of the others, and therefore-whether wisely or not-it instinctively inclines towards backing the Conservatives.

That alone is a sufficient reason for a reform of the present system. If the House of Lords were placed in such a position that it could feel confident that its powers were secure, it would no longer try to buttress itself by seeking the support of the Conservative party; it would recognise that its duty as a legis- ✔ lative assembly is to act with the same impartiality that its legal members observe when discharging the functions of a supreme court of justice. For this amply sufficient reason Conservatives, if they wish to protect the country and at the same time to play fair to their opponents, ought at once to tackle the second chamber problem.

Their present hesitation to do so is difficult to explain. In spite of the grave dangers to the nation involved in our present single chamber system of government, many Conservative members of parliament still speak as if the Parliament Act were too sacred to be touched. So far as can be gathered this attitude is partly due to the fact that a large number of the younger Tories are Socialists at heart; partly to the fact that many of the older Tories are timid in temperament. The latter fact is probably the more important. For some strange reason the Conservative party seems to be dominated by the delusion that the way to win political victories is to run away from your own principles and humbly to follow the policy of your opponents. It is only on this theory that one can explain the extraordinary reluctance of the present Conservative majority in the House of Commons to deal at once, and drastically, with the scandal of the Parliament Act of 1911.

The first essential step is the repeal of that Act; the second is to make such changes in the constitution of the House of Lords as will render impossible the restoration of the Act by some future combination of party politicians. The Act was passed by invoking the authority of the Crown to terrorize the House of Lords with the threat of creating a mass of new peers. Whether the nation was wise ever to accept the curious constitutional doctrine that the Crown must act in obedience to the advice of a ministry which represents a temporary majority in the House of Commons is doubtful. But that issue need not here be considered. The important point for the moment is that a second

chamber, with an effective power to protect the country against casual and unscrupulous majorities in the House of Commons, is an urgent national need. The composition of that chamber is a matter of relative unimportance. In whatever way the second chamber is constituted, it should have power to veto any measure passed by the House of Commons, so as to enable the electors themselves to decide whether they wish-or do not wish— that measure to become law.

In

Admittedly there is a danger, as above pointed out, that the House of Lords, as at present constituted, might use its powers to veto Liberal or Labour measures, while allowing Tory measures to pass. It would thus be able to throw upon Liberal or Labour governments the expense and inconvenience of a general election, while leaving Conservatives in the placid enjoyment of power and of the fruits of office. To guard against this danger, there should be established the right of a direct appeal to the electors themselves on specific measures by means of a referendum. Switzerland, the most democratic of all countries, the referendum works admirably. There is no reason why it should not work equally well in Great Britain and, if it were established, all risk of unfairness by the Upper Chamber as between different political parties would disappear. In the case of a measure which had passed the House of Commons being rejected by the Lords, the majority of the House of Commons should have a right to demand a poll of the people to enable the electors to answer "yes" or no to the question: "Do you wish this Bill to become law?" In the case of the Lords permitting to pass a Bill strongly opposed by a large minority of the House of Commons, that minority, if it exceeded say 33 per cent. of the House, should equally be entitled to demand a referendum. With this safeguard for the country established, and its own position assured, the House of Lords would have no motive for favouring one party rather than another, and would probably soon win the allegiance of all parties.

As regards the composition of the House of Lords, the important point is that it should be essentially different from that of the House of Commons. We do not want two chambers, each elected by a popular vote. Barring its excessive size, the present House of Lords is probably a better second chamber than is to be found in any other country. It has the great merit of

embodying the principle of heredity. That principle is the foundation of the monarchy which has served our country well for many long centuries, with rare intervals of failure. To-day, the hereditary throne of Great Britain is the central pivot of the greatest empire the world has ever known. The Dominions feel little or no interest in the British House of Commons, or in the clash of contending parties in that assembly, but they have a deep respect for the sovereign and for the members of the royal family. The same consideration applies to the Crown colonies. In the case of India-as those who were fortunate enough to be present at the Delhi Durbar of 1911 were able to see the respect for the throne amounts to a deep religious reverence.* It may safely be said that to-day, in spite of or, perhaps, in consequence of-the progress of democracy, the hereditary throne is the most potent bond of unity throughout the whole British Empire.

For similar ultimate reasons the hereditary principle, as expressed in the present constitution of the House of Lords, commands far-reaching respect. The democracy prefers to pay respect to something outside itself. Indeed, one of the humours of our democratic constitution is that, in practice, the composition of the House of Commons is, to an appreciable extent, affected by the high value that is attached to hereditary titles. Both the older political parties have long been in the habit of replenishing their party funds by the sale of peerages. Apparently, without this utilization of the aristocratic mentality, it would be extremely difficult to work the democratic machine.

