still more indisposed than they now are to respond to another call. If General Thomas should now be able to carry out the intentions of General Sherman in relation to Selma, I can be of material service by operations from the river and Gulf. I will communicate with General Thomas and be prepared to aid him as far as possible. E. R. S. CANBY, Major-General, Commanding. MEMPHIS, TENN., December 29, 1864-7 a. m. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff: A few of my colored cavalry who were captured escaped from Corinth on Monday. They report my cavalry as having struck the road, only five miles south of Corinth, on Sunday. Five miles of road had been destroyed, and they were proceeding south, continuing their Yankee repairs to the road. N. J. T. DANA, Major-General, Commanding. MEMPHIS, December 29, 1864. Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS: The Mobile and Ohio road is cut by my cavalry below Corinth. The cavalry is ordered to go to Cahaba, if possible. N. J. T. DANA. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Lieut. Col. C. T. CHRISTENSEN, Assistant Adjutant-General, Mil. Div. of West Mississippi: I have just received a telegram from Collierville, stating that some of my colored cavalry soldiers who had been captured had escaped from Corinth on Monday morning, and they state that my cavalry had struck the Mobile and Ohio road only five miles below Corinth, had destroyed five miles of track, and were still at work. My orders were, in case of a heavy garrison being at Corinth, to give it a wide berth; and from the boldness exhibited by beginning their work so near that place, I infer that we have a gratifying prospect of success. Respectfully, N. J. T. DANA, WASHINGTON, December 30, 1864—1.30 p. m. Lieutenant-General GRANT, City Point, Va. : I think, from the tone of General Thomas' telegram of last night, that there is very little hope of his doing much further injury to Hood's army by pursuing it. You will perceive that he is disposed to postpone further operations till spring. This seems to me entirely wrong. In our present financial condition we cannot afford this delay. I there fore respectfully suggest whether Schofield and A. J. Smith, with, say, 20,000 men, should not be sent by water to Pascagoula to assist Canby in taking Mobile, and then using it as a base against Selma and Montgomery. This would prevent any of Hood's force from being sent against Sherman, and the capture of Selma would be almost as disastrous to the enemy as that of Atlanta. Thomas, with the remainder of his forces, could certainly maintain the line of the Tennessee to Chattanooga. If Schofield should be sent, the two departments (Tennessee and Kentucky) should be united under Thomas. If Thomas was as active as Sherman, I would say march directly from Decatur to Talladega, Montgomery, and Selma, living upon the country, and anticipating Hood, should he move by Meridian. But I think Thomas entirely too slow to live on the country. He, however, will make the best possible defense. It is said that the rebels have a very large amount of supplies at Selma and Montgomery. If these can be captured and the railroads destroyed, their Western armies cannot get ammunition and ordnance stores. The reason for not suggesting that Schofield move from Vicksburg by Meridian is that the country is mostly stripped of supplies, and at this season very difficult of passage, while that from Mobile is less swampy, and, moreover, the operating army could be supplied by steamers on the Alabama River. Major-General HALLECK, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General and Chief of Staff. CITY POINT, VA., December 30, 1864. Chief of Staff of the Army: I have no idea of keeping idle troops in any place, but before taking troops away from Thomas it will be advisable to see whether Hood halts his army at Corinth. I do not think he will, but think he is much more likely to be thrown in front of Sherman; if so, it will be just where we want him to go. Let Thomas collect all troops not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, if he chooses a part of them at Tuscumbia, and be in readiness for their removal where they can be used. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.: I have heard from General Wilson up to 3 p. m. of yesterday, and, as his information leads him to think the enemy will endeavor probably to reach Corinth, I have ordered the cavalry to move to Eastport, to operate against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, should Hood really halt at Corinth. Croxton, it is expected, would reach Eastport this afternoon, and I hope to hear in a few days that he has succeeded in destroying Bear Creek bridge. I have heard nothing of General Steedmau since the morning of the 28th instant. Trains have commenced running on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad regularly to-day. GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Brig. Gen. ANDREW JOHNSON, Military Governor of Tennessee, Nashville: As the enemy is now entirely driven out of the State of Tennessee, I would respectfully suggest that immediate measures be taken for the reorganization of the civil government of the State, as it is desirable, it possible, to place as large a force of the army beyond the borders of the State and as close to the enemy as we can, and I should be very happy to be assured that I could leave the State in the hands of the citizens. All should certainly now feel that the establishment of rebel authority in the State of Tennessee is hopeless, and their own interests should induce them to return to their allegiance to the United States, and restore peace to their State without any further quibbling. GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Brigadier-General WEBSTER, Chief of Staff, Nashville: Pulaski, December 30, 1864. The major-general commanding directs me to inquire whether you have received his dispatch for Major-General Sherman. Send to Eastport 8,000 pairs of shoes, 16,000 pairs stockings, and a due proportion of other articles of clothing for the use of troops going there. WM. D. WHIPPLE, Assistant Adjutant-General. