confident it will be more than two hours before he is ready." General Polk said to me he was going out to inspect his lines, and ordered me to keep his escort there and establish his headquarters just on the right of where they had been the day before. Some fifteen minutes after General Polk left, General Bragg came up and asked me where he was. I replied that he had gone along the line to make an inspection and find out the cause of the delay in making the attack. I remarked that General Polk would return there, but that he (General Bragg) would no doubt find him sooner by going along the line; and I then said, "General, in case you should not find General Polk I will tell you what has been done this morning: General Polk sent orders to General Hill in time for the attack to have been made by daylight if General Hill could have been found; but this was impossible, and when General Polk learned this he sent orders by me to Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne to make an immediate attack. Major-General Cheatham was informed of this and ordered to conform to the movements; that I found Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne and Hill together, and delivered the orders to Generals B[reckinridge] and Cleburne] in presence of General Hill." I then told General Bragg the contents of General Hill's note to General Polk, and said I did not believe General Hill would be ready to move to the attack in two hours, but that he should have done so at daylight. General Bragg asked me how I expected General Hill to make the attack before he received orders to do so. I said, "General, you will remember when General Polk sent me to you yesterday evening you instructed me to say that you would send a staff officer for him and the other generals, as you wished to have a conference with them." My last remark was made under the impression that General Hill was, of course, present at that conference and understood that he was to make the attack at daylight, and that General Polk had renewed the orders himself, so that there could not possibly be any mistake. I then said, "General, General Cleburne reported to General Hill this morning while I was there that the enemy were felling trees on his front all night." General Bragg said, "Well, sir, is this not another important reason why the attack should be made at once ?" I said, "Yes, sir; it does certainly seem so to me; but it did not seem to impress General Hill in that way."

J. FRANK WHELESS, Captain, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS,

Missionary Ridge, September 30, 1863.

Lieut. Gen. D. H. HILL: GENERAL: You will remember in a conversation held with you some days ago I handed you an order from army headquarters, directing me to furnish an explanation of my failure to attack the enemy at daylight on the morning of the 20th. You will remember, also, that in that conversation I discussed with you the reasons which had caused that failure. Those reasons, as I understood them, I embodied in an answer to the above order and transmitted them as my reply to the commanding general. A copy of that communication I think proper to furnish you. You will find it herewith inclosed.* So far as I remember there was but one point of difference between us as to

it

*See p. 47.

statements contained in that communication. That was as to the relation of your line to that of General Cheatham. There is one other point to which you called my attention, and on which it may be proper to remark: It is that in which I stated that on meeting your staff officer in the road on the night of the 19th I communicated to him my orders. You replied, "If you communicated them to him, they were not communicated by him to me." On this point I have to say my recollection of the conversation with him was that I had orders to attack at daylight; that I wished you to post General Breckinridge as a supporting force to General Cleburne, and that I wished to see you at my headquarters beyond Alexander's Bridge, where I would have couriers posted to direct you. He said, "In regard to the posting of the troops, you had expressed a wish to place Breckinridge on Cleburne's right. I replied, "Then tell General Hill he may post his troops as he pleases." In reply to my question where your headquarters would be, he said they would be at Thedford's Ford.

Referring you to my communication of yesterday's date, I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS CHEATHAM'S DIVISION,

.

Camp near Chattanooga, September 30, 1863.

Lieutenant-General POLK:

GENERAL: Your note of the 29th, asking some questions, is received and the following answers returned:

Question 1. "Where were your quarters on the night of the 19th, and how far from mine?”

Answer. My quarters were near the ground occupied by yourself during the day of the 19th, and about 1 mile from where I understood your quarters to be on that night.

Question 2. "Did you receive orders for the attack from me, and at what hour of night or morning?"

Answer. I received your orders for the attack about 1 [o'clock] on the morning of the 20th.

Question 3. "When and at what time were you ready for the attack?"

