evolved an adroit plan to turn her action to the disadvantage of the English. This plan he confided to Goertz, and on February 29, 1780, Goertz wrote to Frederick : All will now depend upon the reply the Spanish court makes to the remonstrances. If it gives a satisfactory one, as they have a right to expect, then I agree with Count Panin in thinking that this new intrigue will result to the disadvantage of the one who contrived it and of his court. If unhappily the court of Spain persists in its false measures, the worst is to be feared. . . . Your Majesty will be best able to enlighten her in the matter, and having already proved your impartiality, you have a right at so important a moment to speak with frankness.' Upon receipt of this intelligence Frederick saw the importance of action. On March 14 he sent to his minister at Paris instructions to "demand a particular audience of the ministry at Versailles", and to use every endeavor to induce them to impress upon the Spanish court" the absolute necessity of satisfying Russia without the slightest delay on an article where the honor of her flag is so greatly interested." The French minister, Vergennes, read Frederick's letter, and despatched a copy of it to the French representative at Madrid with orders to use all his influence to get Spain to apologize. The Spanish court saw the wisdom of such a course and followed it. A satisfactory answer was given to Russia, and a possible war was thereby averted.* Later both France and Spain, partly because of advice given by Frederick, acquiesced in the new maritime code that the empress had promulgated on March 8, 1780.5 Thus, through the adroit management of Panin and the assistance rendered by Frederick, a declaration that the English minister had hoped would result in an armed conflict between Russia and the family of the Bourbons became in the end a measure wholly opposed to the interests of England. By the part he played in bringing about this result-comparatively unimportant as the Armed Neutrality really proved-Frederick unquestionably contributed indirectly to the success of the colonies. It was, in fact, in ways such as these that whatever assistance the colonies received from Frederick was chiefly rendered. The direct assistance he gave them was certainly very slight. He did not recognize their independence until it had been recognized by England herself. His commercial concessions were of little real value; his permission to purchase arms in his dominions resulted, though 1 Ibid., 237-238. 2 Ibid., 241. 3 Vergennes to Montmorin, March 27, 1780. Goertz to Frederick, May 2, 1780. 5 Goertz to Frederick, March 10, Circourt, III. 240, May 2, 1780, and other letters. cans. through no fault of his own, in a disastrous bargain for the AmeriHe gave a little good advice and a small amount of information, but, on the whole, what he did directly was really very trivial. On the other hand, the indirect aid which he rendered as a result of coincident interests was more important. Had he been a friend to England instead of being secretly in opposition to her, it is quite conceivable that the course of history might have been materially changed. The relations between Russia and England might have been different. Certainly France would have hesitated longer. Probably the minor German states would have furnished England with more mercenaries. But "what might have been" is speculation pure and simple. Less difficult to determine are the motives that moved Frederick in his policy toward the colonies. As has already been pointed out, he hated England with great intensity, yet at the same time he saw clearly that the interests of his kingdom demanded that he should. not become her open enemy. In consequence, he carried his hostility just far enough not to embroil him in a war with England. He would not recognize the colonies because that would have taken him over the danger line. At times he even performed friendly acts and exercised great forbearance in order to prevent his relations with England from becoming too strained; instances are his leniency toward Elliot in the matter of the theft of Lee's papers, and his giving permission for the mercenaries to cross his dominions. On the other hand, as a result of his hatred for England, it was psychologically natural that he should feel well-disposed toward the colonies. But it would be easy to overestimate this feeling of friendship. Nowhere is there any evidence to show that he had a very deep interest in the colonies for their own sake. Unquestionably he wished them success, but all expressions of friendship made by him or his ministers. should be scrutinized in the light of his avowed intention to procrastinate in the negotiations and of his instruction to Schulenburg, "Mit Complimenten abweissen." Frederick was, indeed, very much interested in the contest; of this the hundreds of letters in which he mentioned the subject are proof conclusive. But the reader of these letters can see with half an eye that it is in the effect of the war upon England and upon the politics of Europe that he was chiefly interested, not in its effects upon the colonies. At one time a story was widely current, and it is still believed by many, to the effect that he entertained a great admiration for Washington, and that he even went so far as to send him a sword upon which was inscribed, "From the oldest general in the world to the greatest." This is one of those many historical myths that have been eagerly accepted by a willing and credulous public, and it has been completely exploded.1 Furthermore, as Bancroft admits, there is nowhere in Frederick's correspondence any trace of a personal interest in Washington.2 Much the same may be affirmed of his interest in the colonies. His rather friendly attitude toward them was due chiefly to his hatred for England and to his desire to keep a way open for commercial relations with the new power in case it should sustain its independ-, ence. There is little or no evidence to prove that sentiment was a factor in determining his policy. PAUL LELAND HAWORTH. 1 See an article by Moncure D. Conway in The Century Magazine, XIX. 945. 2 Preface to Vol. X. (original edition, 1874). COMPROMISES OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN the question of adopting the, Federal Constitution was being considered in the Pennsylvania state convention, James Wilson, who had taken an important part in the framing of that instrument, stated that the gentlemen of the opposition did not appear to appreciate, even in the most difficult part of the plan, the difficulties that had been experienced by the Federal Convention. Inasmuch as the Constitution came forth as the practically unanimous product of the Federal Convention's labors, and the proceedings of that body were secret, it is not surprising that the men of that time should have failed to comprehend the difficulties that had been encountered. Since the publication of the records of the Convention, however, it is somewhat remarkable that those who have attempted to describe the framing of our Constitution should continue under similar if not the same misapprehensions of which Wilson complained in 1787. In nothing is this more clearly shown than in the treatment of the compromises that were such an essential feature of the Convention's work. Not only have some of the most important compromises been completely overlooked, but others have been greatly misrepresented, and in consequence the final outcome of the Convention's proceedings, as well as those proceedings themselves, have been sadly distorted. The only explanation that appears plausible as to this misinterpretation of perfectly accessible facts is that the great source of our information as to what actually took place in the Federal Convention, the Madison Papers, first appeared in 1840.2 This was just the time when the slavery question was becoming the allabsorbing topic in our national life, and it was but natural that the men of that time should turn to the debates of the Convention to see what the framers of our Constitution had said and done upon the question that was then uppermost in the minds of all. It is possible that as "Compromise" was the shibboleth of the '40's and '50's, men instinctively tended to support their position by the action of 1 Elliot's Debates, first edition, 1827-1830, III. 297. 2 The writer is at present engaged in an attempt to examine all the more important works dealing with the formation of the Constitution, in order to determine, if possible, the origin and development of current misconceptions. That examination is only partially completed, but it has been carried far enough to render extremely probable the explanation that is here given. vy prac No such ines not Boed study fled to Din at this electing the Ition's to the dim The berusness summarize his 1 Con 1. but appar te se te term "Connec de composition of the two alviet is begration because he megrenzun ji ne part taken by them, that to Like fra de mat a getting this compromise adopted. “KIDZÍ DA Delta in iis ase has become almost eu vir is compromise is so called are by no means A munce Toansen s tremi tam that the birth of the ConstiDe graning of the Connect cut system on the stock of the old Confed |