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cessity of doing evil since the fall, by reason of the disability he hath contracted by it, to do any thing which is truly good; and from his having showed, that though the evil habits, added to our natural corruption, do render it exceeding difficult, they do not render it impossible for them to do what is good and acceptable in the sight of God." I reply; If no more light were put into the understanding of man, or communicated to him, but what is done by moral causes, he would never be capable of knowing and receiving the things of the Spirit of God; and if the will of man were no otherwise wrought upon than by moral suasion, it would never be subject to the law of God, or gospel of Christ. Nor has this author demonstrated the falsehood of the hypothesis, that though God has laid no necessity upon men to sin, by his decrees, yet such is the disability of man, contracted by the fall, that he cannot but sin; for God's decrees do not at all infringe the liberty of the will, as the case of Joseph's being sold by his brethren, and the crucifixion of Christ, do abundantly declare; and that such is the state of man since the fall, such the corruption and impotency of his nature, that he cannot do that which is spiritually good, and is fully set and wholly bent upon that which is evil, both Scripture and all experience sufficiently testify. I observe, this author allows of the natural corruption of man, which he elsewhere seems unwilling to own; and that evil habits added to it, render it exceeding difficult, though not impossible, to do that which is good: whereas the prophet represents * it as impossible for persons to do good, that are accustomed to do evil, as it is for the Ethiopian to change his skin, or the leopard his spots.

VIII. The same + author argues from the received notion of the word, that "that only is said to be free for us to do, which it is in our power to do; which may be done otherwise than it is done, and about which there is ground for consultation and deliberation." I reply; that these rules will hold good about the natural and civil actions of life, which, it is allowed, are in the power of man to do, are controllable by his will, upon consultation and deliberation; and as to outward acts of religion, there are many things in the power of man, which may be done otherwise than they are, upon consultation and deliberation. But as to spiritual things, they are not in the power of man, and yet they may be done freely, under the influence and by the assistance of the grace of God; and if no actions can be free, but what may be done otherwise than they are, then the actions of the holy angels and glorified saints, of Christ as man, yea, of God himself, cannot be free. And as to evil actions, committed by wicked men, they are done by them freely; even though they are such slaves to sin, so overcome by it, and so much under the power of it, that they cannot do otherwise but sin; and that oftentimes, without consultation or deliberation, the corruption of their natures strongly inclining and pushing them on unto it.

IX. This author goes on to argue from Le Blanc, that "all the actions which proceed freely from us, may be subject to a command, and by the law of God or man may be enjoined or forbidden; but this Ibid. p. 356; ed. 2. 347.

* Jer. xii. 23.

† Whitby, p. 354; ed. 2. 345.

cannot agree to those acts, circa quos voluntas immutabiliter se habet, in which the will is so immutably determined, that it never can or could do otherwise." To which may be replied; that the actions of the holy angels and glorified saints are subject to a command, and are done in obedience to the will of God, and which proceed from them freely, though their wills are immutably determined, that they never can do otherwise. On the other hand, the evil actions of devils are forbidden by the law of God, and proceed from them freely, though their wills are immutably determined, that they never can do otherwise. And if so, why may not, on the one hand, the good actions of saints, done in obedience to the law of God, proceed freely from them, though their wills are influenced and determined by the grace of God to them? And, on the other hand, why may not the actions of wicked men, forbidden by the law of God, proceed freely from them, though their wills are influenced and determined to them through the corruption of their nature? This writer * further observes, "that if this be the case of lapsed man, his sin cannot proceed freely from him, and so cannot reasonably be forbidden; and that those laws are certainly unjust, which prohibit that under a penalty, which a man cannot possibly shun, or require that which cannot possibly be done :" or as he elsewhere + expresses it, " to make laws for lapsed man, impossible to be performed by him, is unsuitable to the divine wisdom; to punish him for not doing what he could not do; or performing what he could not avoid, is unsuitable to the divine justice; and to excite them to their duties by motives, which he knows cannot work upon them, is unsuitable to the sincerity of God." I answer: that when God first made and gave laws to man, he was in a capacity to obey them; they were not impossible to be performed by him, he was not then in his lapsed estate; and therefore it was not unsuitable to the divine wisdom to make and give out the laws he did; nor is it now unsuitable to it to continue them; which is necessary to support his own authority, though man has lost his power to obey. Man's present impossibility to fulfil the law of God, does not arise from the nature of that law, nor from his original constitution, but from that vitiosity and corruption which he has contracted by sin: wherefore, it is not unsuitable to divine justice to punish for that which man cannot do, or cannot avoid; any more than it is unjust in a creditor to demand his just debts, and punish for the same, though the debtor is not in a capacity to pay. Nor is it unsuitable to the sincerity of God, nor in vain, that he makes use of motives, as promises and threatenings, to excite men to duty, which he knows cannot work upon them without his powerful grace; since by these he more fully points out the duty of man, admonishes him of it, expresses more largely the vile nature and dreadful consequences of sin, leaves the impenitent inexcusable, and, by the power of his grace accompanying these means, brings his own people effectually to himself.