Answer. My lines were reformed on the night of the 19th, after the night attack, with four brigades in the front line, and Jackson as a reserve. I was ready at daylight. Just before daylight Captain Wheless, of your staff, passed my quarters, and remarked that the courier had been unable to find General Hill, and that he was then bearing orders to General Cleburne to make the attack at daylight.

Question 4. "At what time in the morning did you first see me on the field."

Answer. To the best of my recollection I saw you at Turner's battery about sunrise, you having, as I understood, just returned from the right of your lines.

Yours, very respectfully,

B. F. CHEATHAM, Major-General, C. S. Army.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1863.

Lieutenant-General POLK:

GENERAL: Your inquiries embrace points upon which we have conversed, but I will answer them in order:

1st. I was at Thedford's Ford from 11 till 3 [o'clock] on the night of the 19th. I went there after the battle to communicate with General Bragg and to ask for orders for the next day, as I had not been apprised that I was placed under your command until midnight, or after it.

2d. I left Thedford's Ford at 3 o'clock and went with my staff to Alexander's Bridge, where I had been told couriers were posted to conduct me to your quarters. Myself and staff searched about there for such couriers, but found none. I then went up to the battlefield and notified Generals Cleburne and Breckinridge of my pres

ence.

3d. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, and possibly Lieutenant Reid, told me that they had seen you, and that you wished to see me at Alexander's Bridge that night. No staff officer of mine or yours communicated any order to me to attack at daylight.

4th. I had no orders to make such attack, which is a sufficient an

swer.

5th. I was present when an order was sent to Generals Cleburne and Breckinridge to begin the attack. I think the order reached them about 7.30 a. m. on the 20th instant.

6th. I think you came up some half hour or later after the receipt of your order for attack. Our conversation was in reference to a note which I had sent you, stating that the line of my corps was at right angles to yours, and asking that the two lines be properly connected while rations were being distributed to my men.

7th. Breckinridge had got into position when you came up, and my line was ready, in a tactical sense, for attack; but I thought no attack ought to be made till the men had taken their breakfast, and till the whole line of battle was properly arranged from right to left. Yours, &c.,

D. H. HILL, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS POLK'S CORPS,
September 30, 1863..

In consequence of an unfortunate disagreement between myself and the commander-in-chief of this department, I have been relieved of my command, and am about to retire from the army.

Without attempting to explain the circumstances of this disagreement, or prejudicing the public mind by a premature appeal to its judgment, I must be permitted to express my unqualified conviction of the rectitude of my conduct, and that time and investigation will amply vindicate my action on the field of Chickamauga.

I cannot, however, part even temporarily with the gallant officers and soldiers of my old corps, without the deepest feeling of regret and a heartfelt expression of my gratitude for the courage, conduct, and devotion they have always manifested while under my command. Belmont, Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesborough, and Chickamauga all attest on your part the very highest soldierly qualities, and are crowded with precious memories.

Contending with a numerous, well-appointed, and merciless enemy

for all that man holds dear, you have borne unexampled privations with fortitude, fought with undaunted bravery, and ever yielded a ready and cheerful obedience to your officers.

Soldiers who struggle in such a cause, and with such hearts, can never be conquered. Clouds and darkness may enshroud you for a time, but the sunlight of the future is bright and glowing; the blood of patriots is never shed in vain, and our final victory is certain and assured.

Whoever commands you, my earnest exhortation and request to you is, to fight on and fight ever, with true hearts, until your independence is achieved. Thousands of hearts may fall crushed and bleeding under the weapons of the foe, or the passions and mistakes of friends, but the great cause must never be sacrificed, or our flag abandoned. Our cause is just, and your duty to your country and God is as clear as the sun in the heavens.

I leave my command in the care of the bravest of the brave, who has often led them in the darkest hour of their trials. He and you will have my hopes and prayers to the Ruler of the Universe for your happiness and success.

Your kindness, devotion and respect for me exhibited during the years of our association, both in camp and on the field, is graven on my heart, and will be treasured there until it ceases to beat.

