life, and he who had perseveringly pursued the task of examining them, would probably find himself, at its completion, a hoary student without any opinion of his own; not merely doubtful upon one or two minor points, or even vacillating between many different systems, but utterly confounded and bewildered among them.

What clouds of sophistry have been raised about the doctrine of abstraction? How interminably have the reasonings about the original springs of every mental process been prolonged, and into how many unintelligible distinctions have the questions been split concerning the existence and the nature of moral and intellectual principles in the human mind? These, and many other similar speculations have been totally beaten into atoms by the dint of systematizing, and the obvious perceptions of sound reason have been obscured by the mist of contradictory surmises and tenebriferous illustrations, insomuch that a discreet person will now scarcely presume even to state what are the points to be considered, but rather avoid the subject altogether. Dr. Paley, indeed, attempted to join the several disputants at issue respecting the question of a moral instinct; and the wretched failure of that judicious reasoner should be a warning to us. He was told, that the opinions which he ascribed to his adversaries, "had been loudly and repeatedly disavowed" by a large portion of them, and that he had vainly essayed "to reduce to a single

alternative" a number of "subtle systems" and fictitious refinements, which were not more opposed to his substantial views than they were contradictory in themselves: in fact, he met, as he merited, the fate of a quack who ignorantly attempted the application of intelligible reasoning to a metaphysical discussion, while he should either have heartily joined the company of moral philosophers, comparing together all their mystical conceits, and puzzling his readers and himself, or adhered strictly to plain common sense, leaving the philosophers in undisturbed possession of their bauble. Neither of these he did; but unwisely touching (and he touched very tenderly) upon the

a In a late discourse from the pen of a universal genius, the noble author observes, that "in Dr. Paley's works not the least allusion is made to the argument here stated," (it is one of those arguments which are intended only for philosophers,)" although it is the foundation of the whole of natural theology. Not only does this author (Dr. Paley) leave entirely untouched the argument à priori, (as it is called,) and also all the inductive arguments derived from the phenomena of mind, but he does not even advert to the argument upon which the inference of design must of necessity rest, that design which is the whole subject of his book. Nothing can more evince his distaste or incapacity for metaphysical researches. As to the fundamental doctrine of causation, not the least allusion is made to it in any of his writings, even in his moral philosophy." For our part we have admired Paley chiefly for the tact and power which enabled him to avoid all metaphysical difficulties, not by evasion, but by preventing the possibility of their occurrence. Whether this arose from incapacity or design, seems of no importance. But we feel that in his incapacity, if to such we must refer the perfection of reasoning, he was peculiarly felicitous, and that he is more to be envied for that fault, than other justly celebrated men for their perfections.

metaphysical part of his subject, which was extraneous and unnecessary to the establishment of his system, he gave occasion to an outery against a work, which, with all its faults, is, by far the most useful, elegant, and perspicuous treatise upon morality to which we can direct the practical student.

Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Hutchinson, who had at an earlier period embraced a different view of the subject, might, indeed, have set the question at rest, but that the former seems to have seldom penetrated beyond superficial views, even when by chance he had struck in upon a happy vein; and the latter could not sufficiently resist the common infatuation of a theorist, to refine and formalize his discoveries at the expense of their utility and substance-to spin out plain and practical reflections into worthless, speculative trifles and thus, from the most simple thoughts, to fabricate a subtle system, a peуа какov, of intricacies and abstractions, though at the risk of being himself entangled and lost in the labyrinth of his own making. Hence the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which was by many of his cotemporaries believed to appertain to sensible objects, was forced headlong into his theory of moral actions,a ad captandum volgi, which may here be rendered, to attract the attention of the rabble of moral philosophers; and hence also the senseless algebra, by which he divides and multiplies his desires and appetites, extracts the square root of a virtue, or trisects a vice; preposterous affectations of science which must

for ever attach a ludicrous colouring to his writings.* This pedantry of philosophizing has greatly perplexed the clearness of his luminous views, and the foolish minutiae of his dry and dull distinctions quite bewilder and disgust the general reader. Yet his book contained so much of really valuable matter, that the moral sciences have, since its publication, assumed an aspect entirely new. The old foundations of truth, right reason, the fitness of things, &c. as maintained by Woolaston, Dr. Cudworth, and others, were for a while exploded, and the sentiment of beauty, the charms of virtue and honour, with a long train of internal feelings and perceptions, supplied their place. These new springs of action were varied, and diversified, and compounded, and pursued into so many divarications by different authors, that no human wit could comprehend, or any memory retain the complex multiplicity of systems which the mania for sentimental theories occasioned. The former principles were afterwards revived, and the subject became still more and more embroiled up to the present day, when, if we ask an accurate inquirer to which of those innumerable systems he most inclines, he will generally reply, that he agrees not fully with any of them-that many are quite unintelligible—many of them perfectly absurd-all of them difficult to digest-and that, distracted among the variety of contradictory hypotheses, he has not yet found leisure to frame one for himself.

We are, therefore, venturing upon a very delicate

* Hutchinson's Inquiry, treatise 2, sec. 3.

topic; but, it is absolutely necessary by way of introduction to the principal subjects of these tracts, not indeed to add another to the numerous theories already extant upon the subject, but simply to make some observations upon the foundation of morality in human nature; and we entreat the reader candidly and favourably to receive them. From no contempt of authorities will we omit the minutest examination of a hundred systems, but from a thorough conviction that by such a method of proceeding we would only trifle with the reader's patience and our own. It cannot be the genuine but a depraved species of curiosity, which seeks to be acquainted with all the false and contradictory opinions that ever have prevailed. To know these, and be able to render unto every man his particular error, and his peculiar doubt, may be learning, but certainly it is not wisdom. We will, therefore, omit the disastrous catalogue; and thus subtracting nine parts from the quantity of our matter, it is hoped the remaining tenth will be the more intelligible.

Without pretending, therefore, to determine what may be the exact difference between right and fit, between expedient and conformable to reason and truth; between a sentiment and a tendency; a sense, an instinct and instinctive notions; between innate perceptions and principles of conscience, &c.; all of which phrases, so far from meaning the same thing, (as Dr. Paley has of most of them inconsiderately affirmed,) seem rather, according to Mr. Stewart's opinion above quoted, to mean any thing, every thing, and nothing, I shall proceed to consider the subject