among us, by sending Wisdom itself, that is, the Son of God, thought good to send first such as these, meaning the stoics, and their writings, to light up the sparks thereof, and drive away some of the Cimmerian darkness of vice and error." And should it appear, that we agree with them in the doctrine of God's decrees, I know no other consequence that will follow upon it but this, that our doctrine is consonant to the light of nature, and far from being repugnant to the natural reason of mankind. It is, indeed, not very easy, to settle their true sense and meaning of fate, since they do not seem to agree one with another, nor to write consistently with themselves; did they, we should not be ashamed to own an agreement with them. And it must be allowed, that there are some things said by them which have an affinity with some tenets of ours; as,

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(1.) When they say that "fate is God himself, to whom all things are subject, and by whom they are all determined, ordered, and directed as he pleases. This is mentioned by Laertius*, as one of the positions of Zeno, the author of this sect, that "there is one God, who is called the mind, fate, Jupiter, and by many other names. And, says Senecat, who was one of the best writers among them, "If you call him (God) fate, you will not be mistaken, since fate is nothing else but an series of causes, and he is the first cause of all on which the rest depend." And a little after‡, "If you call him nature, fate, fortune, they are all the names of the same God, using his power in a different way." Panætius, the stoic, also expressly asserts fate to be God§; with whom agrees Phurnutus, another of the same sect, who says ||, that "Jupiter is called fate, because of the invisible distribution or ordination of things which befall every man in this life." Now, setting aside the language in which these things are expressed, there is nothing but what is agreeable to our sentiments, namely, that God is he who has fixed and determined all things in their own order, place and time, according to his good will and pleasure; and that God's decree is God himself decreeing: and therefore we also agree with them when,

(2.) They represent fate as no other than the will, purpose, and decree of God. This Homer calls "the counsel, or good will and pleasure of God;" and Seneca**, " a divine law, and an eternal law;" which is no other than the eternal will of God, and so agreeable to the derivation of the word ++, fatum a fando. Servius says, that "fate is the voice of Jupiter." To this nothing can be excepted, but the use of the word fate, as has been owned by many Christian

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writers: "what else is fate," says Minutius Felix*, "but what God says of every one of us?" And so the great Augustin allows the thing, though he deniest the name; "human governments are entirely constituted by Divine Providence," says he; “ which if therefore any one will ascribe to fate, because he calls the will or power of God by that name, let him hold his opinion, but correct his language." And when the Pelagians charged the doctrine of grace, as maintained by him, with being the same with the stoical fate, he replies, "Under the name of grace we do not assert fate, because we say, that the grace of God is not anteceded by any merits of men; but if any please to call the will of the omnipotent God by the name of fate, we shun indeed the use of new profane words, but do not love to contend about them." So our Bradwardine, who was a second Austin, says §, concerning the stoics: "They spoke of fate according to the efficacy of the divine will, wherefore they were free from all real, though perhaps not from verbal, error; for the word fate is suspected with catholics though the thing itself is right."

(3.) We agree with them when they assert, that "all things that happen|| are determined by God from the beginning or from eternity ; and that they happen very justly**, and always for the best t;" and therefore advise men to give themselves up willingly to fate, or patiently and quietly to submit to the will of God: all which entirely agrees with many passages of Scripture §§, and with the practices of the best of men, both among Jews and Christians || ||, and of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ himself 9.

(4.) Some of them were very careful to preserve the natural liberty of the will of man, as we are. Chrysippus, one of the principal among them***, was of opinion, that "the mind was free from the necessity of motion," which, in this case, he disapproved of; and though it was his sentiment, that nothing happened without preceding causes, yet, that he might escape necessity, and retain fate, he distinguished causes; some of which, he said, were perfectæ et principales; others, adjuvantes et proxime; and, therefore, when he asserted, that "all things were by fate from preceding causes, his meaning was, that they were so, not by

• Quid enim aliud est fatum, quam quod de nnoquoque nostrum Deus fatus est? Min. Felix. Octavius, p. 39.

† Aug. de Civ. Dei, &c., 1. 5, c. 1; vide ib. c. 8, 9.

Nec sub nomine gratiæ fatum asserimus, &c.-Aug. contr. duas Epist. Pelag. 1. 1, c. 5. § Ipsi enim loquebantur de fato secundum efficaciam voluntatis divinæ, &c.-Bradwardin. de Causa Dei, 1. 1, с. 28, p. 267.

|| Αφης παντα τα γινομενα συμμηρνεται. - M. Antonin. 1. 8, s. 23.

