of its commander, stating his resources and ability for defense, favorably indorsed by Major-General Buckner, the orders were suspended on August 31. The main body of our army was encamped near Chattanooga, while the cavalry force, much reduced and enfeebled by long service on short rations, was recruiting in the vicinity of Rome, Ga. Immediately after crossing the mountains to the Tennessee the enemy threw a corps by way of Sequatchie Valley, to strike the rear of General Buckner's command, while Burnside occupied him in front. One division already ordered to his assistance proving insufficient to meet the force concentrating on him, Buckner was directed to withdraw to the Hiwassee with his infantry, artillery, and supplies, and to hold his cavalry in front to check the enemy's advance. As soon as this change was made the corps threatening his rear was withdrawn, and the enemy commenced a movement in force against our left and rear. On the last of August, it became known that he had crossed his main force over the Tennessee River at and near Caperton's Ferry, the most accessible point from Stevenson. By a direct route he was now as near our main depot of supplies as we were, and our whole line of communication was exposed, while his was partially secured by mountains and the river. By the timely arrival of two small divisions from Mississippi our effective force, exclusive of cavalry, was now a little over 35,000, with which it was determined to strike on the first favorable opportunity. Closely watched by our cavalry, which had been brought forward, it was soon ascertained that the enemy's general movement was toward our left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between us. The nature of the country and the want of supplies in it, with the presence of Burnside's force on our right, rendered a movement on the enemy's rear with our inferior force extremely hazardous, if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to meet him in front whenever he should emerge from the mountain gorges. To do this and hold Chattanooga was impossible without such a division of our small force as to endanger both parts. Accordingly our troops were put in motion on September 7 and 8, and took position from Lee and Gordon's Mills to La Fayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain. The forces on the Hiwassee and at Chickamauga Station took the route by Ringgold. A small cavalry force was left in observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry, strongly supported by cavalry, was left at Ringgold to hold the railroad and protect it from raids. As soon as our movement was known to the enemy his corps nearest Chattanooga, and which had been threatening Buckner's rear, was thrown into that place, and shortly thereafter commenced to move on our rear by the two roads to La Fayette and Ringgold. Two other corps were now in Will's Valley-one nearly opposite the head of McLemore's Cove (a valley formed by Lookout Mountain and a spur of the main range, called Pigeon Mountain) and the other at or near Colonel Winston's, opposite Alpine. During the 9th it was ascertained that a column, estimated at from 4,000 to 8,000, had crossed Lookout Mountain into the cove by way of Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps. Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concen trated opposite his center, and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us and thus exposed himself in detail. Major-General Hindman received verbal instructions on the 9th to prepare his division to move against this force, and was informed that another division from Lieutenant-General Hill's command, at La Fayette, would join him. That evening the following written orders were issued to Generals Hindman and Hill: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Major-General HINDMAN, GENERAL: You will move with your division immediately to Davis' Cross-Roads, on the road from La Fayette to Stevens' Gap. At this point you will put yourself in communication with the column of General Hill, ordered to move to the same point, and take command of the joint forces, or report to the officer commanding Hill's column according to rank. If in command you will move upon the enemy, reported to be 4,000 or 5,000 strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain at Stevens' Gap. Another column of the enemy is reported to be at Cooper's Gap; number not known. I am, general, &c., Lieutenant-General HILL, KINLOCH FALCONER, Assistant Adjutant-General. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Lee and Gordon's Mills, September 9, 1863-11.45 p. m. Commanding Corps: GENERAL: I inclose orders given to General Hindman. General Bragg directs that you send or take, as your judgment dictates, Cleburne's division to unite with General Hindman at Davis' Cross-Roads to-morrow morning. Hindman starts at 12 o'clock to-night, and he has 13 miles to make. The commander of the column thus united will move upon the enemy encamped at the foot of Stevens' Gap, said to be 4,000 or 5,000. If unforeseen circumstances should prevent your movement, notify Hindman. A cavalry force should accompany your column. Hindman has none. Open communication with Hindman with your cavalry in advance of the junction. He marches on the road from Dr. Anderson's to Davis' Cross-Roads. I am, general, &c., KINLOCH FALCONER, On the receipt of his order, during the night, General Hill replied that the movement required by him was impracticable, as General Cleburne was sick, and both the gaps (Dug and Catlett's) had been blocked by felling timber, which would require twenty-four hours for its removal. Not to lose this favorable opportunity-Hindman, by a prompt movement, being already in position-the following orders were issued at 8 a. m. on the 10th, for Major-General Buckner to move with his two divisions and report to Hindman: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Major-General BUCKNER, GENERAL: I inclose orders issued last night to Generals Hill and Hindman. General Hill has found it impossible to carry out the part assigned to Cleburne's division. The general commanding desires that you will execute without delay the order issued to General Hill. You can move to Davis' Cross-Roads by the direct road from your present position at Anderson's, along which General Hindman has passed. I am, general, &c., GEORGE WM. BRENT, And both Hindman and Hill were notified. Hindman had halted his division at Morgan's, some 3 or 4 miles from Davis' Cross-Roads, in the cove, and at this point Buckner joined him during the afternoon of the 10th. Reports fully confirming previous information in regard to the position of the enemy's forces were received during the 10th, and it became certain he was moving his three columns to form a junction upon us at or near La Fayette. The corps near Colonel Winston's moved on the mountain toward Alpine, a point 20 miles south of us. The one opposite the cove con tinued its movement and threw forward its advance to Davis' CrossRoads, and Crittenden moved from Chattanooga on the roads to Ringgold and Lee and Gordon's Mills. To strike these isolated commands in succession was our obvious policy. To secure more prompt and decided action in the movement ordered against the enemy's center, my headquarters were removed to La Fayette, where I arrived about 11.30 p. m. on the 10th, and Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered forward with his remaining division to Anderson's, so as to cover Hindman's rear during the operations in the cove. At La Fayette, I met Major Nocquet, engineer officer on General Buckner's staff, sent by General Hindman, after a junction of their commands, to confer with me and suggest a change in the plan of operations. After hearing the report of this officer, and obtaining from the active and energetic cavalry commander in front of our position (Brigadier-General Martin) the latest information of the enemy's movements and position, I verbally directed the major to return to General Hindman and say that my plans could not be changed, and that he would carry out his orders. At the same time the following written orders were sent to the general by courier: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, La Fayette, Ga., September 10, 1863-12 p. m. Major-General HINDMAN, Commanding, &c. : GENERAL: Headquarters are here, and the following is the information: Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force from the south has advanced to within 7 miles of this point. Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning. Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard. I am, general, &c., GEORGE WM. BRENT, 1 Orders were also given for Walker's Reserve Corps to move promptly and join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap to unite in the attack. At the same time Cleburne's was directed to remove all obstructions in the road in his front, which was promptly done, and by daylight he was ready to move. The obstructions in Catlett's Gap were also ordered to be removed, to clear the road in Hindman's rear. Breckinridge's division (Hill's corps) was kept in position south of La Fayette, to check any movement the enemy might make from that direction. At daylight I proceeded to join Cleburne at Dug Gap, and found him waiting the opening of Hindman's guns to move on the enemy's flank and rear. Most of the day was spent in this position, waiting in great anxiety for the attack by Hindman's column. Several couriers and two staff officers were dispatched at different times urging him to move with promptness and vigor, About the middle of the afternoon the first gun was heard, when the advance of Cleburne's division discovered the enemy had taken advantage of our delay and retreated to the mountain passes. The enemy now discovered his error, and commenced to repair it by withdrawing his corps from the direction of Alpine to unite with the one near McLemore's Cove, while that was gradually extended toward Lee and Gordon's Mills. Our movement having thus failed in its justly anticipated results, it was determined to turn upon the third corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of Chattanooga. The forces were accordingly withdrawn to La Fayette, and Polk's and Walker's corps were moved immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. The one corps of the enemy in this direction was known to be divided, one division having been sent to Ringgold. Upon learning the dispositions of the enemy from our cavalry commander in that direction, on the afternoon of the 12th Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding the advance forces, was directed in the following note to attack at daylight on the 13th: Lieutenant-General POLK: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, GENERAL: I inclose you a dispatch* from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn again on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder, so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success. Very truly, yours, BRAXTON BRAGG. Upon further information, the order was renewed in two notes at later hours of the same day, as follows: Lieutenant-General POLK, Commanding Corps: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, GENERAL: I inclose you a dispatch, marked A,* and I now give you the orders of the commanding general, viz, to attack at day dawn to-morrow. The infantry column reported in said dispatch at three-quarters of a mile beyond Pea Vine Church, on the road to Graysville from La Fayette. I am, general, &c., Lieutenant-General POLK, Commanding Corps: GEORGE WM. BRENT, Assistant Adjutant-General. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, GENERAL: The enemy is approaching from the south, and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost. am, general, &c., GEORGE WM. BRENT, At 11 p. m. a dispatch was received from the general, stating that he had taken a strong position for defense, and requesting that he should be heavily re-enforced. He was promptly ordered not to defer his attack, his force being already numerically superior to the * Not found. + Copy with Polk's records is dated September 13, 12.30 a. m. See p. 50. enemy, and was reminded that his success depended upon the promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further informed that Buckner's corps would be moved within supporting distance the next morning. Early on the 13th, I proceeded to the front, ahead of Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in front. Major-General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry, occupied the positions on the extreme left, vacated by Hill's corps, and was directed to press the enemy in McLemore's Cove, to divert his attention from our real movement. Brigadier-General Forrest, with his own and Pegram's divisions of cavalry, covered the movement on our front and right. Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson, whose brigade had been at Ringgold, holding the railroad, was moved toward Reed's Bridge, which brought him on the extreme right of the line. Walker's corps formed on his left opposite Alexander's Bridge, Buckner's next near Thedford's Ford, Polk's opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Hill's on the extreme left. With Johnson moved two brigades just arrived from Mississippi, and three of Longstreet's corps, all without artillery and transportation. The following orders were issued on the night of the 17th, for the forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing the movement at 6 a. m. on the 18th by the extreme right, at Reed's Bridge: [CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, 1. Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route and sweep up the Chickamauga, toward Lee and Gordon's Mills. 2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction. 3. Buckner, crossing at Thedford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's Mills. 4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford, or at Thedford's, as may be necessary, and join in the attack wherever the enemy tay be. 5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front ascertain if the enemy is re-enforcing at Lee and Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank. 6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and cover our rear and left and bring up stragglers. 7. All teams, &c., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains. Rations, when cooked, will be forwarded to the troops. 8. The above movements will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor, and persistence. By command of General Bragg: GEORGE WM. BRENT, The resistance offered by the enemy's cavalry and the difficulties arising from the bad and narrow country roads caused unexpected delays in the execution of these movements. Though the commander of the right column was several times urged to press forward, his crossing was not effected until late in the afternoon. At this time Major-General Hood, of Longstreet's corps, arrived and |