Your friend,

L. POLK, Lieutenant-General.

BEFORE CHATTANOOGA, TENN.,

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,

President of Confederate States, Richmond:

October 4, 1863.

SIR: Your petitioners, general officers of the Confederate armies, now serving with the Army of Tennessee, impressed alike with the importance of the questions they propose to present to you and the responsibilities attached to their action, deem it their duty to make to you the following representations:

Disclaiming in this paper any criticism on the actions of their superiors, they desire to limit their representation to a statement of the existing status of affairs in this locality with suggestions which, in their judgment, will serve as a remedy for the existing evils.

Two weeks ago this army, elated by a great victory which promised to be the most fruitful of the war, was in readiness to pursue its defeated enemy. That enemy, driven in confusion from the field, was fleeing in disorder and panic-stricken across the Tennessee River. To-day, after having been twelve days in line of battle in that enemy's front, within cannon range of his position, the Army of Tennessee has seen a new Sebastopol rise steadily before its view. The beaten enemy, recovering behind its formidable works from the effects of his defeat, is understood to be already receiving re-enforcements, while heavy additions to his strength are rapidly approaching him. Whatever may have been accomplished heretofore, it is certain that the fruits of the victory of the Chickamauga have now escaped our grasp. The Army of Tennessee, stricken with a complete paralysis, will in a few days' time be thrown strictly on the defensive, and may deem itself fortunate if it escapes from its present position without disaster.

5 R R-VOL XXX, PT II

nessee.

It is needless to enlarge upon the importance of the possession of Chattanooga. To us it is the gateway of supplies for a Confederate army in Tennessee. To the enemy it is a formidable tête-de-pont, from which his armies can debouch into the heart of the Confederacy. It has already been to him an asylum, within which his routed army has found a safe refuge, and the possession of which has enabled him to paralyze the movement of our forces. It has thus far maintained him in possession of a great part of East TenA few more weeks of unmolested possession and it will be to him a formidable fortress, provisioned for six months and capable of being held by a small garrison against any assailing force. The recovery of Middle Tennessee will thereby be effectually preventedeven though we defeat his armies beyond the river-our only line of supply will be obstructed, and the maintenance of our army cut off. With this state of facts your petitioners approach Your Excellency. They view this campaign as virtually closed. The preponderance of strength by the delays of the last two weeks is again with the enemy. Their re-enforcements must be met as nearly as possible by corresponding re-enforcements to this army. The increasing difficulties of the position require increased resources on our part. Without additional strength the ablest general could not be expected to grapple successfully with the accumulating difficulties of the sitBut in addition to re-enforcements, your petitioners would' deem it a dereliction of the sacred duty they owe the country if they did not further ask that Your Excellency assign to the command of this army an officer who will inspire the army and the country with undivided confidence. Without entering into a criticism of the merits of our present commander, your petitioners regard it as a sufficient reason, without assigning others, to urge his being relieved, because, in their opinion, the condition of his health totally unfits him for the command of an army in the field.

In making these representations to Your Excellency your petitioners are aware that the proceeding is unusual among military men, but the extraordinary condition of affairs in this army, the magnitude of the interests at stake, and a sense of the responsibilities under which they rest to Your Excellency and to the Republic, render this proceeding, in their judgment, a matter of solemn duty, from which, as patriots, they cannot shrink. While Your Excellency may be assured that any commander whom you may assign or retain in this army will receive their earnest support, as far as their ability extends, your petitioners cannot withhold from Your Excellency the expression of the fact that under the command, as it now exists, they can render you no assurance of the success which Your Excellency may reasonably expect.

Your petitioners, therefore, protesting that in making these representations they are actuated solely by a sense of public duty, pray that Your Excellency will grant such speedy action as the exigencies of the situation demand.

We are, respectfully, Your Excellency's obedient servants,

[Indorsement.*]

Supposed to have been written by Buckner. Signed by Hill, Brown, Preston, and others. W. M. P[OLK].

*See Polk to Davis, October 6, following. Longstreet to Hill, October 4, Part IV, p. 728.