[ Απ' αρχης σοι συγκαθειμαρτο και συνεκλωθετο παν το συμβαινον. -Ib. 1. 4,6, s. 26. Εξ αιων νος προκατερκευαζετο. -Ib. 1. 10, s. 5.

** Παν το συμβαινον, δικαίως συμβαινει. -Ib. 1. 4, s. 10.

++ Οι θεοι, καλως εβουλευσαντο. - Ib. 1. 6, s. 44. Μονον φιλειν το εαυτω συμβαίνον και συγκλω θόμενον, τι γαρ αρμόδιωτερον. -Ib. 1. 7, s. 57.

# Vide Epict. Enchirid. c. 38, 77-79; et Arrian. 1. 2, c. 17, et 1. 3, c. 26; Antonin. 1. 3, s. 16, et l. 4, s. 34, et 1. 10, s. 28; et Seneca, ep. 107.

§§ Acts xv. 17, 18; Psalm cxlv. 17; Rom. viii. 28; Jam. iv. 15; Psalm xlvi. 10,

|||| 1 Sam. iii. 18; Job i. 21; Psalm xxxix. 9; Acts xxi. 14.

Luke xxii. 42.

*** Chrysippus-applicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animos liberatos volunt, &c. -Cicero de Fato.

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the former, but the latter sort of causes." And says Seneca *, men know not what they may will, but in the very moment in which they will; for to will, or nill, is not entirely decreed to any man. Indeed, they seem to be jealous of the liberty of the will, and fear, where no fear or cause of fear was, as if liberty could not consist with any kind of necessity; and, therefore, Austin blames them when he sayst, "Hence it appears, that that necessity is not to be feared; by fearing which, the stoics have laboured so to distinguish the causes of things, as to withdraw some from, and put others under necessity; and among those which they would not have to be under necessity, they place our wills, lest they should not be free, if put under necessity:" and goes on to prove, that the will may be subject to some sort of necessity, without any disadvantage to it; so that in this he, with whom we agree in some respect, exceeded the stoics themselves.

(5.) It must be allowed, that much the same objections were made against the stoical destiny, as are made against the decree of election, and met with like success, and were refuted in much the same manner. As our opponents argue, that if a man is chosen to salvation, he need not be concerned about the means; whether he has them, and uses them, or not, he shall certainly be saved: but if he is not chosen to it, let him be never so careful and concerned about means, he shall not be saved. So the opposers of the stoics argued against them thus: "If it is thy fate that thou shalt recover of this disease, thou shalt recover whether thou makest use of a physician or not; but if thy fate is, that thou shalt not recover, whether thou usest a physician or not, thou shalt not recover." This argument, in Cicero, is represented agreeable to the philosophers, as αργος λογος, ignava ratio, iners genus interrogationis, an idle way of reasoning. Cicero observes, that if there was any thing in this argument, it would hold equally good if fate was never mentioned: his words are these: "You may change, and not use the word fate, and yet hold the same opinion, in this manner: If this was true from eternity, that thou shalt recover of this disease, thou shalt recover, whether thou usest a physician or not; but if this was false from eternity, that thou shalt recover of this disease, whether thou usest a physician or not, thou shalt not recover." And then proceeds to show in what manner Chrysippus, the stoic, answered and refuted this argument, by distinguishing things into simplicia et copulata; which are illustrated by the instances of Edipus being begotten by Laius, and Milo's wrestling in the Olympic games; where he shows, that it is a mistake to suppose that it was destined that Laius should beget Edipus, whether he had carnal knowledge of a woman or not; or that Milo should wrestle, whether he had an adversary to wrestle with or not; for these things, he observes, are confatalia, equally included in fate: to which Cicero assents, and says, that in this way all captious arguments of this kind are refuted; and, upon the whole, Carneades himself, a violent opposer of the stoics, disapproved of this kind of reasoning, and thought the argument was too inconsiderately concluded, and therefore pressed Chrysippus in another way, and left off calumny*. In like manner we say, that "the means, sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, or faith, holiness, &c., are, to use Chrysippus's phrase, confatalia, equally with the end included in the decree of election, as they are left out of the decree of reprobation;" and therefore pronounce it a captious and idle way of talking, to say, that if a man is elected to salvation, he shall be saved, whether he is sanctified or no, or whether he believes or no; and if he is not elected, he shall not be saved, let him be never so much concerned for faith and holiness. Again, it was objected to the stoics, that they made God the author of sin, and particularly by Plutarch† to Chrysippus, that, according to him, "there was no intemperance or fraud but what Jupiter was the author of:" and by others, to the same stoic, "that if all things were moved and governed by fate, and could by no means be avoided, then the sins and transgressions of men were not to be ascribed to their own wills, but to a certain necessity which arises from fate, and is the governess of all things, by which that must needs be which shall be; and therefore the punishment of transgressions is unrighteously fixed by laws, if men do not willingly commit sin, but are drawn to it by fate." To this Chrysippus answers, and the substance of his answers is this, "that though all things are connected with fate, yet the dispositions of our minds are only subject to it, agreeable to the property and quality of them: for if they are first wholesomely and profitably formed by nature, they more inoffensively and tractably get over all that force which extrinsically comes upon them by fate; but if they are rough, ignorant, and uncultivated, and not assisted by the help of wholesome arts, though they may be moved by little or no force of fatal disadvantage, yet, through their own badness and voluntary impetus, fall into daily sins and mistakes." This he exemplifies by the rolling of a stone down-hill; the man that pushes it gives it its first motion, but not its volubility; and its continuing to move downwards does not arise from him that first moved it, but from its own volubility. So, says he, the necessity of fate moves the kinds and principles of causes; but it is our own will that moderates, governs, and directs the counsels, determinations, and actions of our minds; and therefore § denies, "that such vile and wicked men are to be heard or borne with, who, when they are in fault, and convicted of a crime, fly to the necessity of fate, as to an asylum, and say, that what they have wickedly done is not to be ascribed to their own rashness, but to fate." And then some lines in Homer|| are mentioned, in which Jupiter is introduced complaining that men accused the gods of being the author of their evils, when their sorrows arose from their own wickedness. Now, from hence it appears, whatever mistakes there may be thought to be in this way of reasoning, they did not believe that God was the author of sin, or that the sins of men were to be ascribed to fate, but to the pravity of their wills; and that whatever distant concern fate had in these things, yet it did not excuse the wickedness of the actions of men, nor exempt them from punishment.

