Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the BrainHow can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials (nerve impulses) become like the feeling of pain in one's experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain. However, although we know that experience arises from a physical basis, we don't have a good explanation of why and how it so arises. The problem of how physical processes give rise to experience is called the 'hard problem' of consciousness and it is the contemporary manifestation of the mind-body problem. This book explains the key concepts that surround the issue as well as the nature of the hard problem and the several approaches to it. It gives a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon incorporating its main metaphysical and epistemic aspects, as well as recent empirical findings, such as the phenomenon of blindsight, change blindness, visual-form agnosia and optic ataraxia, mirror recognition in other primates, split-brain cases and synaesthesia. |
Contents
Phenomenal Consciousness The Hard Problem | |
Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sufficiency Claim | |
Experience and FirstOrder Representationalism | |
Experience and the Explanatory | |
Experience and HigherOrder Representationalism | |
Notes | |
Other editions - View all
Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and ... Dimitris Platchias No preview available - 2011 |
Common terms and phrases
A-conscious According to Chalmers appears argued argument behaviour belief blindsight Block brain C-fibre firing causal cause Chalmers’s claim cognitive colour conceivable concept conceptual repertoire conscious experience conscious qualitative correlates Dennett Descartes directly aware dispositional dispositionalist distinction dorsal stream Dretske essentially conscious example exist experiential properties explain explanatory gap facts feel first-order mental functional hard problem Hence higher-order HOT theory ibid idea identical identify instance introspectively conscious involved kind Lycan mental phenomena mental qualitative properties mind multiple realizability mysterian Nagelian neural neurophysiological non-conceptual non-introspectively conscious occur unconsciously one’s P-conscious perceptual experiences phenomenal consciousness philosophers philosophical zombie philosophy of mind physical properties physicalist possible problem of consciousness property dualism propositional attitudes red patch reductive explanation representational content representationalism representationalist role seems sensations sense sensory qualities substance dualism sufficient for experience suggest supervenience things thought ventral stream virtue what-it-is-likeness zombie
