as better conveying in a small compass a notion of the multifarious subjects of the Mimánsá.1 I [The Mimánsá tenets on 'correct knowledge' (pramá) are curious and often alluded to in philosophical treatises. The followers of Prabhakara hold that knowledge is an object of internal perception, and its correctness is cognized by the same act of cognition as the knowledge itself. Thus there is first the perception, this is a jar,' and then the cognition of this perception, I perceive the jar,' and simultaneously with it the cognition of the truth of the perception. Thus the cognition is threefold, embracing the jar, the cognizing soul, 'I,' and the perception of the jar, which also includes a conviction of the truth of the perception; the same internal organ, the mind, grasps them all, and forms them into one act of cognition. The followers of Kumárila hold that knowledge is supersensuous, and therefore not an object of perception, but of inference. According to them, when a jar is perceived, there is first produced in it a quality called 'cognizedness' (jnátatá); this cognizedness becomes an object of perception, in the form this jar is known.' I next infer, from its effect in the jar, the existence of this cognition in myself, and I also at the same time infer the correctness of the cognition. The Nyaya holds that the three steps, 1, perception, 2, consciousness of the perception (anuvyavasaya), and 3, the knowledge of its correctness, are successive, the last being gained by inference; the Mimánsá holds that the two last are simultaneous and in fact identical. The Mimánsá school consistently does not allow such a thing as misapprehension, as all cognition presents real objects. In erroneous perceptions the cognition is correct as far as regards the terms of the proposition; thus when nacre is mistaken for silver, the nacre is actually present to the sight as this,' and the silver is similarly presented through some defect as bilious humour, etc.; the error lies in the mind failing to recognize that they should not be connected as subject and predicate, i.e. this (nacre) is silver' (asamsargágrahakálínam dharmadharminor jnánam eva bhramopapádakam).] X. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS. PART IV.1 [From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, INTRODUCTION. [325] A PRECEDING essay on Indian philosophy contained a succinct account of the Karma-mimánsá. The present one will be devoted to the Brahma-mimánsá; which, as the complement of the former, is termed uttara, later, contrasted with púrva, prior, being the investigation of proof, deducible from the Vedas in regard to theology, as the other is in regard to works and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mimánsá is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but, differing on Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, April 7, 1827. 2 [These terms do not authorize any inference as to the relative antiquity of the two systems, they only refer to the respective time of study. The Purvamímánsá deals with the Púrva-kanda or ceremonial part of the Veda, while the Vedanta treats of the Uttara-kánda or the theological. But it is curious to compare the two readings in the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, p. 6, 1. 16; the one in the printed text (Púrvam vedamayárthataḥ) seems to explain púrva as 'before the Vedanta in time' (cf. p. 7, 1. 5); the other (Púrvavedaprakáśakam) gives distinctly the true explanation. But there can be no doubt that the Púrva-mímánsá school did precede the other by a considerable interval.] many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as in a philosophical view. The ordinary designation of the Uttara-mímánsá is Vedánta, a term likewise of more comprehensive import. It literally signifies "conclusion of the Veda," and bears reference to the Upanishads, which are, for the most part, terminating sections of the Vedas to which they belong. It implies, however, the doctrine derived from them, and extends to books of sacred authority, in which that doc[326]trine is thence deduced; and in this large acceptation, it is "the end and scope of the "Vedas." The followers of the Vedanta have separated in several sects, as 'ancient' and 'modern' Vedantins, and bearing other designations. The points on which they disagree, and the difference of their opinions, will not be a subject of the present essay, but may be noticed in a future one.1 Among numerous Upanishads, those which are principally relied upon for the Vedanta, and which accordingly are most frequently cited, are the Chhándogya, Kaushitaki, Vṛihadáranyaka, Aitareyaka, Taittiriyaka, Káṭhaka, Kathavalli, Mundaka, Praśna, Śwetáśwatara; to which may be added the I'śá-rásya, Kena, and one or two