This may be further illustrated by the instance of Zeno and his servant. Zeno caught his servant playing the thief, and beat him for it. The fellow, agreeable to his master's doctrine, as he thought, and in vindication of himself, says, that "he was destined by fate to steal." "Yes," replied Zeno, "and to be beaten too*." When it is objected to us, that we make God the author of sin, we deny it, and clear ourselves, by distinguishing between the action and the disorder of it; for though God is concerned in all motion and action, for in him we live, move, and have our being; and he is the first cause and mover of all things: yet the ataxy, disorder, and iniquity of any action, arise from ourselves, and our own corrupt wills and affections; and whatever concern we suppose the decrees of God have about sin, yet they do not excuse the wickedness of men, or exempt them from proper punishment: the same decree which permits sin, provides for the punishment of it.

(6.) How far soever the stoics carried their doctrine of fate or destiny, it is certain they never thought it had a tendency to looseness of life; nor does it appear to have had any such influence upon them; for, of all the sects of the philosophers, none were more addicted both to the love and practice of moral virtue, than this sect. The Manual of Epictetus, his Commentaries, digested by Arrianus, the writings of Seneca, and of the emperor Mark Antonine, do abundantly declare their strict regard to the worship of God, and the doing of justice among men. This made Josephus sayt, that the sect of the pharisees, which was the strictest sect among the Jews for morality and external holiness, was very much like to that of the stoics. It is, indeed, said of Tiberius Nero, that he was more negligent of God and religion, being fully persuaded that all things were done by fate; but then the historian observes, that he was addicted to the mathematics; so that the fate he gave into was not the stoical fate, as asserted by the best writers of that sect, but the mathematical fate, which depended upon the influence of the stars. Now, of these things, in which we agree with them, we are not ashamed; and what advantage our opponents are able to make of all this, I see not. But others of this sect, or the same writers, by either contradicting themselves, or one another, or as they have been understood by others, very greatly differ from us in their doctrine of fate or destiny, as when,

(1.) And as far as they agree with the Chaldeans and astrologers, who placed fate in the position and influence of the stars. The wiser

Ειμαρτο μοι κλίψαι, και δαρηναι, εφα. - Laert. 1. 7, in vita Zeno.

† Η φαρισαίων αιρεσις παραπλήσιος εστι τη παρ' Ελλησι στοικη λεγομηνη. -Josepli, in vita sua. Circa Deos et religiones negligentior, quippe addictus mathematicæ, persuasionisque plenus cuncta fato agi. Sueton. Tiber. Nero, c. 69.