X. Another argument to prove freedom from necessity, is thus ‡ formed: "If wicked men be not necessitated to do the evil that they do, or to neglect the good they do neglect, then have they freedom from necessity, in both these cases; and if they be thus necessitated, then neither their sins of omission nor of commission could deserve that name." It is elsewhere said *, "that the notion concerning the consistence of liberty with necessity, and a determination to one, is destructive of the nature of vice and virtue:" and if this be truet. "then vice and virtue must be empty names." I reply: As to the first of these, the definition of sin is not to be taken from the power of man, or from what he can or cannot do, but from the law of God; for sin is a transgression of the law; and that action which is voluntarily committed against the law of God, is blameworthy, and deserves the name of sin or vice, and so punishable; though the will may be influenced and determined to it by the corruption of nature; for sin is no less sinful, because man has so corrupted his way, and implicated himself in sinning, that he cannot do otherwise. The devils can do nothing else but sin; and yet, surely, their actions deserve the name of vice. As to the actions of good men, performed under the influences of the grace of God, it is certain, that they are called virtues in Scripture, and are truly and properly so; it is strange, that the grace of God, which influences, determines, and enables men to perform an action better, should destroy the goodness of it, and take away both his name and nature. The good actions of the holy angels may be called virtues, though their wills are influenced and determined by the grace of God to these, and these only.

* Whitby, p. 356; ed. 2. 347. † 1bid. p. 315; ed. 2. 307.

Ibid. p. 357; ed. 2. 348.

XI. It is affirmed §, " that there is a plain agreement betwixt the doctrine of Mr. Hobbes and of us (Calvinists) concerning this matter, as to the great concernments of religion." Be it so; if it be truth we agree in, it is never the worse for being held and maintained by a man otherwise of corrupt principles. Truth is truth, let it drop from what mouth or pen soever; nay, if delivered by the devil himself, it ought to be assented to as such; but, perhaps, upon an examination of this matter, it will not appear, that there is such a plain agreement between our sentiments and those of this gentleman. For,

1. The question between Mr. Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall, as drawn up by the latter, and allowed by the former, was plainly this || ; "whether all agents and all events, natural, civil, moral (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably, without their own concurrence in the determination; so as all actions and events, which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end, than they are, and all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes determining them to one." So that the conversion of a sinner did not concern the question between them; whereas this is the main thing between us and the Arminians, "whether the conversion of a sinner is to be ascribed to the efficacy of the grace of God, or to the power of man's free will." Phil. iv. 8; 2 Pet. i. 3, 5. 2. The dispute between Mr. Hobbes and his antagonist, was not about the power of the will, or of man to do this or that thing, but about the natural liberty of his will. Mr. Hobbes allows *, that " man is free to do what he will;" but denies that "he is free to will;" and therefore declares, that whatever is alleged to prove that a man hath liberty to do what he will, is impertinent to the question †; and complains of the bishop, who "would fraudulently insinuate, says he, that it is my opinion, that a man is not free to do if he will, and to abstain if he will; whereas, from the beginning, I have often declared, that it is none of my opinion, and that my opinion is only this, that he is not free to will, or which is all one, he is not master of his future will;" which he elsewhere explains thus: "Put the case, a man has a will to-day to do a certain action to-morrow, is he sure to have the same will to-morrow, when he is to do it? Is he free to-day to choose tomorrow's will? this is that now in question." Hence it appears, that though he denies the natural liberty of the will, or that the will has a liberty of itself to will, but supposes it is necessitated by preceding causes: yet he affirms, that man has a power of doing whatsoever he will: in which he agrees not with us, but with the Arminians; as is more fully manifest from what he observes concerning the covenant made with man, Do this, and thou shalt live. It is plain, says hes, that if a man do this he shall live; and he may do this if he will: in this the bishop and I disagree not. This, therefore, is not the question; but "whether the will to do this, or not to do this, be in a man's own election;" whereas, on the other hand, we believe that man has no power to do anything that is spiritually good, and that if he had a will to keep the law of God, he is not able to do it; we affirm with the apostle||, that though to will is present with us, but how to perform that which is good we find not.

