Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic TheoryHow can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness. |
Contents
List of figures | xi |
Preface | xiii |
Assumptions distinctions and a mapi | 1 |
2 Functionalism and theorytheory | 5 |
kinds of consciousness | 9 |
the tree of consciousness | 22 |
Perspectival subjective and worldly facts | 27 |
2 On facts and properties | 32 |
Higherorder representationalism a first defence | 180 |
2 HOR theory and qualia irrealism | 184 |
3 Of animals infants and the autistic | 193 |
4 Moral consequences? | 203 |
Dispositionalist higherorder thought theory 1 function | 210 |
2 Actualist HOT theory | 219 |
3 Dispositionalist HOT theory | 227 |
4 Dispositional theory and categorical experience | 233 |
3 Necessary identities | 39 |
4 Logical supervenience | 49 |
Explanatory gaps and qualia | 59 |
2 The explanatory gap | 64 |
3 The knowledge argument | 71 |
4 Inverted and absent qualia arguments | 76 |
Naturalisation and narrow content | 88 |
2 Naturalisation by content | 95 |
3 Wide versus narrow content | 104 |
4 Phenomenal consciousness and narrow content | 109 |
Firstorder representationalism | 114 |
defence | 122 |
3 Nonconceptual versus analog content | 129 |
4 More varieties of FOR theory | 136 |
Against firstorder representationalism | 147 |
the scientific case | 154 |
3 A trilemma for FOR theory | 168 |
4 Nonconscious phenomenality? | 175 |
Dispositionalist higherorder thought theory 2 feel | 236 |
2 Actual HOTs and feel | 239 |
3 Consumer semantics and feel | 241 |
4 Elucidations and replies | 259 |
Phenomenal consciousness and language | 271 |
2 Higherorder description HOD theory | 278 |
3 The Joycean machine | 282 |
4 The independence of structured HOTs from language | 288 |
Fragmentary consciousness and the Cartesian theatre | 297 |
2 Fragmenting the Cartesian theatre | 307 |
3 Time as represented versus time of representing | 313 |
4 Objective versus subjective time | 318 |
Conclusion | 325 |
330 | |
341 | |
344 | |
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Common terms and phrases
access-conscious account of phenomenal actualist HOT theory actually and/or argue argument awareness behaviour belief blindsight brain C-fibre capable capacity causal causal co-variance causal role cause Chalmers chapter characterised claim cognitive colour concepts of experience conceptualised consumer semantics creature-consciousness defended Dennett dispositionalist HOT theory Dretske ence example experience of red explain explanation of phenomenal fact first-order functional green higher-order thought HOT idea inferential role semantics inner sense intentional content inverted involved judgements language Leibniz's Law mental mind-reading movement mysterian narrow content natural naturalistic neural nomenal consciousness non-conscious experience normal notion object particular perceived perceptual contents phenome phenomenal consciousness phenomenally conscious experience phenomenology physical possess possible worlds problem processes propositional attitudes qualia question recognitional concepts reductive explanation reflexive thinking theory representationalism represented rience scious sort subjective feel supposed theorist theory of mind theory-theory tion tional visual system what-it-is-likeness