and seemed on a quick march to Vienna. The authority of the archduke Charles, now commanderin-chief of the Austrian armies on the Rhine, restrained dissentions and contests among general officers his example inspired courage into every officer and soldier and his courage, guided by cool deliberation, as well as prompt decision, in the very throat of danger and fate, was victorious.

Yet, on the whole, on weighing the prosperous against the adverse events of the year, the balance was greatly in favour of the French republic. Jourdan, though defeated in several engagements, by the young Austrian hero, had been able to effect his retreat to Dusseldorf. And Moreau, who, for want of a third French army, was exposed on his flanks, to total excision or capture, had made a masterly retreat, and conducted the main body of his army, through rany dangers and conflicts, across the Rhine, into a situation of safety, within the French frontier. Thus, though the French were repulsed from Germany, the honour of their arms, even in that quarter, was unimpaired, while, in another, they were gloriously triumphant.

The policy of France was not less successful. After detaching Prussia and Spain from the confederacy, she had succeeded, through dint of artifice and intrigue, in connecting herself with both of these powers by a close alliance. The former of these had not, indeed, publicly declared in its favour, but was well understood to be so intimately connected with the republic, that, in case of absolute necessity, no doubt was entertained of its determination to assist France to the utmost of its capacity. The latter having, in

the year 1795, concluded a peace with the republic, had afterwards entered into an alliance, defensive and offensive, with it, that was explicitly levelled at Great Britain. This treaty, which took place in August, 1796, was followed, in the commencement of October, by a formal declaration of war against England, and by the preparation of a formidable naval strength, to act in conjunction with that of France. In Italy, every prince and state was either in peace or confederacy with the French, the pope alone excepted; whose situation, however, was such, that he could not long defer submission to their own terins. Germany could not be reputed hostile to France. Though certainly averse to the entrance of its armies into the empire, yet the secondary ranks of princes and states, of which it is composed, were not dissatisfied at the humiliation of Austria, of which they dreaded the power and pretensions. These were permanent, and had often endangered the liberties of Germany: whereas, the irruptions of the French could never be more than occasional and transitory. The precedents of former times had shewn, that the politics of France, which must continue the same, whether it were a monarchy or a republic, would always aim at holding the balance between the head and the members of the empire. In the north of Europe, the two kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden were too conscious of the impending power of Russia, to lend themselves to the depression of France, which they now considered as necessary to preserve the dominion of the Baltic equally divided between those three countries.

To

To all the other circumstances that tended to encourage the hopes, and inflame the ambition of the French republic, is to be added the death of the empress of Russia. Though it might seem to a sound politician, unwarped by prejudice or passion, that an emperor of Russia could not be other than hostile to the friends of Sweden and the Porte, and the patrons of revolution in Poland; yet there was generally in sovereign princes, as well as in prime ministers and governors of allkinds, a jealousy of the very shade, and a disposition to recede in their conduct, from the measures and maxims of their predecessors. Neither the temper and genius of Paul I. nor the terms on which he had lived with his illustrious mother, gave any reason to expect that he would strictly adhere to her plans, and adopt her intentions. In fact, hehad no sooner mounted the throne of Russia, than he countermanded the orders that had been given for the march of the troops to Gallicia. He entered into a negociation for a settlement of an old debt, due by the Russian government, to the Seven United Provinces, and for the establishment of a treaty of commerce. He shewed a disposition to become a mediator for peace, in danger of being broken, between the Austrians and Prussians, and seemed even ambitious of being the arbiter of a general peace in Europe.

Thus Great Britain and Austria were the sole adversaries that France had now to encounter. But the successes of its arms had so completely defeated all the projects they had jointly engaged in against it, that no apprehensions were entertained of their being able to turn the scale of fortune by any subse

quent efforts. The efficacy of these must naturally be diminished proportionably to the losses and discomfitures they had met with, and would, probably, still experience, if they were to persist in a contest, in which, being only the remainder of the coalition, they could not hope to be less unsuccessful than it had proved in the united strength of its whole power.

In addition to the maritime force of Spain, France relied with still more confidence on that of the Batavian republic. The numerous seamen, employed in its extensive commerce, had always borne the character of a brave and hardy race of men, completely skilled in their profession, and incomparably preferable, in every respect, to the Spanish mariners. That republic was now exerting itself to fit out as many ships of war as were lying in its ports, and of adding them to those of its French and Spanish confederates, in hopes of depriving the English of the empire of the sea.

This hope had not been diminished by the failure of the attempt against Ireland, which the French attributed solely to the unpropitious weather that had constantly attended the expedition. It had been planned, in their opinion, on the best of all grounds; the noted discontents of a people ill-treated, and weary of a yoke that had for centu ries kept them in a state of depression. They were all ripe for a vigorous resistance, and required only a moderate assistance to deliver themselves from the tyrrany of England. Though the first essay to relieve them had failed, from causes that could not, in the nature of things, be obviated, it was not to be imagined, that these would al[B 2]

ways 1

ways recur. The attempt ought, therefore, to be resumed, as the opportunity still continued as inviting as ever. It was ignominious for three such powers as France, Spain, and Holland, to desist from so practicable a design, which they had every reason to prosecute, and none to abandon. The facets of Great Britain were not superior to those of the potent confederacy, formed against it; and so many advantages would result from the accomplishment of the object proposed, that it ought, in good poliev, to be persisted in, against all ditticulties, and at all hazards. Such was the language of the French.

Animated by a otives of this kind, the three allied powers resolved to exert themselves, without intermis sion, in the equi; ment of such a naval force, as might eff cty confront the British marine, and make, at the same time, a successful inpression upon that part of the capite of Great Britain, which a, peered most vulner .ble. Such was the plan in the contemplation of the enemies of England, and of which they formed the most sanguine expectations. Nor did the most sagacious politicians look upon it as ill founded, though they were equally persuaded, that it would meet with every ob truction from the long noted valour and skill of their adversaries. Thus, all circumstances contributed to render the present year productive of events, not less, if not more, important and striking than those that had preceded. Thegyes of alle European nations, were anxiously fixed on the vast piya.a tions king against a power, which, if it resistud them, would become, greater than ever; but of which the destiny seemed uncer

tain, when the rooted hostility, and the prodigious efforts of such formidable enemies, were duly and impartially considered.

The readiness with which the French government broke off the negociation with England, arose, in the opinion of those who were reputed the most judicious, in the firm persuasion that the triple alliance, as it was styled, now formed against it, could hardly fail to compass the ends it proposed, by prosecuting them with the energy and perseverance, of which they were deserving.

While France was so busily intent on the means of effecting the downtal of England, it was no less occupied in preparing, as it hoped, the final destruction of the power of Austria. The spirit with which this latter sustained the successive disasters that had befallen its repeated endeavours to maintain its ground in Italy, had kept alive the courage of its subjects and well-wishers to such a degree, that they all concurred in a resolute determination to stand by it as long as the least prospect remained of any possibility to retrieve its affairs.

The theatre, to which the attention of Europe was chiefly turned, at the end of the last and beginning of the present year, was Italy. The exploits of 1 uonaparte had not yet terminated, as he had long expected, and many labours awaited him before the accomplishment of that object, with out which, both he and his foes well foresaw that his views would be frustrated, and the fruits of his victories lost. This was the capture of Mia, ma, which held out with an obstinacy that had never been excceded in the defence of

any