more. Certain religious exercises, consisting chiefly in profound meditation, with particular sitting sitting postures rigorously continued, are inculcated as preparing the student for the attainment of divine knowledge, and promoting his acquisition of it. Directions concerning such devout exercises are to be found in several of the Upanishads, especially in the Śwetáswatara; and likewise in other portions of the Vedas, as a part of the general ritual. These are accordingly cited by the 1 [For an able review of the Vedanta, more especially according to S'ankara's view of it, see Dr. Bruining's Bijdrage tot de Kennis van den Vedanta, Leiden, 1871. Nilakantha's Refutation of Hindu Philosophy abounds with valuable information, but it chiefly refers to the modern school of the Vedanta. Cf. also Banerjea's Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy.] 2 [This should be the Kathaka or Kathavalli.'] commentators of the Vedánta, and must be considered to be comprehended under that general term; and others from different sákhás of the Vedas, as further exemplified in a note below.2 [327] Besides the portion of the Vedas understood to be intended by the designation of Vedanta, the grand authority for its doctrine is the collection of sútras, or aphorisms, entitled Brahma-sútra or Śáriraka-mimánsá, and sometimes Śárirasútra or Vedánta-sútra. Śárira, it should be observed, signifies embodied or incarnate (soul).3 Other authorities are the ancient scholia of that text, which is the standard work of the science; and didactic poems comprehended under the designation of smṛiti, a name implying a certain degree of veneration due to the authors. Such are the Bhagavad-gítá and Yoga-vásishtha, reputed to be inspired writings. WRITERS ON THE VEDÁNTA. 4 The Śáriraka-mimánsá or Brahma-sútra, above mentioned, is a collection of succinct aphorisms attributed to Bádarayaṇa, who is the same with Vyása or Veda-ryása; also called Dwaipayana or Krishna-dwaipayana. According to mythology, he had in a former state, being then a brahmana bearing the name of Apántara-tamas,5 acquired a perfect knowledge of revela tion and of the divinity, and was consequently qualified for eternal beatitude. Nevertheless, by special command of the 1 For instance, the Agni-rahasya-bráhmana of the Kanwas and of the Fajins (or Vajasaneyins); the Rahasya-bráhmaṇa of the Táṇḍins and of the Paingins. 2 The Udgitha-brahmana of the Vajasaneyins, the Panchágni-vidyá-prakaraṇa of the same, the Khila-grantha of the Randyaniyas, the Práṇa-samváda or Práṇavidyá, Dahara-vidyá, Hárda-vidyá, Paramátma-vidyá, Satya-vidyá, Vaiśwánaravidya, Sandilya-vidya, Vámaderya-vidya, Upakośala-vidyd, Paryanka-vidyá, Madhu-vidya, Shoḍaśakala-vidya, Samvarga-vidya, etc. 3 [Govindánanda in 'Vedanta Aphorisms,' (Bibl. Ind.) p. 22.] [He is only called Badarayana in the sútras.] 5 S'ank. etc. on Br. Sútr. 3. 3. 32. deity, he resumed a corporeal frame and the human shape, at the period intervening between the third and fourth ages of the present world, and was compiler of the Vedas, as his title of Vyása implies. In the Puránas, and by Paráśara, he is said to be an incar. nation (avatára) of Vishnu. This, however, is not altogether at variance with the foregoing legend; since Apántara-tamas, having attained perfection, was identified with the deity; and his resumption of the human forin was a descent of the god, in mythological notions. [328] Apart from mythology, it is not to be deemed unlikely, that the person (whoever he really was) who compiled and arranged the Vedas, was led to compose a treatise on their scope and essential doctrine. But Vyása is also reputed author of the Mahabharata, and most of the principal puránas; and that is for the contrary reason improbable, since the doctrine of the puránas, and even of the Bhagavad-gitá and the rest of the Mahábhárata, are not quite consonant to that of the Vedas, as expounded in the Brahma-sútras. The same person would not have deduced from the same premises such different conclusions. 2 The name of Bádarayana frequently recurs in the sútras ascribed to him, as does that of Jaimini, the reputed author of the Púrva-mímánsá, in his. I have already remarked, in the preceding essay,3 on the mention of an author by his name, and in the third person, in his own work. It is nothing unusual in literature or science of other nations: but a Hindu commentator will account for it, by presuming the actual composition to be that of a disciple recording the words of his teacher. Besides Bádarayana himself, and his great predecessor 1 [Thus Govindánanda in his preliminary verses, Vydsam Harim sútrakṛitam cha vachmi.] 2 [I. 3. 26; I. 3. 33; III. 2. 41; III. 4. 1, 8, 19; IV. 3. 15; IV. 4. 7, 12.] 3 See p. 320 of this volume. VOL. II. [ESSAYS I.] 23 |