"MODERN INSTANCES OF A

found a sympathetic ear and his wrongs have been speedily righted in New York; for in Brice v. Flagler, 23 Wend., 354, the barking of a dog by night was held a nuisance. From how many sympathetic lips before me do I hear the earnest expression, "another Daniel come to judgment"? But in London Mr. Cushing would have been compelled to brood in secret over his wrong and injury; for in Street v. Tugwell, 2 Selw., 1138, Lord Kenyon held just to the contrary, and refused to interfere (prompted, perhaps, by an Englishman's kindly feeling for a dog) to interfere with what he evidently regarded as the inalienable right of the dog in question to bark as long and as loud as he pleased. And if I may quote from another English poet, it would seem appropriate to conclude by the lines that some few of you may recall among the recollections of your earlier—and shall I say, perhaps your better days:

"Let dogs delight

To bark and bite,

For 'tis their nature to."

Whether these lines were cited by the learned counsel in the argument that led Lord Kenyon to his conclusion, I am unable to say. Another instance, doubtless, of the shortcomings of the reporters.

"The tintintabulation of the bells, bells, bells," sung by the genius of Edgar Poe has been held a nuisance in repeated instances, not only of heavy factory bells early in the morning, but the chiming of the bells of various churches in both England and in this country; though one called to work and the other to

pray.

And in the line of amusements fetes with music, dancing, and fireworks, bowling-alleys, playing of skittles, and even in our sister State of West Virginia, a skating-rink near a dwelling, were all held nuisances.

Will it surprise a part of my audience and horrify another and the "better half" to be told that "a common scold is a common-law nuisance"? But it is nothing more than any well-regu

lated mind would expect, to be told immediately after that "the practice of scolding must be habitual." Of course, for how can any conscientious wife do her duty by her husband without the aid of an occasional curtain lecture? But it is perhaps as well that it should not be permitted to become habitual. It might lose its effect. But what are we to think of our forefathers when we read that "at common law the offence was confined to women, and was punished by fine"? But there has been found one man, and he a Chief Justice-Woodward—of Pennsylvania, bold enough to put himself upon record, as follows:

"As to the unreasonableness of holding women liable to punishment for a too free use of their tongue, it is enough to say that the common law, which is the expressed wisdom of ages, adjudges that it is not unreasonable.”

But in our effort to agree with the Chief Justice in his opinion we will be greatly aided to note that the concession is made that "anger and provocation may excuse it."

The insistance upon the meaning for this maxim to which this paper has been in large part devoted, has not been in forgetfulness of the fact that every lawyer has observed in his own experience-viz., that it is comparatively rarely that any rule of law is left to its own independent operation; and that often— may we say usually-such operation is modified by other rules of law, set in operation by the combination of circumstances, the conflict of rights and interests, out of which has developed the case presented for study and management.

Nor has it been forgotten that in the practical application of our maxim we very often give it a wider scope than it would have under the circumstances insisted upon. But it is well known that there are many words which have come in time to such general use in their secondary meaning, that their origi nal meaning has been almost forgotten. Notwithstanding this, he is but a raw recruit and unskilled in the use of his weapons who fails to learn this original or primary meaning. And a

knowledge of it-aye, more, of the etymology of the word-is. essential to the right and best handling of it. We Virginians are wont to believe we can better handle horses and men if we know their pedigree.

And so in any application of our maxim, it is of great service to keep in mind its primary, its more exact meaning. He better understands the course and constituent elements of the Mississippi river who has traced it to its source in the clear waters of the Minnesota lake. And we are better fitted to apply this maxim in all its modifications of itself and in all its complications with other rules of law, if we sit in all teachableness at the very feet of Justice, and under the shadow of her outstretched arm, and from the firm lips under the bandaged eyes hear the words: "So use thine own as not to hurt thy neighbor's."

The shepherds of the Delectable Mountains, in John Bunyan's allegory, said, "one to another," "Let us here show to the pilgrims the gate of the celestial city, if they have skill to look through our perspective glass." The pilgrims then lovingly accepted the motion; so they had them to the top of a high hill called Clear, and gave them their glass to look.

Then they essayed to look, but the remembrance of that last thing that the shepherds had showed them made their hands shake, by means of which impediment they could not look steadily through the glass; yet they thought they saw something like the gate, and also some of the glory of the place.

And then the chronicle tells us how they went on their way, not unmindful of the dangers and difficulties yet to be encountered, but the better encouraged and equipped to face and overcome them by even the faint glimpse they had had of "the glories that awaited them."

And is it not true of this maxim, which a Riely calls "golden," and a Moncure "emphatically applies" as "the true legal as well as moral measure" of the rights of the man before him; that it, too, is "the top of a high hill called Clear," and that from the height of its moral sublimity, with lungs filled with its pure

ether, and vision freed from the obscuring mists of the low grounds, we catch glimpses, faint and fleeting though they be, of the higher and better things of the universe of God; and that with the clamor of contending voices still ringing in our ears, we can with the eye of hope and faith look far away

"To where, beyond these voices, there is peace."

CODE OF ETHICS.

ADOPTED JULY 24, 1889.-MINUTES 1889, PAGE 25.

The purity and efficiency of judicial administration, which under our system is largely government itself, depends as much upon the character, conduct, and demeanor of attorneys in their great trust as upon the fidelity and learning of courts or the honesty and intelligence of juries.

"There is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law. There is certainly, without any exception, no profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the lines of strict integrity; in which so many delicate and difficult questions of duty are constantly arising. There are pitfalls and mantraps at every step, and the mere youth, at the very outset of his career, needs often the prudence of self-denial, as well as the moral courage, which belong commonly to riper years. High moral principle is his only safe guide; the only torch to light his way amidst darkness and obstruction."--Sharswood.

No rule will determine an attorney's duty in the varying phases of every case. What is right and proper must, in the absence of statutory rules and an authoritative code, be ascertained in view of the peculiar facts, in the light of conscience, and the conduct of honorable and distinguished attorneys in similar cases, and by analogy to the duties enjoined by statute, and the rules of good neighborhood.

The following general rules are adopted by the Virginia State Bar Association for the guidance of its members: