unsatisfactory: I could even suppose, with the deriders of this argument, that so many, and such prophecies, so directed, might not improbably be accounted for, from some odd conjuncture of circumstances; and that the accomplishment of them did by no means infer a certainty of inspiration.

But, if now, on the other hand, it be indisputable, That a vast variety of predictions are to be found in the scriptures of the Old and New Testament; That a great part of these predictions are delivered with the utmost degree of minuteness and particularity; and, lastly, that all of them, whether general or particular, respect one common subject, and profess to have, or to expect, their completion in one connected scheme of things, and, upon the matter, in one single person: On this latter supposition, I must still think, that there is great reason to admit the divine inspiration of such prophecies, when seen to be fulfilled.

To convert this supposition into a proof, is not within the scope and purpose of this Lecture. The work hath been undertaken and discharged by many others: or, it may be sufficient, in so clear a point, to refer you directly to the scriptures themselves; which no man can read without seeing, that the prophecies, contained in them, are extremely numerous-that many of these prophe

cies are minutely circumstantial-and that one person, whoever he be, is the principal object of them all. My concern, at present, is only to shew, that, if the supposition itself be well founded, the inference, just now mentioned, is rightly made.

1. First, then, if the prophecies in the Old and New Testament be very numerous, and if those prophecies, so many of them, I mean, as are alleged in this controversy with unbelievers, have had a reasonable completion (and I have a right to make this last supposition, when the question is concerning the account to be given of such a fact:) If, I say, we argue from these two assumptions, it must appear highly credible and probable, that so numerous prophecies, so fulfilled, had not their origin from human conjecture, nor their accomplishment from what we call, Chance. For mere conjecture is not usually so happy; nor chance, so constant.* Further still; if the scrip

*Casu, inquis. Itane vero quicquam potest esse casu factum, quod omnes habet in se numeros veritatis? Quatuor tali jacti, casu Venereum efficiunt. Num etiam centum Venereos, si cccc talos jeceris, casu futuros putas? De Div. l. i. p. 259, Lutet. 1565.Had the supposed case been fairly applied to the subject, there had been an end of the dispute; as may appear from the pitiful answer, made in the next book to this reasoning-dixisti multa de casu ut, Venereum jaci posse casu, quatuor talis jactis: quadringentis, centum Venereos non posse casu consistere. Primum, NESCIO, CUR NON POSSINT.Was this, like a philosopher!

tural prophecies have been completed in numerous instances, and if in no instance whatsoever can it be clearly shewn that they have failed in the event, the presumption is still stronger, that such coincidence could not be fortuitous; and a material difference between scriptural prophecy, and Pagan divination is, at the same time, pointed out. For, that, in the multitude of pretended oracles in the days of paganism, some few only should come to pass, while the generality of them fell to the ground, may well be the sport of fortune.* But, that very many prophecies, recorded in our scriptures, have had an evident completion, when not one of all those, there recorded, can be convicted of imposture, must surely be the work of design.

The argument cannot be denied to have real weight, though the expression of all the prophecies were allowed to be general. But this is, by no means, the case. It is further assumed, and is evident to all that have read the scriptures, that a great number of them are delivered with the utmost degree of minuteness and particularity. And, from this assumption, I infer,

* Multa vera, inquit, evadere. Quid, quod multo plura, falsa? Nonne ipsa varietas, quæ est propria fortunæ, fortunam esse causam, non naturam, docet? De Div. l. ii. p. 295. This, methinks, looks like sense.

2. Secondly, that the accomplishment of prophecies, só circumstantially defined, can still less be imputed to mere chance.

Without doubt, if all the prophecies concerning the Messiah had been penned in the style of the first—that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head-though even then there might be reason for applying them, exclusively, to the person of Christ, yet, the evidence, that they were intended to be so applied, would have been much obscured by the mode of expression; the wide cover of which might seem to afford room for other applications. But when, to this general prophecy, the theme of all succeeding ones, it is further added, That this seed of the woman, should be the seed of Abraham; of the tribe of Juda; of the family of David; that he should be born at Bethlehem; that he should appear in the world at a time, limited by certain events, and even precisely determined to a certain period:when, after a particular description of his life and office, it is said of him, that he should be betrayed by an intimate friend; and sold for a price, exactly specified; that he should suffer a particular kind of death; should have his hands and feet pierced; should have vinegar given him to drink; and should be buried in the sepulchre of a rich man-with innumerable other particularities of

the like nature*-When all this, I say, is considered, the improbability, that these specific characters should meet in the same person by chance, is so great, that a reasonable man will scarce venture on so hazardous a position.

3. Still this is not all. Were we at liberty to apply even numerous, and circumstantial prophecies, to any person, indifferently, whom they might suit, and to any events indiscriminately, to which they might correspond, sought out at large in the history of mankind, the force of the argument for design in such prophecies, might in good measure be eluded. But, when we reflect on what, in part, hath appeared under the last article, that all the scriptural predictions profess to respect one certain scheme of things; run in the line of one people; and point ultimately at one person, whose country, and family, and age, and birth-place are exactly defined; the application of them is so limited and restrained, that, if they suit at all, there is scarce a possibility of excluding actual foresight, and intention.

* See the ancient apologists, who are frequent and large on this subject; and, of the moderns, see especially Huetii Dem. Evang. Prop. IX.-Bishop Kidder's Dem. of the Messias, c. ii. p. 17, 18. London, 1726, fol. —Dr. Clarke's Evidences of Nat. and Rev.' Religion-Pensees de M. Pascal, p. 108.