by his directions. That however is not the opinion of the learned in Bengal; who are more inclined to suppose that the real author may have borne the name which is affixed to his work, and may have been a professed lawyer who performed the functions of judge and legal adviser to one of the most celebrated of the Hindu sovereigns of Bengal. No evidence, however, has been adduced in support of this opinion; and the period when this author flourished is therefore entirely uncertain. He cites several earlier writers; but, their age being not less doubtful than his own, no aid can be at present derived from that circumstance, towards the determination of the limits between which he is to be placed. His commentators suppose him in many places to be occupied in refuting the doctrines of the Mitákshará. Probably they are right; it is however possible, that he may be there refuting the doctrines of earlier authors, which may have subsequently been repeated from them in the later compilation of Vijnáneswara. Assuming, however, that the opinion of the commentators is correct, the age of Jímútaváhana must be placed between that of Vijnaneswara, whose doctrine he opposes, and that of Raghunandana, who has followed his authority. Now Raghunandana's date is ascertained at about three hundred years from this time: for he was pupil of Vásudeva-sárvabhauma, and studied at the same time with three other disciples of the same preceptor, who likewise have acquired great celebrity: viz. Śiromani, Krishnananda, and Chaitanya; the latter is the well-known founder of the religious order and sect of Vaishnavas so numerous in the vicinity of Calcutta, and so notorious for the scandalous dissoluteness of their morals; and, the date of his birth being held memorable by his followers, it is ascertained by his horoscope said to be still preserved, as well as by the express mention of the date in his works, to have been 1411 of the Śaka era, answering to Y.c. 1489; consequently Raghunandana, being his contemporary, must have flourished at the beginning of the sixteenth century. 490 XIV. ON HINDU COURTS OF JUSTICE.1 [From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, THE Composition of an Indian court of justice, conformably with the ancient Hindu institutions, being very imperfectly understood, and many erroneous notions having become prevalent on this subject, it appears to deserve a more full investigation than it has yet undergone; and, with this view, I submit to the Society the result of a careful perusal of original authorities of Hindu law relating to that point. The following is an abstract,3 from very ample disquisitions, contained in treatises of Indian jurisprudence. An assembly for the administration of justice is of various sorts either stationary, being held in the town or village; or moveable, being held in field or forest; or it is a tribunal superintended by the chief judge appointed by the sovereign, and entrusted with the royal seal to empower him to summon 1 Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, May 24, 1828. 2 [Wilson, in a note to Mill (vol. i. p. 213), assigns these regulations to "a period not long subsequent to the Code of Manu, if not contemporary." It would be an interesting subject of inquiry to determine how far the Hindu courts and laws were allowed to remain in force during the five centuries and a half of Muham madan predominance throughout India. Cf. Elphinstone, History, pp. 91, 484, 487, 545.] 3 A short extract from this treatise was communicated to Mr. H. St. George Tucker, for insertion in the Appendix to his work on the financial state of the East-India Company. parties; or it is a court held before the sovereign in person. The two first of these are constituted at the request of parties, who solicit cognizance and determination of their differences; they are not established by operation of law, nor by the act of the king, but by voluntary consent. The two last are courts of judicature, established by the sovereign's authority: such a court is resorted to for relief as occasions occur, and not, as the first-mentioned, constituted merely for the particular purpose. To accommodate or determine a dispute between contending parties, the heads of the family, or the chiefs of the society, or the inhabitants of the town or village, select a referee approved by both parties. Among persons who roam the forest, an assembly for terminating litigation is to be held in the wilderness; among those who belong to an army, in the camp; and among merchants and artisans, in their societies. Places of resort for redress are: 1st. The court of the sovereign, who is assisted by learned Bráhmans as assessors. It is ambulatory, being held where the king abides or sojourns. 66 2nd. The tribunal of the chief judge ("Prád-viváka," or Dharmadhyaksha") appointed by the sovereign, and sitting with three or more assessors, not exceeding seven. This is a stationary court, being held at an appointed place. 3rd. Inferior judges, appointed by the sovereign's authority, for local jurisdictions. From their decisions an appeal lies to the court of the chief judge, and thence to the rájá or king in person. The gradations in arbitration are also three: 1st. Assemblies of townsmen, or meetings of persons belonging to various tribes, and following different professions, but inhabiting the same place. 2nd. Companies of traders or artisans; conventions of persons belonging to different tribes, but subsisting by the practice of the same profession. 3rd. Meetings of kinsmen, or assemblages of relations connected by consanguinity. The technical terms in the Hindu law-books for these three gradations of assemblies are, 1st. Púga; 2nd. Sreņi; 3rd. Kula. Their decisions or awards are subject to revision; an unsatisfactory determination of the "Kula," or family, is revised by the "Śreni," or company, as less liable to suspicion of partiality than the kindred; and an unsatisfactory decision of fellow-artisans is revised by the "Púga," or assembly of co-habitants, who are still less to be suspected of partiality. From the award of the "Púga," or assembly, an appeal lies, according to the statutes of Hindu law, to the tribunal of the "Prád-viváka," or judge; and, finally, to the court of the Rájá, or sovereign prince. The "Púga," "Śreni," and "Kula," are different degrees of arbitration, which, as is apparent, is not in the nature either of a jury or of a rustic tribunal, with which they have been assimilated; but merely a system of arbitration, subordinate to regularly constituted tribunals or courts of justice. I now proceed to the more detailed consideration of the composition of such courts. In several passages of Hindu law-books the members of the judicature are enumerated, but not without some discrepancy: one authority specifying so many as ten; others eight, but in some instances, nevertheless, noticing a greater number. The difference, however, is not material. That enumeration concerns the sovereign court, wherein the king personally presides. The composition of subordinate tribunals, with respect to its members and attendants and officers, has not been particularized; nor are there any direc tions found concerning the manner in which the business of inferior courts is to be conducted, or the sittings of arbitrators. No doubt the analogy of the sovereign court would be followed, so far as applicable; and the composition of the highest tribunal would be the type or model for the construction of a subordinate one. A court of judicature is, in the passages which have been adverted to, likened to a body furnished with limbs; and the similitude of the members of the one and limbs of the other is followed out to a puerile minuteness. Without regard, however, to this solemn trifling, it may be observed, that the members enumerated are: first, the king or sovereign prince; next, the chief judge, or superintendent appointed by him; afterwards the assessors or puisne judges, considered in the aggregate as one member, though their number ought to be three, five, or seven. The written law is to be had for reference or consultation, and is mentioned as one member; gold and fire are also to be in readiness, for use in the administration of oaths, and are in like manner noticed as members; as is also water, provided for refreshment. The principal officers of the court, namely, the accountant, the scribe, and the sequestrator, complete the formal enumeration. But to these must be added, other officers and attendants of the court, as the summoner and the moderator; likewise the king's domestic priest or spiritual counsellor, and his ministers of state or temporal advisers; and also the audience or bystanders, comprehending qualified persons, any one of whom may interpose in the capacity of an amicus curiæ; and persons in attendance to keep order and prevent the intrusion of the populace. By the Hindu institutes, the administration of justice, civil and criminal, is among the chief functions of the Rájá or sovereign; not arbitrarily, according to his mere will and pleasure; but conformably with fixed laws recorded by ancient sages, and agreeable to the established custom of the country. He will naturally need the assistance of learned persons conversant with those laws and usages, and competent to the application of them in particular and individual cases. There |