THE WESTMINSTER REVIEW. JANUARY TO JUNE (INCLUSIVE) 1904. "Truth can never be confirmed enough, SHAKSPEARE. Wahrheitsliebe zeigt sich darin, daß man überall das Gute zu finden und zu schäßen weik. VOL CLXI GOTHE. NEW YORK: THE LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY. 7 & 9 WARREN STREET. MDCCCCIV. THE WESTMINSTER REVIEW. VOL. CLXI. No. 1.-JANUARY 1904. HERBERT SPENCER. In his impressive address beside the coffin of the late Herbert Spencer an address which will long live in the memory of those of us who were privileged to hear it as a masterpiece of slow and stately eloquence-Mr. Leonard Courtney laid particular stress upon the great philosopher's marvellous powers of generalisation. And he was right in so doing, for it is precisely here, we think, that we may recognise the most remarkable characteristic of Spencer's genius. How vast were the range and sweep of his mind, and how daring yet how sure-footed was his advance from facts to induction, and again to more comprehensive induction, will become clear to any reader who watches closely the unfolding of his argument in almost any division of his works. Much has been written of his encyclopaedic knowledge, illustrated not only in the ten volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy, but also in his numerous disconnected essays, in which he discussed with apparently equal ease and certainty, such varied subjects as the Nebular Hypothesis, animal worship, architectural types, music, railway policy, manners and fashions, and representative government. Such versatility is well calculated to cause astonishment. But the real significance of it is missed if no due notice is taken of the fact that in treating thus of many topics, Spencer made important contributions to the discussion of nearly all of them. Specialists in almost every walk acknowledge their indebtedness to him, and writers on astronomy, musical theory, and literary style, no less than those who deal with psychology and ethics, find it necessary, even when it is to express disagreement, to take his speculations and conclusious under consideration. Why is this? In the nature of things it cannot be VOL. 161.-No. 1. 128645 A that Spencer wrote as a specialist himself on all these different themes-that in every phase and aspect of life dealt with in the Synthetic System, from the most abstract questions of cosmology at the one end, to the most trivial details of savage superstitions at the other, his own position should have been that of pioneer and original investigator. This was impossible. The explanation of the extraordinary value possessed by nearly all his writings, even on subjects remote from the great highways of his thought, will ultimately be found in the fact that he brought to bear upon every problem that he took up, not only enormous erudition and the rarest sagacity, but also, and in particular, that wonderful generalising power to which we now specially refer. It seemed as if in his hands facts, apparently the most alien and disconnected, discovered their affinities with one another, and entered into wholly unexpected relationships; as if the phenomena under study grouped themselves of their own accord into such patterns as to make recognition of the laws which they exemplified inevitable. The finest illustrations of this power and of the results which it enabled Spencer to achieve, are probably to be found in the Principles of Psychology; but there is hardly an essay or chapter in the whole extent of his writings in which some noteworthy instance is not afforded. Approaching his philosophy in this way, we reach a point of view from which both the salient features of his system and his characteristic method become perfectly clear. The object which Spencer set out to accomplish was the discovery and co-inordination of those most general laws by which we symbolise the processes of the Universe as we know these under the limitations of our own intelligence. And this object was reached primarily by a long series of generalisations, the results being finally knit together, in their most abstract statements, into a unified and coherent whole. By the process of generalisation the various sciences advance to the establishment of certain comprehensive laws within the area of their own phenomena. But such special results remain practically independent of one another. The business of philosophy, as conceived by Spencer, is to formulate the universal laws underlying all such special laws, and thus to become the science of the sciences; for "as each widest generalisation of science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalisations of its own division, so the generalisations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisations of science." Philosophy thus represents "the final product of that process which begins with a mere colligation of crude observations, goes on establishing propositions that are broader and more separated from particular cases, and ends in universal propositions." Spencer's greatest achievement in generalisation was of course his formulation of the great law of Evolution, which is the founda 2 tion and backbone of his entire body of thought. Of the relation of this law to those universal truths which constitute the first principles of his system-the persistence of force, the uniformity of law, the indestructibility of matter, and the rhythm of motion-it is hardly necessary here to speak, for this is a point which can have : very little interest for any one save the special student of philosophy. There is one aspect of his general doctrine, however, which has practical importance, and which, since misconceptions concerning it are rather common, calls for passing remark. It is often supposed that, as a universal process, Evolution stands alone in Spencer's systematic treatment of life. This is not so. It is a necessary corollary from one of the first principles just referred to the law of the rhythm of motion-that the redistribution of matter and motion throughout the universe and in all its parts, should comprise two antagonistic processes-the one tending to increasing consolidation and definiteness, the other towards diffusion and incoherence. The former is Evolution, the latter Dissolution; the one is the building, the other the destroying force. Thus in no theory of things-whether we consider the tiny cycle of an insect's life, or the growth and decay of worlds-can we ignore the disintegrating force by which sooner or later the work of Evolution must be undone. But as upon our own planet, throughout the ages of which we know anything, and still at the present time, it is the evolutionary process which has been and remains predominant, it is upon this phase of the general transformation going on everywhere about us, that we may properly fix our attentton. And the Spencerian philosophy, broadly considered, is the philosophy which explains the universe in terms of the fundamental law of Evolution, which, established in First Principles, was then, in the nine succeeding volumes of the Synthetic System, carried forward as an organon into the domains of biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics. Let us take this crowning achievement of Spencer's inductive powers, and try to show how by generalisation upon generalisation the complete formula of Evolution was gradually reached. In marking the successive stages of the process, we shall be able to bring out the full meaning of the method pursued by Spencer in the elaboration of his entire system of thought. It is, of course, to the work produced by him between 1850 and 1860 that is, to his remarkable series of preliminary studies from Social Statics to the original edition of First Principles-that we naturally turn,1 and in these the development of his thought towards 1 Readers of the WESTMINSTER REVIEW will hardly need to be reminded how many of Spencer's most important essays first appeared in these pages. Among them may specially be mentioned those on "The Philosophy of Style,' "Over. Legislation," "Manners and Fashion," "Progress, its Law and Cause," "Representative Government," "State Tamperings with Money and Banks," "The Morals of Trade," "The Social Organism," "The Nebular Hypothesis," and "Parliamentary Reform." |