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Brig. Gen. J. L. DONALDSON, Nashville: Pulaski, December 30, 1864. Send forage to Eastport for the whole of General Wilson's cavalry. There will be no necessity for sending forage to Huntsville, except for the teams of Twenty-third Corps to take en route to Chattanooga and a little to start the Fourth Corps teams. WM. D. WHIPPLE, Brigadier-General. NASHVILLE, December 30, 1864. Major-General THOMAS: The pontoon train of sixty boats will be ready to-morrow afternoon. JAS. R. WILLETT, Major, &c. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Everything is ready for pontoon train to start as soon as trestle bridge is ready. A. G. TASSIN, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Pontoon Train. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Lieut. Col. A. G. TASSIN, Pulaski, Tenn., December 30, 1864. Commanding Pontoon Train, Columbia: Take up one bridge and start it for Elkton, and have party to take up the other as soon as trestle bridge is finished. General W. D. WHIPPLE, Chief of Staff: WM. D. WHIPPLE, Chief of Staff. COLUMBIA, December 30, 1864. Started train with one bridge; will reach Pulaski to-morrow night, Elkton next day. I expect stores and material from Nashville to be here to-morrow; trestle bridge will be then completed. A. G. TASSIN, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Pontoon Train. HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Brigadier-General WHIPPLE, Chief of Staff: GENERAL: In accordance with instructions just received from MajorGeneral Thomas, we will march from here for Huntsville and Athens to-morrow morning, starting at daylight and taking the most direct routes. I will take all the artillery and wagons that I have with me here along; by doing so I will avoid a long detour by the way of Pulaski, by which route we will have more dirt road and only fifteen miles of turnpike. I will promptly report the disposition I make of my troops in posting them at Huntsville, Athens, and vicinity. I have ordered my chief quartermaster, Colonel Hayes, to bring up, via Athens, all of my trains in the rear, and if any orders are necessary to assist him I would be much obliged to the commanding general if he will give such. It was necessary for me to leave part of my artillery at Pulaski and to use the horses of the same in helping those through now with my command. As soon as we arrive at our destination I will send back my chief of artillery with horses for this artillery. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, TH. J. WOOD, Brigadier-General, Commanding. Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE, HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff: GENERAL: Every particle of information, however derived, in regard to the condition of Hood's army attests the fact of its complete and perfect demoralization. I have made many inquiries of citizens living on the road we have followed in the pursuit, and have received universally the same answers, namely, that one-half of the retreating troops are unarmed, and that everything like organization is gone. Two escaped prisoners came in yesterday, and their statements fully corroborate the information derived from other sources. One of these prisoners marched, or rather went with Lee's corps (for he says there was nothing like marching among them), to within two miles of the Tennessee River, where he escaped. He says that not more than one-half of the corps was armed; that there was no organization at all in the corps; that he saw nothing like a company, regiment, or brigade, and that the men moved in squads, varying from six or eight to fifteen or twenty, and that these squads moved and halted at their own choice. He further states that from Pulaski to the point at which he escaped the rebels had nothing to eat but parched corn. The other escaped prisoner marched with Cheatham's corps, from Pulaski toward the Tennessee River, by the old military road. He says that out of the whole corps only about a regi ment could be got to guard about 140 prisoners, and that the remainder of the corps marched in small squads, these squads moving as they chose. He says that in these squads he saw occasionally a musket or two to shoot cattle, &c., along the line of retreat. Both of these men speak of the destitute condition of the rebels in regard to clothing; they are without blankets, a great number without shoes, and all imperfectly clad. I feel confident that Hood has not taken across the Tennessee River more than half the men he brought across it; that not more than one-half of those taken out are armed; that he lost three-fourths of his artillery; and that, for rout, demoralization, even disintegration, the condition of his command is without a parallel in this war. I am also confident that his command cannot be reorganized for service for some weeks, perhaps not before spring. At present, so |