34.

* Whitby, p. 322; ed. 2. 314.

§ Whitby, p. 359; ed. 2. 350.

† Ibid. 15.

|| The questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 3, Ed. 1655.

3. The learned author himself, I attend to, has such an observation as this: " It is no great difference," says he, "betwixt the opinion of these men and that of Mr. Hobbes, that the one destroys the liberty of all our actions, and theirs only destroys our liberty in spiritual and moral actions." This observation implies that there

is

a difference, though it supposes no great difference between our opinion and that of Mr. Hobbes. The difference must appear considerable to every one that observes, that as the case is here stated, the one only destroys our liberty in spiritual and moral actions, the other destroys the liberty of all our actions. We say, that "the moral liberty of the will is only lost by the fall, but that the natural liberty of it continues, and is even preserved in all those actions, in which man appears to be a slave to his sinful lusts and pleasures." We suppose that man has a liberty of will in things of a natural and civil, but not in things of a moral and spiritual kind.

4. Our opinion is, that " the will of man is moved and determined by the special influence of the grace of God, to that which is spiritually good; as it is moved and determined, whilst the man is in a natural estate, by the influence of corrupt nature, to that which is evil." Mr. Hobbes will not allow, that the will is determined by special influence from the first cause: "that senseless word influence," says he *, " I never used;" nor will he allow, that the will is moved at all; and still less, by any thing infused: whereas we suppose, that grace is infused into the soul: and by this the will is moved and determined to that which is spiritually good;" his words are these †; "and because nothing can move, that is not itself moved, it is untruly said, that either the will, or anything else, is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive passions, or by acts or habits, or that acts or habits are infused by God; for infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies."

• The questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 4. § Ibid. p. 191.

+ Ibid. p. 143. || Rom. vii. 18.

Ibid. p. 310.

Whitby, p. 362; cd. 2.354.

5. The necessity we contend for, that the will of man lies under, is only a necessity of obligation to the will of God, and a necessity of immutability and infallibility with respect to the decrees of God, which have their necessary, unchangeable, and certain event, and a necessity of influence by the power of the grace of God, to that which is spiritually good; and by the strength and prevalence of corruption, to that which is evil; all which is consistent with the natural liberty of the will; but then we say, it is free, not only from a necessity of coaction or force, but also from a physical necessity of nature; such as that by which the sun, moon, and stars, move in their course, fire burns, light things ascend upwards, and heavy bodies move downwards; whereas Mr. Hobbes affirms, that " every man is moved to desire that which is good to him, and to avoid that which is evil to him, especially the greatest of natural evils, death; and that by a certain necessity of nature, no less than that by which a stone is moved downwards." And elsewhere he expresses himself thuss: "My meaning is, that the election I shall have of anything hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire that now is, and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it hereafter; or, to use his (the bishop's) own terms, the will hath no more power to suspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its burning; or rather, more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend his will, than the fire to suspend its burning."

6. Mr. Hobbes's opinion makes God the cause of all sinful actions, as well as good; and this is not only a consequence deduced from his principles by his opposers, but is what is allowed by himself, though he will not admit that it follows, that God is the author of them. "Author," he says ||, " is he which owneth an action, or giveth a warrant to it: do I say," adds he, "that any man hath in the Scripture (which is all the warrant we have from God for any action whatsoever) a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other sin? Does the opinion of necessity infer that there is such a warrant in the Scripture? Perhaps he (the bishop) will say, no; but that this opinion makes him the cause of sin. But does not the bishop think him the cause of all actions? and * The questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 190, † Ibid. p. 246.

231.

Fertur enim unus quisque, &c. - Hobbes de Cive, c. 1, sect. 7, p. 11. Ed. Amsterd. 1657. § The questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 232. Ibid. p. 175.

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