The House of Lords is also a great historical asset. It is probably the oldest legislative chamber in the world: it long preceded the House of Commons. The two-chamber system of the English legislature, like many other English institutions, seems to have come into being largely as the result of accident.

*More than twenty years earlier, I myself, then teaching at a college in India, came across a somewhat startling illustration of Indian loyalty to the throne of England. One of the students in my class had been reading in some English newspaper an article advocating the abolition of the monarchy. He came to me boiling with indignation. I assured him that it was only a wheeze of some ultra-Radical. He was partially comforted; but, as he went away, he turned and said: Well, sir, I can tell you this, that if those Radicals in England put the Queen off the throne we will raise an army in India and put her on again."

66

But, on the whole, through the long centuries that it has existed, it has worked well. It has been copied in principle by practically every country in the world. At only one brief period in our history was the second chamber abolished, and in the same period the throne was also abolished.

The story of the temporary abolition of the House of Lords at the time of the Commonwealth has been concisely told by Sir John Marriott, who usefully quotes the resolution of the Commons abolishing the House of Lords and the subsequent resolutions re-establishing that chamber :

"The Commons of England assembled in Parliament, finding by too long experience that the House of Lords is useless and dangerous to the people of England to be continued, have thought fit to ordain and enact... that from henceforth the House of Lords in Parliament shall be and is hereby wholly abolished and taken away.”—“ Act” of the Long Parliament, March 19, 1649.

"That your Highness will for the future be pleased to call Parliaments consisting of two Houses."-" Humble Petition and Advice," §2 (May 25, 1657.)

"That the Government is and ought to be by King, Lords and Commons."—" Resolution of Convention Parliament,” May 1, 1660.*

During the period that the House of Commons remained in possession of uncontrolled power, it exercised, in the words of Cromwell," the horridest arbitrariness that ever existed on earth.” Should we ever again pass under the complete authority of a single chamber that arbitrariness will certainly recur. The fact that the House of Commons, or any similar assembly, has been elected by a popular vote provides no guarantee that it will act fairly. What it will do is to obey the orders of the party leaders who have secured a majority for themselves, and they will be willing to play any political trick that they think will help them to retain that majority. On the other hand, the hereditary character of the House of Lords is itself, to a large extent, a guarantee that it will generally take a longer and a more patriotic view of current controversies than an elected assembly dependent on the popular cries of the moment. The growth of a nation depends on inherited habits of conduct and of thought; not on momentary fads and political wheezes. An understanding of the past is a necessary condition of present stability and of future progress.

"Second Chambers," by Sir J. A. R. Marriott. Clarendon Press,

1910.

And, in addition to the advantages that attach to inherited traditions, the House of Lords possesses the further advantage that it is constantly receiving as new recruits men who have won prominent positions in the modern world of commerce and industry. The fact that these new recruits generally have to pay for their footing by heavy subscriptions to party funds does not deprive them of the experience they have acquired in business, nor of the value of that experience to the House in which they sit. This constant replenishment of the House of Lords has been going on for longer than many people realise. Writing in 1854, the late Homersham Cox said :

The ancient baronial families contribute but a small part of the peers of the realm, and the large majority of the titles of that body are less than 150 years old; a very considerable part of them are of much more recent date. Of the peers who habitually legislate, by far the greater number consists of men who have sprung from the people who have, by vast energy, industry and talents, forced their way through the barriers of the House of Lords. .

There may be among them, as there necessarily will be in all wealthy classes, many who are merely fruges consumere nati, and who occupy their time in frivolous amusements. But this is not the characteristic of that nor of any other class of Englishmen: a zeal for work is common to them, from the duke to the peasant. The majority of peers work hard in the improvement of their lands, in local affairs, or in public business, and take their full share in the competition for national honours. Happily dolce far niente will not bear translation into English.*

He also remarks that " the debates of the peers, on great occasions, are distinguished by a vigour of thought and a precision of reasoning, which are by no means the invariable attributes of the Lower House."

That gives a fair picture of the House of Lords as it has been for many years, and as it is to-day. In the matter of the personal ability of its members, the House of Lords certainly to-day stands on a higher level than the House of Commons, and this relative superiority tends to be increased by the fact that successful members of the House of Commons frequently seek, and obtain, promotion to the Upper House. In practice the average peer has usually had a wider experience of life and is more accustomed to the discharge of responsible duties

"The British Commonwealth," by Homersham Cox; 1854.