ad litem continued to act for her in the case after she became of age. The court refers to the well-established doctrine that the right of an infant to show cause against a decree which affects his interests after he arrives at age, as allowed under our statutes, must be limited to the causes existing at the rendition of the decree—that is, the propriety and justice and right of the decree must be judged altogether by the facts and circumstances upon which it was based at the time it was entered.

There is one question of importance touching the sale of infants' property under the statute finally settled by this case. As is well known to the profession, it has for many years been provided by our legislation, now section 2435 of the Code, that if a sale of property be made under a decree of court after six months from the date of the decree, and the sale be confirmed, the title of the purchaser at such sale shall not be affected, although the decree of sale be afterwards set aside. It was held that this provision applies to a sale made in proceedings to sell the property of persons under disability, or to sell infants' lands.

I have thus passed in review the legislation of Virginia, and the principal decisions interpreting it, relating to the guardian ad litem for infants. I fear the recital has appeared to you tedious, and perhaps unnecessary. I shall feel, however, fully compensated if I have succeeded, even but partially, in interesting my fellow members of the Association, or in pointing out of its younger members a ready means of gaining access to the mysteries of the guardian ad litem. To some of you, I feel quite certain, that subject has not been without interest, and the time extended to me is not felt to have been lost.

to any

It has never been the custom in this Association to limit the time which addresses of this character shall occupy, and never has any complaint been made that our patience has been abused. When a lawyer is invited to speak, it would scarcely be justice to him to fix a time by which he shall measure the flow of his talk. This is not the practice or habit even in the courts, except in the august appellate tribunals, the judges of which are gen

erally overworked and badly compensated. Even in the olden time, the judges recognized that a lawyer might say something worth listening to and throwing light upon the subject of the case. In ancient Rome, when oratory became a profession, and lawyers for the most part became professional orators, it was in vogue to use a water-clock to measure the time of the speaker, the hour-glass not having been invented; and if the court extended the time, it was said to give the lawyer water-"dare aquam.’

If I have not exhausted my subject, I do not feel justified in asking for more water. But I will beg you to bear in mind what was said by Pliny, when acting as a judge, in a letter which he wrote to a friend. I quote the letter:

"Whenever I sit on the Bench, I always give the advocates as much water as they require. For I look upon it as the height of presumption to pretend to guess, before a cause is heard, what time it will require, and to set limits to an affair before one is acquainted with its extent; especially as the first and most sacred duty of a judge is patience, which is indeed, of itself, a very considerable part of justice.

"But the advocates will say many things that are useless. Granted. Yet is it not better to hear too much than not to hear enough? Besides, how can you know things are useless until you have heard them?"

These are memorable words of the ancient philosopher-judge, and we commend them to both judges and members of the Bar. Under the present legislation of our State, we of the Bar are placed in the exalted position occupied hundreds of years ago by the King of England. We have become collectively "parens patriae," the protector of the helpless infants, and their defender from imposition. Any one of us is liable to be called upon at any time to exercise this high prerogative which has been handed down to us from royal sources.

This being so, we should bear in mind the wise words of a learned judge in the case of Pinchback v. Graves, 42 Ark., 222, where he says:

"The business and juridical history of America is strewn with the wreck of infants' fortunes. The courts and the relatives of the infants are culpable in this, not the Legislature. The laws are wise and careful; the true spirit of them should be kept in view and administered."

And after reviewing the provisions of the statute of his State, he adds:

"These are wise provisions, and they are so far imperative. I think, too, that a guardian ad litem fails in his full duty and does not apprehend the true obligation which he voluntarily assumes, if he contents himself with simply putting in a general denial, which is commonly done, and then leaves the infant to the rude stream of the ensuing contest. His interests after issue require attention as well as before; proof may be required in his behalf; witnesses against him may require cross-examination. Points on error must be duly saved. With regard to these matters, the statutes are not mandatory, but the caution of the Legislature would fall far short of its design, and be nullified in its effect-would, indeed, be but empty pretense, if it be not further understood that the guardian ad litem should watch the interests of the infant throughout the litigation, and see to it that a vigorous and real defence be made throughout by attorney. It is a moral obligation of the imperfect sort, perhaps, which cannot be enforced; but it is none the less, in contemplation of law, which aims only to be as practical as possible."

PAPER READ

BY

JOHN J. WILLIAMS,

of the Winchester Bar.

SOME MODERN INSTANCES" OF A "WISE SAW."

Gentlemen of the Virginia State Bar Association:

The title of this paper doubtless recalls the well-known passage that Shakespeare puts in the mouth of the philosophic Jaques in "As You Like It," where he describes the "many parts" that "each man in his time" "plays" upon this "stage" of the world. Just how far this is true of the individuals of the membership of our Association may be a matter of question. Each of us has been "the infant" "in the nurse's arms"; most of us "the whining school boy," creeping unwillingly to school," and all save the inveterate old bachelors, if indeed they be an exception-which we very much doubt-have at some time or other been "the lover, sighing like a furnace." And though it has been a generation since the close of our war, yet there are still not a few of us who have played the part of "a soldier," "bearded like the pard"; though in that army with its unique membership, it was not true of all or of many that they were "full of strange oaths," and that the animating cause of their being soldiers was that they were "seeking the bubble reputation even in the cannon's mouth." Some of our younger members are even now filling the part of the soldier under the folds of the flag which, in the strange mutation of human affairs, their fathers