fret and look at Japan with a question mark. What did Admiral Baron Kato, the chief delegate of Japan, mean when he said he would accept the Hughes program in principle? The Admiral, at the session of November 14, made this statement endorsing the American proposal: "Japan deeply appreciates the sincerity of purpose

evident in the plan of the American Government for the limitation of armaments. She is satisfied that the proposed plan will materially relieve the nations of wasteful expenditures and cannot fail to make for the peace of the world.

"She cannot remain unmoved by the high aims which have actuated the American project. Gladly accepting, therefore, the proposal in principle, Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping reduction in her naval armament.

"It will be universally admitted that a nation must be provided with such armaments as are essential to its security. This requirement must be fully weighed in the examination of the plan. With this requirement in view, certain modifications will be proposed with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement of the various classes of vessels. This subject should be referred to special consideration by naval experts. When such modifications are proposed, I know that the American and other delegations will consider them with the same desire to meet our ideas as we have to meet theirs.

"Japan has never claimed or had any intention of claiming to have a naval establishment equal in strength to that of either the United States or the British Empire. Her existing plan will show conclusively that she never had in view preparations for offensive war."

In saying that he accepted the Hughes plan in principle, Baron Kato meant that he endorsed the four fundamental principles laid down in the American program, namely:

1. That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned.

2. That further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships.

3. That, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned.

4. That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies, and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

Now as to the first, second, and fourth principles, there can be no argument. But the third principle calls for the definition of the "existing naval strength," which is to be the basis of calculation for the future naval strength of each of the nations participating in the Conference.

Yesterday afternoon the Japanese experts had a frank but friendly exchange of views with the American experts in Mr. Hughes' office at the State Department. What transpired behind the closed doors is known only to those present at the meeting. But it is surmised that the conversation was characterized by a spirit of accommodation on both sides. The Japanese asked for more information on certain aspects of the American proposal, more particularly the basis of calculation as to the existing relative naval strength of England, America, and Japan. They are of the opinion that if the allotment of ships for the coming ten years is to be based upon the present ratio, the existing relative strength of the three navies should be most carefully examined and defined.

Inquiries have revealed that the American estimate in this respect is not entirely accurate. Basing his judgment upon that estimate, Mr. Hughes seems to think that Japan's present naval strength is between 50 and 60 as against America's 100. Consequently his conclusion is that an allotment of 100 to America and 60 to Japan for the coming ten years, namely a ratio

of 5 to 3, does not disturb the status quo of the relative strength of the two navies.

The Japanese experts contend that the estimate upon which Mr. Hughes' conclusion is founded is erroneous. To support this contention, it is understood, they have submitted to Mr. Hughes and the American experts a brief but clear statement, which they are ready to back up with further information and explanation.

The substance of this statement is carefully guarded. In one of the Tokyo newspapers just to hand, I find the following table showing the existing strength of the American and Japanese navies as follows:

As this table shows, there are six methods of estimating the existing strengths of the two navies. The percentage of the Japanese navy thus obtained ranges from 61 to 83. In the opinion of the Japanese experts the first classification, which allows 73 per cent to Japan, gives the most logical basis of estimation. But